

# U.S. PRESENCE AND RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT

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## THE U.S. PRESENCE IN 2011

This quarter, civilians under the authority of Ambassador James Jeffrey, the U.S. Chief of Mission (COM) in Iraq, and troops under the command of General Lloyd Austin III, the commander of U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I), continued to make progress in transitioning toward a civilian-led U.S. presence in Iraq. Meanwhile, in Washington, much discussion focused on the capacity of the Department of State (DoS) to assume the lead from the Department of Defense (DoD) in light of the December 31, 2011, deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. forces and on the extent and impact of the Congress's proposed cuts to the DoS budget.

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad's reconstruction assistance activities are guided by the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), which outlines the U.S.-Iraqi relationship in key areas, including political and diplomatic cooperation, defense, culture, economics, energy, health, the environment, communications, and the rule of law.<sup>161</sup>

Significant work remains to secure the life support, security, transportation, and other Embassy requirements currently provided by USF-I.<sup>162</sup> DoS does not currently have the administrative and oversight capacity in Iraq to manage large-scale support requirements after transition and will, therefore, require continued DoD support through the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) through at least June 2012.<sup>163</sup> According to testimony from the Under Secretary of State for Management, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad's post-transition capacity is further threatened by potentially "devastating" budget cuts that could result in mission failure in Iraq.<sup>164</sup>

USF-I operates under the legal framework of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, which sets limits on the types of activities U.S. forces can perform, removes immunity from Iraqi law for U.S. contractors, and stipulates that U.S. forces must leave the country by December 31, 2011.<sup>165</sup> However, the



Secretary of Defense Gates talks with soldiers assigned to 2nd Battalion, 1st Advise and Assist Brigade, during a visit to Camp Victory in Baghdad, Iraq, on April 7, 2011. Gates took questions and held an open discussion on issues facing deployed soldiers. (DoD photo)

withdrawal deadline applies only to so-called "Title X" forces—those forces serving a military role under military command.<sup>166</sup> The more broadly focused SFA stipulates that, "in order to strengthen security and stability in Iraq, and thereby contribute to international peace and stability," the United States and Iraq "shall continue to foster close cooperation concerning defense and security arrangements," pursuant to withdrawal requirements under the Security Agreement.<sup>167</sup> According to USF-I, this means that whereas the August 31, 2010, deadline to end combat operations represented a change under Title X, the December 31, 2011, withdrawal deadline will represent a change from a Title X military mission to a Title XXII security assistance mission.<sup>168</sup>

As of March 31, 2011, there were 45,601 U.S. troops in Iraq, down slightly from 47,320 last quarter and down more than 70% from the height of the U.S. "surge" in October 2007.<sup>169</sup> This quarter, approximately 20,000 U.S. troops were involved in training and mentoring programs for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). DoD anticipates comparable force strength until the December 31, 2011, withdrawal deadline.<sup>170</sup> After December 31, 2011, approximately 200 "DoD or government personnel" (and 800 contractors) will help provide security assistance,<sup>171</sup>

Significant work remains to secure the life support, security, transportation, and other Embassy requirements currently provided by USF-I.

Secretary Gates acknowledged that there was Iraqi interest in U.S. troops remaining past the December 31, 2011, withdrawal deadline, but that political concerns required any initiative to that effect to come from the Iraqi government.<sup>173</sup>

and “a couple of dozen” U.S. Marines under COM authority will help protect the Embassy.<sup>172</sup>

In early April 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates met with U.S. troops and civilians in Iraq, as well as Iraqi leaders—including Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, Deputy Prime Minister Salih al-Mutlaq, President Jalal Talabani, and the Kurdistan Regional Government President Masoud Barzani. During a visit to Camp Liberty, in Baghdad, Secretary Gates acknowledged that there was Iraqi interest in U.S. troops remaining past the December 31, 2011, withdrawal deadline, but that political concerns required any initiative to that effect to come from the Iraqi government.<sup>173</sup>

## Strategic Management of the Transition

On February 14, 2011, Secretary of State Clinton announced the appointment of Ambassador Patricia M. Haslach as Iraq Transition Coordinator. This new Washington-based position reports to the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources and is responsible for coordinating DoS aspects of the U.S. transition from military to civilian operations in Iraq. Ambassador Haslach previously served as the Assistant Chief of Mission for Assistance Transition in Iraq.<sup>174</sup>

In Iraq, the transition is being managed by U.S. Embassy-Baghdad’s current Assistant Chief of Mission for Transition Assistance, Ambassador Peter Bodde. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Iraq, the Iraq Strategic Partnership Office (ISPO), and the Economic Affairs Section all report through him to the COM.<sup>175</sup> On February 22, 2011, Ambassador Bodde was appointed the Coordinator on Minority Issues. In that capacity, he heads U.S. Embassy-Baghdad’s outreach to local minority communities on issues of mutual concern, while continuing his transition-related role.<sup>176</sup>

Two other Embassy sections will be critical to the DoS-led reconstruction effort after December 31, 2011, as indicated by their share of requested foreign

assistance: International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), which will implement the Police Development Program (PDP), and Political-Military Affairs, which will oversee the new Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I).<sup>177</sup> Both of these Embassy sections report through Deputy Chief of Mission Stuart Jones.<sup>178</sup>

## U.S. Embassy-Baghdad: Building Capacity To Sustain the Assistance Program

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad is the largest U.S. diplomatic mission in the world, with approximately 8,000 personnel currently under COM authority.<sup>179</sup> This number is expected to increase dramatically as U.S. forces withdraw ahead of the December 31, 2011, deadline, but estimates of the extent vary. In October 2010, the DoS Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported plans for approximately 13,000 personnel and contractors to serve under COM authority at the main Embassy complex, the four enduring provincial posts, and as many as 10 additional support and logistical sites across the country.<sup>180</sup> In March 2011, it was estimated that approximately 17,000 would serve under COM authority.<sup>181</sup>

Currently, security concerns largely restrict Embassy employees and contractors to the 22-building Embassy complex in Baghdad. According to the DoS OIG, the dangers of operating in Baghdad “make setting up meetings with Iraqi officials complicated, and reaching out to ordinary Iraqi citizens all but impossible.”<sup>182</sup> Similarly, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)—which are scheduled to draw down through September 2011—move outside their compounds only under heavy security.<sup>183</sup>

Security risks are expected to increase as U.S. troops withdraw, requiring additional private security contractors (PSCs) and support personnel. Consequently, only a tiny fraction of personnel under COM authority outside Baghdad will substantively address mission priorities. According to DoS OIG, the ratio of substantive to support staff

in Iraq will range from 1:15 to 1:60, depending on how “support staff” is defined. In contrast, the ratio of substantive to support staff under COM authority in Beijing, Cairo, and New Delhi is approximately 4:3.<sup>184</sup>

## ISPO/USACE

This quarter, the Iraq Strategic Partnership Office (ISPO) continued its regular project monitoring, dialogue, and assistance efforts with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).

ISPO oversees a subset of the projects implemented by USACE—specifically, those projects funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and Economic Support Fund (ESF). In addition to IRRF- and ESF-funded projects, USACE implements projects funded by the three other major funds: the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF), the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), and the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, as well as sizeable projects supported by other U.S. and Iraqi funding streams not discussed here.<sup>185</sup>

This quarter, USACE completed 58 projects, valued at \$159.5 million. Among the completed projects were 28 overseen by ISPO, valued at \$67.6 million. As of March 31, 2011, USACE was implementing 85 ongoing projects, valued at \$365.1 million. Among the ongoing projects were 34 overseen by ISPO, valued at \$149.3 million.<sup>186</sup> For details on completed and ongoing projects, by agency and province, see Figure 3.1.

This quarter, SIGIR issued two audit reports on USACE’s management of its downsizing in Iraq. For complete details, see Section 5 of this Report.

## Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq



On October 1, 2011, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad plans to transition responsibility for U.S. assistance to

Iraq’s Ministry of Defense from the U.S. military to the OSC-I, which will function as an Embassy section under COM authority. CENTCOM will retain operational control of OSC-I personnel.<sup>187</sup>



According to Ambassador Jeffrey, OSC-I will be charged with advising, training, and equipping Iraqi forces; supporting professional military education; and planning joint military exercises. These tasks entail administration of U.S. foreign assistance provided to the Iraqi military through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account (should it be provided in Iraq) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) account. In addition to foreign assistance, OSC-I will facilitate other forms of bilateral military

FIGURE 3.1  
STATUS OF ISPO/USACE PROJECTS, AS OF 3/31/2011  
\$ Millions

### Completed, 1/1/2011–3/31/2011



### Ongoing, as of 3/31/2011



Notes: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. Includes only those projects funded by the five major funds: IRRF, ISFF, ESF, CERP, and INCLE.

Sources: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, ISPO, response to SIGIR data call, 4/1/2011; USACE, TAD, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2011.

engagement, most notably the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.<sup>188</sup>

### Continuity of Effort

After December 31, 2011, some U.S. military forces will remain in Iraq to provide security assistance—albeit under COM control rather than the military chain-of-command—and it appears there will be considerable continuity in staffing. U.S. security assistance is currently provided by USF-I under the authority of the Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training (DCG-A&T). On October 1, 2011, he is slated to become the director of OSC-I. Likewise, the current head of USF-I's FMS unit will continue as the OSC-I director's deputy. This pattern will extend throughout the organization, with additional subject matter experts and staff transitioning from the existing organization to OSC-I.<sup>189</sup>

According to USF-I, DoD plans to designate the director of OSC-I as the senior defense official (SDO) in Iraq on January 1, 2012. The SDO is the COM's principal military advisor on defense and national security issues, the senior diplomatically accredited DoD officer assigned to the U.S. mission, and the single point of contact for all DoD matters involving U.S. Embassy-Baghdad or DoD elements assigned to or working from the Embassy. The SDO will also exercise coordinating authority over DoD elements under COM authority.<sup>190</sup>

Many activities will also remain the same. For example, DoD components will be largely responsible for fulfilling 374 ongoing FMS cases, valued at \$8.59 billion.<sup>191</sup> For more details on the current FMS program in Iraq, see the Security subsection of this Report.

### Organization and Staffing

OSC-I will feature a division of labor between a DoS Political-Military Affairs Section and a DoD security cooperation office, which is standard practice at U.S. embassies around the world.<sup>192</sup> Currently, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad is planning for a full-time, substantive OSC-I staff of 157: 118 military, 9 U.S. government civilians, and 30 locally

employed staff. This core staff will be responsible for overall management of the security assistance and security cooperation program.<sup>193</sup> As of March 31, 2011, it was not clear how many personnel and contractors will be required to support the OSC-I core staff; USF-I estimates approximately 3,000, but the number continues to be refined.<sup>194</sup>

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad plans to supplement the core OSC-I staff and support contractors with Security Assistance Teams (SATs), which will comprise mostly civilian contractors with some support from U.S. military officers or DoD civilians. SATs will be deployed to Iraq on temporary assignments to provide advice, training, technical assistance, and support as required by the terms of specific FMS cases. At the beginning of 2012, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad anticipates approximately 750 SAT members in Iraq.<sup>195</sup> According to USF-I, FMS case requirements will determine the SAT footprint.<sup>196</sup> According to the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, up to 200 DoD personnel and 800 DoD contractors will eventually be stationed across Iraq to support various FMS cases.<sup>197</sup>

While in the field administering FMS cases, OSC-I's DoD components will operate in a potentially dangerous security environment that may limit U.S. Embassy-Baghdad's day-to-day oversight. Given the inevitable problems of separating responsibility for program resources and management responsibility for program execution, OSC-I's structure creates significant risk of waste and mismanagement.<sup>198</sup>

### Locations of Operation

Current plans call for OSC-I to operate out of five dedicated sites, located on or near existing Iraqi military installations:<sup>199</sup>

- **Baghdad**—the current location of DCG-A&T at Forward Operating Base Union III
- **Tikrit**—home of the Iraqi Air Academy
- **Umm Qasr**—main port of the Iraqi Navy
- **Taji**—site of the Iraqi National Logistics Center and headquarters of the Iraqi Army
- **Besmaya**—site of the Iraqi Army Training Center

OSC-I's structure creates significant risk of waste and mismanagement.



The Iraqi National Logistics Center at Taji serves as the ISF's central logistics and supply center. (U.S. Army photo)

OSC-I may also operate at U.S. Embassy locations on the grounds of existing Joint Security Stations Shield and Sather, as well as in Kirkuk, Erbil, and Basrah. Finally, FMS case implementation may require OSC-I personnel, particularly SATs, to operate at additional locations.<sup>200</sup> According to the USF-I Deputy Commanding General for Support, every proposed OSC-I site is an existing USF-I base. Consequently, the “authorities exist already,” but plans “are continuing to mature.”<sup>201</sup>

## Funding

Funding for OSC-I has not yet been secured. DoD requested \$252 million for construction, but received \$129 million in the FY 2011 appropriation. In response, USF-I and U.S. Embassy-Baghdad “shifted plans” to maintain more of the sites’ existing footprints. According to their analysis, shrinking or otherwise adjusting footprints can increase costs if it requires “re-reconstruction” of key infrastructure—such as wastewater treatment facilities—that might fall outside the new footprint. In addition, instead of requesting all necessary funding in a single budget request, USF-I and U.S. Embassy-Baghdad divided construction into two phases: the first focuses on adjusting footprints; the second will focus on higher-level force protection, such as overhead cover.<sup>202</sup>

Operating costs are still more uncertain. SATs’ direct costs related to implementation of specific FMS cases will be included as budgeted items in parent FMS cases, but the indirect cost of life support and security—which are “anticipated to

be significant”—will have to be funded through other means, such as U.S. appropriations.<sup>203</sup> Other activities—such as administration of assistance provided through FMF and IMET and any support provided to INL at OSC-I sites—might also require support from U.S. appropriations. Options include supporting OSC-I through the DoS Diplomatic and Consular Programs account or through a special DoD fund, for which DoD might later be reimbursed by DoS. The Administration has requested \$524 million in the FY 2012 DoD Overseas Contingency Operations budget to support OSC-I activities, which is currently being considered by the Congress.<sup>204</sup>

## Police Development Program

On October 1, 2011, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad plans to transition responsibility for U.S. assistance to Iraq’s Ministry of Interior from the U.S. military to INL, which will provide the bulk of assistance through its flagship program—the PDP. According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, the PDP will have achieved initial operating capability by July 1, 2011, to start an effective transition from the current DoD police training mission.<sup>205</sup>

INL intends to focus the PDP on developing MOI leadership and managerial capacity to build institutional stability for future development and to achieve primary police responsibility for internal security throughout Iraq. According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, the PDP is primarily an advise-and-mentor mission and, as such, is intended to build on and supplement the MOI’s “highly developed” training system. With DoD support, the MOI had assumed control for all basic- and advanced-training responsibilities at its police training academies and police colleges, where it employs a standardized training curriculum. The limited training that will be available under the PDP will focus on instructor development—to sustain prior advances made in police training capacity—and on providing specialized training as requested by the MOI.<sup>206</sup>

INL intends to focus the PDP on developing MOI leadership and managerial capacity.

## Organization and Staffing

Current plans call for the PDP to have a contingent of 190 advisors. INL reported that it intends to use the authority of 5 U.S.C. Section 3161 for temporary hires, although it may be necessary to contract for a small number of personnel for highly specialized subject-matter expertise. Approximately 50 advisors will provide management and supervision for the program, leaving 140 to focus on the PDP's substantive mission.<sup>207</sup> Additional planned support elements include: security professionals (contractors and government employees) to provide movement, technical, and static security; aviation contractors; and life-support contractors.<sup>208</sup> In total, the substantive-to-support ratio for the PDP, as planned, will be 1:9.<sup>209</sup>

The PDP advise-and-mentor mission will operate year-round with senior-level police officials at the MOI and at national, regional, and provincial policing institutions. INL advisors will provide advice and mentoring in such areas as logistics, finance, strategic planning, operations, human resources, and communications and information technology.<sup>210</sup>

Instructor development will be provided by a small contingent of INL advisors at the Baghdad, Erbil, and Basrah Police Colleges. Highly specialized training will be conducted by temporary duty instructors, many of whom will be from partner federal law enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; the U.S. Marshals Service; and the Drug Enforcement Agency.<sup>211</sup>

## Locations of Operation

According to Ambassador Jeffrey, the PDP will reach approximately 55% of Iraq's approximately 300,000 police who, in turn, provide local security for approximately 65% of Iraq's population.<sup>212</sup> PDP advisors, operating from three "hubs" will visit 28 proposed sites, 21 by ground and 7 by air:<sup>213</sup>

- **Baghdad hub**—15 sites (11 by ground; 4 by air)
- **Erbil hub**—9 sites (6 by ground; 3 by air)
- **Basrah hub**—4 sites (all by ground)

Advise-and-mentor sites are subject to change based on consultations with GOI, security concerns, and other circumstances.<sup>214</sup>

INL expects to require three medium-lift helicopters and nine light-lift helicopters to support the PDP. Additionally, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad security and medical air-lift capability may be used if required. INL also plans to utilize U.S. Embassy-Baghdad's fixed-wing air support for domestic travel in Iraq and international travel through Jordan and Kuwait.<sup>215</sup>

According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, security for the PDP will be provided by the DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), which has determined how many protective security details would be needed—including Quick Reaction Force elements—based on PDP travel and advising requirements. Support will come from DS teams already in-country as well as from additional DS teams yet to deploy.<sup>216</sup>

## Funding and Cost-Sharing

Funding for the PDP has not yet been secured. To support the PDP and programs in Justice Corrections and Counternarcotics, DoS requested \$315 million in FY 2011 appropriations and \$1.00 billion in FY 2012 appropriations to the INCLE in Iraq.<sup>217</sup> Of the \$315 million FY 2011 request, \$200 million was forward-funded through the FY 2010 supplemental appropriation.<sup>218</sup> INL will provide INCLE funding for all costs associated with security and life support for the PDP.<sup>219</sup>

According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, DoS and the Embassy are working closely with the GOI to determine cost-sharing arrangements. Negotiations are ongoing concerning contributions for PDP personnel support (salaries and transportation), equipment and fuel for policing operations, and no-cost leases of land and facilities.<sup>220</sup>

According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, DoS and the Embassy are working closely with the GOI to determine cost-sharing.

## Transitioning U.S. Embassy-Baghdad's Provincial Presence

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad is currently drawing down its PRTs across Iraq. As the PRTs close, the Embassy intends to transfer some of their reconstruction-related functions to the planned consulates and Embassy Branch Offices (EBOs).

### Ongoing Mission and Organization

Since their introduction in Iraq in late 2005, the PRTs have worked to build provincial government capacity, mitigate conflicts between sectarian groups, and facilitate small-scale reconstruction projects endorsed by local populations. According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, current PRT priorities include:<sup>221</sup>

- serving as an “honest broker” to mediate and manage ethnic tensions and avoid sectarian breakdown
- helping Iraqis strengthen the capacity of government institutions and civil society to protect the rule of law, confront corruption, and deliver basic services
- countering malign influences
- encouraging foreign investment and economic diversification
- promoting stability and partnering with newly elected governments
- assisting internally displaced persons
- serving as a platform for the United Nations and other international organizations

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad's Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) connects policy-makers in Washington and Baghdad to the PRTs. The office is intended to ensure that information from the field, including reporting cables and weekly reports, effectively reaches policymakers in Washington and Baghdad and that the policy they devise is communicated to and implemented by the PRTs. Within OPA, Desk Officers are organized geographically and serve as the primary Embassy contact for each PRT; Lines of Operation Coordinators oversee rule-of-law,

governance, economic, and other issues for PRTs across the country.<sup>222</sup>

The PRTs are staffed by U.S. government civilian, military, temporary-hire (3161), and local-national (Iraqi) personnel.<sup>223</sup>

### Transfer of PRT-related Tasks to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad Sections

Last quarter, in a “task binning” exercise, OPA catalogued 117 tasks performed by its staff members that would need to be transferred to other U.S. Embassy-Baghdad sections to support the proposed consulates and EBOs after OPA closes.<sup>224</sup> As of March 31, 2011, 13 of those tasks—all related to human resources (HR)—had been transitioned.<sup>225</sup> For details, see Table 3.1.

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad could not provide details on what tasks remained to be transferred because their number and composition are “continuously evolving” as OPA and counterparts in other Embassy sections review the tasks' relevancy; tasks may be refined or phased out as events in Iraq develop and future operational budget information becomes available. Consequently, forecasts of the number and composition of support tasks that other Embassy sections will ultimately assume from OPA is only an approximation.<sup>226</sup>

According to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, OPA is still functioning at full capacity and continues to perform most of the tasks it was originally assigned. In June, OPA will start migrating remaining tasks to other Embassy sections. The transition of each task is linked to the departure of a particular OPA staff member. When necessary, OPA will transition tasks ahead of staff departures, allowing for overlap time.<sup>227</sup>

### PRT “Footprint” and Planned Drawdown

As of March 31, 2011, the PRT “footprint” comprised 17 sites across Iraq, including 14 PRTs and 3 Forward Presence locations.<sup>228</sup> The PRTs were staffed by 623 personnel: 140 U.S. civilians, 132 military, and 351 contractors.<sup>229</sup>

In June, OPA will start migrating remaining tasks to other Embassy sections.

TABLE 3.1

TRANSITION OF TASKS FROM THE OFFICE OF PROVINCIAL AFFAIRS TO OTHER U.S. EMBASSY-BAGHDAD SECTIONS

FUNCTION	ASSOCIATED TASKS	RECIPIENT SECTION
<b>Staff the Organization with Government Employees</b>	Recruit, select, assign, and provide limited HR support for Foreign Service officers	Human Resources
	Recruit, select, assign, and provide limited HR support for 3161s	Human Resources
	Recruit, select, assign, and provide limited HR support for locally employed staff	Embassy Office & Human Resources
	Provide Staff Reports to NEA-I for each consulate/EBO	Human Resources
<b>Process and Facilitate New Personnel Arrivals</b>	Track arrival dates	Human Resources
	Country clearance approval	Human Resources
	Assist in check-in process	Human Resources
	Update personnel listings	Human Resources
<b>Process and Facilitate New Personnel Departures</b>	Update personnel listings	Human Resources
<b>Maintain and Transmit Key Personnel Documents</b>	Maintain staff contact lists and email distribution lists	Human Resources-Information Management Office
	Update head count personnel reports	Human Resources
	Review and submit PRT personnel awards and certificates	Human Resources
	Facilitate USG personnel visa applications	Human Resources

Source: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 4/1/2011.

The PRT closures represent a significant loss of provincial presence.

Between May and September 2011, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad plans to close 10 PRTs. The other four will be transitioned to “enduring” provincial presences, as discussed below.<sup>230</sup> For the location of remaining PRTs and their planned drawdown schedule, see Figure 3.2. Coupled with withdrawal of tens of thousands of U.S. troops and DoD contractors by December 31, 2011, the PRT closures represent a significant loss of provincial presence and the political outreach, development assistance, and situational awareness that their presence facilitates.<sup>231</sup>

**Consulates and Embassy Branch Offices**

DoS plans to establish consulates in Basrah and Erbil and EBOs in Mosul and Kirkuk.<sup>232</sup> Together, they will comprise U.S. Embassy-Baghdad’s provincial presence and host approximately 3,600 DoS personnel, contractors, and support personnel.<sup>233</sup> Along with U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, they will enable DoS and other civilian agencies to conduct “robust engagement” with the Iraqi population, “enhancing connections between the political, economic, and social fabric of the country.”<sup>234</sup>


The consulates in Basrah and Erbil are intended to be permanent installations and, together with U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, will serve three of the four largest cities in Iraq. The consulates will focus primarily on diplomacy and consular services, but DoS will also operate aviation facilities in Baghdad, Basrah, and Erbil necessary to support the INL-managed PDP.<sup>235</sup> The consulate in Basrah will have the added benefit of proximity to Iraq’s southern oil fields and the many U.S. companies operating there.

The EBOs are intended to be temporary installations, with expected mission spans of three to five years. The EBOs’ first priority, as established by DoS, is to mitigate and mediate Arab-Kurd, Sunni-Shia, and provincial-national tensions primarily along the Arab-Kurd “fault line” in northern Iraq. The DoS OIG has questioned these expectations based on the centuries-old nature of the conflicts, the local population’s unfavorable or ambivalent views of the United States (estimated at 95% in recent polling), the EBOs’ short expected mission spans, and staffing levels driven by budget constraints.<sup>236</sup> For details on the proposed locations of the consulates and embassy branch offices, see Figure 3.2. ♦


# U.S. PRESENCE AND RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT

FIGURE 3.2  
TRANSITION OF U.S. EMBASSY-BAGHDAD'S PROVINCIAL PRESENCE

PRT Locations, with Security Incidents per 10,000 people (1/1/2010–12/31/2010), by Host Province



PRT Closeout Timeline, with Security Incidents per 10,000 people (1/1/2010–12/31/2010), by Host Province



Deadlines for PRT Closeout Events



Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding.

Sources: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, "Revised PRT Closure Schedule" and "PRT Closeout Timeline," response to SIGIR data call, 3/8/2011; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, OPA, response to SIGIR data call, 4/1/2011.

## CONTRACTING

U.S.-funded contractors and grantees provide a wide range of services, including static security for bases and diplomatic facilities, movement security for convoys and personnel, laundry and food service, equipment maintenance, translation, and construction.<sup>237</sup>

As the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC) recently stated, reduced government staffing following the Cold War and increased government responsibility following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, “opened a breach into which contractors have stepped.” The commission concluded that time-critical decision making in this context resulted in the use of contractors becoming the “default option,” without sufficient consideration of whether their use was the best means to meet mission objectives or whether agencies had the capacity to provide adequate contract management and oversight.<sup>238</sup>

For an overview of the advantages and disadvantages of contracting in overseas contingency operations, see Table 3.2.

Time-critical decision making in this context resulted in the use of contractors becoming the “default option.”

### DoS Management of Contracts and Grants

In Iraq, insufficient government capacity to plan and execute programs—especially in DoS and other civilian agencies—has long constrained the reconstruction effort. According to Secretary Clinton, “both State and USAID have historically been unable to hire enough in-house experts and had to rely too much on contractors.” In addition, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has raised concerns about insufficient staffing, long vacancies in key positions, and lack of expertise in foreign languages among U.S. government personnel.<sup>239</sup>

SIGIR audits have identified numerous weaknesses in U.S. agency management of contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements. Over the years, SIGIR audits have found that U.S. agencies:

- employed insufficient numbers of trained contract and grants officers to provide necessary performance and financial oversight
- rotated oversight officials often, resulting in loss of institutional knowledge of contracts

TABLE 3.2  
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF USING CONTRACTORS IN OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contractors can be hired and fired more quickly than government personnel, allowing greater adaptability to changing conditions and potentially saving money.</li> <li>• Contractors can serve as a force multiplier for the military, freeing uniformed personnel for combat missions.</li> <li>• Contractors can provide capabilities and skills (such as security provision) not possessed by adequate numbers of civilian personnel.</li> <li>• Contractors (especially local-nationals) can provide unique skills, such as knowledge of terrain, culture, and language.</li> <li>• Contracting can provide jobs and training opportunities for local-nationals.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contractor incentives prioritize profit and contractual considerations, not mission success.</li> <li>• Abuses committed by contractors working for U.S. agencies can strengthen anti-American insurgents.</li> <li>• Lax contract oversight has contributed to contractor abuses, including waste, fraud, and abuse.</li> <li>• Relying on contractors undermines the development of “organic” capabilities and the retention of institutional expertise and memory within government agencies.</li> </ul>

Sources: CWC, “At What Risk? Correcting Over-reliance on Contractors in Contingency Operations,” 2/24/2011, pp. 7, 13–15; Moshe Schwartz, “The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress,” CRS Report R40835, 2/21/2011, pp. 5, 13–16.

- wrote contracts and grants without clear and measurable objectives
- did not maintain comprehensive files to document contracting decisions
- did not detect questionable costs charged to the U.S. government
- did not provide the level of oversight required by sound management practices or internal policy manuals

Often these deficiencies left U.S. funds vulnerable to fraud, waste and abuse.

## Police Training

Weaknesses in DoS contract management for police training were detailed in a January 2010 SIGIR audit report. SIGIR found that INL lacked sufficient resources and controls to adequately manage DynCorp task orders. As a result, more than \$2.5 billion in U.S. funds were vulnerable to waste and fraud. To illustrate, the In-country Contracting Officer's Representatives, who were critical in overseeing DynCorp's performance and expenditures under the current task order, did not perform adequate reviews and tests to ensure that:<sup>240</sup>

- the costs submitted by DynCorp were allowable under the contract/task order, supported by appropriate documentation, and correct
- U.S. government property managed by DynCorp was adequately controlled
- lease agreements negotiated on behalf of the U.S. government protected the U.S. government's interests
- the government received the services at the performance standards specified in the task order

As DoS takes responsibility for the police training program from DoD in 2011 and DoS continues to oversee contracts costing the U.S. taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars, it will be critical for DoS to have in place effective management and controls to ensure that U.S. funds are effectively and efficiently spent.<sup>241</sup>

## Private Security Contractors

According to the CWC, contracting out security functions introduces especially high risks.<sup>242</sup> This problem may grow more acute as DoD personnel—especially the troops who provide security and the personnel who manage and oversee contracts—depart Iraq, and DoS increasingly relies on its own resources. Already, uncertainty and disagreement regarding what constitutes “inherently governmental activities”—those which should not be contracted out—is becoming more pronounced with regard to PSCs. In question are activities such as counter-battery fire, hostage rescue, and improvised explosive device (IED) clearance.<sup>243</sup>

The CWC observes that the general trend toward contracting out security reflects human-resource constraints. Statutory limits on force strength require DoD to choose between using military or contractor personnel for force protection, while DoS and USAID often have no choice but to rely on the U.S. military or contractors. According to the CWC analysis, PSCs are usually used not because they are more effective or efficient than government security personnel, but rather because using in-house capability would require a significant, long-term increase in government manpower or redirecting military personnel from other priorities.<sup>244</sup>

In this context, DoS shortcomings in contract management may create the risk of PSC abuses. Although no formal analysis has been done, the Congressional Research Service notes that many high-profile contractor abuses in Iraq were committed by PSCs working for DoS (not DoD), including the alleged shooting of Iraqi civilians by Triple Canopy personnel and the shooting of 17 Iraqi civilians in Nisoor Square by Blackwater personnel. Some analysts believe that these events undermined the U.S. mission and, if PSCs are not held accountable, undermine the legitimacy of the United States and the Iraqi government.<sup>245</sup>

Despite these risks, DoS and U.S. Embassy-Baghdad face serious capability and resource constraints as they address the challenge of securing Embassy personnel engaged in mission-critical activities.

DoS and U.S. Embassy-Baghdad face serious capability and resource constraints as they address the challenge of securing Embassy personnel engaged in mission-critical activities.

TABLE 3.3  
**CONTRACTING ACTIONS AND GRANTS**  
 \$ Millions

FUND	CURRENT STATUS			CHANGE OVER QUARTER		
	COUNT	OBLIGATED	EXPENDED	COUNT	OBLIGATED	EXPENDED
ISFF	18,353	\$17,753.0	\$16,989.1	229 (1%)	\$106.9 (1%)	\$408.2 (2%)
IRRF	8,489	\$14,418.6	\$14,290.1	5 (0%)	\$11.1 (0%)	\$19.3 (0%)
ESF	7,692	\$3,623.0	\$3,266.6	311 (4%)	\$81.5 (2%)	\$146.6 (5%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>34,534</b>	<b>\$35,794.6</b>	<b>\$34,545.8</b>	<b>545 (2%)</b>	<b>\$199.5 (1%)</b>	<b>\$574.0 (2%)</b>

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. Tables represent only those contracting actions that were reported by the agencies; they do not reflect all obligations or expenditures made in Iraq.

Sources: CEFMS, ESF, IRRF: Construction, IRRF: Non-construction, ISFF, 1/10/2011 and 4/1/2011; USAID, responses to SIGIR data calls, 1/22/2010, 1/11/2011, and 4/16/2011.

According to the Under Secretary of State for Management, “it makes no sense” for DoS to increase the number of diplomatic security personnel worldwide “from 1,800 to 1,800 plus 7,000” to meet temporary security requirements in Iraq. Furthermore, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad will have approximately 200 direct-hire DoS security officers overseeing PSCs (a ratio of 1:35), which the Under Secretary for Management says “is very, very good.”<sup>246</sup>

### Tracking Contractors

In a congressional hearing on March 2, 2011, a member of Congress questioned DoS’s post-transition contractor projections, citing a GAO finding that DoS, DoD, and USAID have been unable to determine the exact number of contractors employed in Iraq.<sup>247</sup> In response, the Under Secretary of State for Management testified that he believed he knew “exactly how many contract employees” DoS had “on any given day in Iraq.” Furthermore, he testified that DoS had analyzed major functions required for U.S. Embassy-Baghdad’s new responsibilities—including aviation, medical, and security—and that a table of organization was created detailing how many contractors were required. He also testified that DoS contractors were entered into the Synchronized Predeployment Operational Tracker (SPOT), a contractor database administered by DoD.<sup>248</sup>

As the transition date nears, however, it appears that DoS’s ability to track contractor data may

be decreasing. For the past two quarters, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad has reported to SIGIR that the DoS Office of the Under Secretary for Management does not keep data on what activities its contractors provide in Iraq, nor could it provide a projection of its contractor requirements over the next year.<sup>249</sup> However, DoS previously provided such data (albeit sometimes inconsistent) to SIGIR through the quarter ending September 30, 2010.<sup>250</sup> USAID was able to provide a limited breakdown of its contractors this quarter, and DoD was able to provide limited data as of December 31, 2010.<sup>251</sup>

SIGIR thus far has been unable to publish aggregated data from SPOT, because the data has been designated “For Official Use Only.”

### Contracting Actions and Grants

As of March 31, 2011, DoD, DoS, and USAID had reported 34,534 Iraq-related contracting actions or grants from ISFF, IRRF, and ESF, totaling \$35.79 billion in cumulative obligations.<sup>252</sup> This quarter, DoD, DoS, and USAID reported 545 new contracting actions or grants from these funds, resulting in \$199.5 million in new obligations and \$574.0 million in new expenditures.<sup>253</sup>

For an overview of the status and quarterly change of contracting actions and grants, see Table 3.3. For a complete list of contracting actions and grants, as reported to SIGIR, visit: [www.sigir.mil](http://www.sigir.mil).♦

It appears that DoS’s ability to track contractor data may be decreasing.


## FOCUS ON ANBAR

### Background

Stretching from Baghdad’s western suburbs to the borders of Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, Anbar province—Iraq’s largest geographically—encompasses 32% of the country’s land area, but contains only about 5% of its population. Almost three-quarters of Anbar’s estimated 1.6 million residents live in the province’s two most populous districts, Ramadi and Falluja, both of which lie within easy driving distance of Baghdad. Mostly desert and sparsely inhabited, Anbar has the lowest population density of any province in Iraq, with about 10 persons per square mile.<sup>254</sup>

Anbar’s predominantly Sunni Arab population is almost evenly divided between those living in urban (52%) and rural (48%) settings, with almost all of the urban residents living in a series of towns and cities stretching northwest from Falluja along the fertile Euphrates River valley to al-Qaim.<sup>255</sup> To the south and southwest of this settled corridor lies Anbar province’s largest district, al-Rutba, whose arid deserts dominate the landscape all the way to Iraq’s borders with Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Of the complex mosaic of tribes, clans, and families that have dominated Anbar’s politics and economy for centuries, the Dulaimi tribal confederation is the most prominent. Historically, the Dulaimis used their strategic position astride the trade routes between Baghdad and points west to extort payment from travelers, traders, and pilgrims alike. In World War I, much of the Dulaimi confederacy initially supported the Ottomans, later switching sides when British forces turned the tide against the Turks in 1917. In later years, the Dulaimis, in general, supported the Ba’athists, receiving a measure of autonomy and



patronage. However, they too often fell victim to Ba’athist depredations, making their support for the government tenuous and conditional. Initially quiescent after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, many of the Dulaimis soon became supporters of the insurgency—at least for a time.<sup>256</sup>

### Post-invasion Developments

#### A Deteriorating Situation, 2003–2006

Although Anbar was not the scene of any major engagements during the three-week campaign in 2003 to depose the Ba’athist government, the province quickly became a center of insurgent activity. When the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the Iraqi Army in May 2003, untold thousands of Anbari men were summarily put out of a job, losing both a source of income and personal status. Moreover, Anbar—which means granary or storehouse in Arabic and is derived from the Persian word for arsenal—was the site of at least




GOI civilian and military officials meet to discuss recent events in Anbar province. (PRT photo)

96 ammunition and weapon storage sites and much of Iraq’s domestic arms industry.<sup>257</sup> With relatively few Coalition personnel policing the vast province in 2003, and fewer still guarding its lengthy border with Syria, many of these sites were looted by insurgents, making Anbar’s pacification that much more challenging. Largely unscathed by the battles of March–April 2003, many of the estimated 40,000 Ba’athist security and intelligence officials who resided in Anbar soon became active in the burgeoning insurgency.<sup>258</sup>

As the insurgency grew in numbers, strength, and audacity, Falluja became one of the centers of resistance to the U.S.-led

FIGURE 3.3  
ANBAR: SECURITY TIMELINE, 2003–2009




Note: This timeline highlights selected major events between 2003 and 2009. It is not intended to be a comprehensive account of events in Anbar during that time period.

Source: SIGIR analysis of GOI and U.S. government documents and open-source information in Arabic and English.

Coalition. On March 31, 2004, four U.S. contractors working for Blackwater USA were ambushed and butchered by insurgent forces in Falluja—their bodies subsequently desecrated and paraded through the streets. In response to these well-publicized murders, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) ordered U.S. Marines to storm Falluja. But on April 9—four days after the assault began and before the city had been secured—MNF-I ordered the Marines to halt the attack under pressure from leading Iraqi politicians and the Arab media. Over the ensuing months, U.S. Marines cordoned off Falluja before storming and taking the city in November 2004.<sup>259</sup>

While Falluja saw much of the heaviest fighting in 2004, MNF-I also conducted operations throughout Anbar province between 2003 and 2006, including campaigns in Ramadi, al-Qaim, and Haditha, and along the upper stretches of the Euphrates River valley.<sup>260</sup> Figure 3.3 displays

FIGURE 3.4  
MONTHLY SECURITY INCIDENTS IN ANBAR, 1/2004–12/2010



Source: USF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2011.

some of the most significant events affecting Anbar's security between 2003 and 2009, and Figure 3.4 shows the number of monthly security incidents in the province from January 2004 to December 2010.

**Anbar Awakening, Sons of Iraq, and U.S. "Surge" (2006–2008)**

In the initial stages of the insurgency, many of the Sunni tribal sheiks

allied—sometimes actively, other times tacitly—with foreign fighters and former regime members to resist the Coalition and the new, Shia-dominated Government of Iraq (GOI), whom they perceived as undercutting their traditional authority. But as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) began increasingly brutal tactics, several leading sheiks built ad hoc alliances with Coalition units to oppose AQI in

a movement that became known as the Anbar Awakening, or the *Sahwa*.<sup>261</sup>

The first stirrings of the Awakening came in 2005 when a few sheiks switched sides to fight AQI. Defection begat defection throughout the next year, culminating on September 14, 2006, in a public statement issued by a convention of Anbari sheiks that they would join with MNF-I to combat the insurgency.<sup>262</sup> According to Awakening leader Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha, whose brother was one of the Awakening’s leaders until he was killed in September 2007, Anbar’s tribes provided approximately 40,000 recruits for the security forces (28,000 for the police and 12,000 for the army).<sup>263</sup> In an April meeting with SIGIR, Sheikh Abu Risha emphasized that the *Sahwa* was not a U.S. program, but rather an indigenous movement created to fight AQI’s extremism.<sup>264</sup>

Coalition forces were quick to capitalize on the Awakening movement, beginning in 2007 to subsidize and otherwise support Anbar sheiks who had chosen to ally with the Coalition.<sup>265</sup> As part of this strategic shift toward empowering local leaders willing to fight AQI, MNF-I commanders in June 2007 began using Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to hire former insurgents to guard checkpoints and neighborhoods throughout Anbar province as part of the broader Sons of Iraq (SOI) program.<sup>266</sup> Although the empirical effects of the SOI program on security in Anbar are difficult to quantify, a SIGIR audit issued in January 2011 suggests that, in at least some cities and towns, they may have been positive. Figure 3.5 summarizes some of the audit’s findings as they pertain to Anbar province.


The pivotal year of 2007 also saw the beginning of the U.S. troop surge. Announced by President Bush in January of that year, this five-brigade, Baghdad-focused reinforcement effort also included extending the tours of duty for about 4,000 U.S. Marines stationed in Anbar.<sup>267</sup> The cumulative effects of

FIGURE 3.5

**SONS OF IRAQ IN ANBAR PROVINCE**

Beginning in October 2008, the Government of Iraq (GOI) progressively assumed full management responsibility for the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program from Coalition forces, taking control of more than 4,000 Anbari personnel on February 1, 2009. Under the terms of an agreement with the Multi-National Force-Iraq, the GOI promised to provide government employment for all 95,120 SOI members. A SIGIR audit released last quarter, however, reported that meeting this goal has been challenging. As of December 2010, 41% of all SOI personnel had been transferred to GOI jobs—but none from Anbar province. Anbar SOI members also receive lower salaries than SOI from other provinces. According to USF-I, the GOI pays Anbar SOI members \$130 per month, which is less than the \$240–300 per month that most other SOI members receive.

Breakdown of SOI Personnel



**Note:** USF-I states that a number of Anbar SOI members transitioned to the ISF when the U.S. military administered the program. Five of the nine provinces with SOI have seen no transitions since the GOI took over the program.

**Sources:** SIGIR Audit 11-010, “Sons of Iraq Program: Results Are Uncertain and Financial Controls Were Weak,” 1/28/2011; USF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 4/14/2011.



Anbar official speaks at the “Hope of Anbar” conference in 2007 in Ramadi. (DoD photo)



Anbar sheiks and Iraqi policemen dance during the “Hope of Anbar” conference. (DoD photo)

this multifaceted U.S. and Iraqi approach were immediate and apparent:

- The number of new police recruits in Ramadi tripled in June 2006 and again in July.<sup>268</sup>
- Attacks in Anbar decreased from a high of 1,350 in October 2006 to about 200 in August 2007.<sup>269</sup>
- Insurgents carried out a daily average of 32 attacks in Anbar and neighboring Salah Al-Din provinces between mid-February and early May 2007; the average declined to 11 daily attacks between early December 2007 and late February 2008.<sup>270</sup>

As Figure 3.6 makes clear, the combined effects of the Awakening and “the surge” devastated the insurgency in Anbar province. In the words of one U.S. soldier, AQI had “overplayed [its] hand”—and lost.<sup>271</sup>

The cost of this apparent victory in U.S. lives, however, has been profound. Since


2003, at least 1,335 U.S. troops have been killed in action in Anbar province.<sup>272</sup>

**Fragile Stability, 2008–2011**

With the security situation dramatically improving, 2008 became a year of transition. In February, U.S. Marines turned over security responsibility for the once-violent town of Heet to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). As the summer wore on, ISF units increasingly took the lead in conducting joint security operations. The transition culminated on September 1, when Anbar (after a brief delay) became the eleventh province transferred to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC), a process that placed Iraqi forces in charge of security in the province.<sup>273</sup>

As the violence diminished, Anbaris said they would be more willing to turn to local police when victimized by a crime, rather than relying on family members. Figure 3.7 shows how trust in both the Awakening members and local police

FIGURE 3.6  
AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ, 2006 VS. 2008



Source: MNF-I, Charts to accompany the testimony of General David H. Petraeus, before the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, "On the Situation in Iraq and Progress Made by the Government of Iraq in Meeting Benchmarks and Achieving Reconciliation," 4/8/2008, slide 8.




Anbari tribesman.

units grew between 2008 and 2009. According to Sheik Abu Risha, in recent years Iraqi courts have convicted and sentenced to death about 160 terrorists for committing capital crimes in Anbar.<sup>274</sup>

**Security in 2011**

Today, while security in Anbar has improved, GOI civilian and military officials are regularly targeted by insurgents, as are leading sheiks and members of the Awakening movement. For example, on April 12, terrorists detonated a bomb that partially destroyed the house of an Awakening member in Baghdad's western suburbs, wounding several of his family members. Despite these difficulties, Sheik

FIGURE 3.7  
WHO ANBARIS REPORT THEY WOULD TURN TO IF THREATENED OR VICTIMIZED BY CRIME, 2008 VS. 2009



Note: Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) were tribal militia groups roughly analogous to Awakening units.

Source: Audra K. Grant and Martin C. Libicki, *Assessing Living Conditions in Iraq's Anbar Province in 2009*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010, p. 8, [www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical\\_reports/2010/RAND\\_TR836.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2010/RAND_TR836.pdf), accessed 4/4/2011.

Abu Risha declared that his *Sahwa* "will never turn to al-Qaeda," but warned that this "does not mean we will sit still when we are being threatened."<sup>275</sup> Figure 3.8 provides details of some of the violent incidents that took place in Anbar province between January 1 and April 11, 2011.<sup>276</sup>

In addition, the deputy chairman of the Provincial Council noted that terrorists are being released from prison because, in some cases, U.S. troops who arrested them did not prepare sufficient paperwork to obtain convictions in Iraqi courts. As a result, some terrorists are

roaming freely, he said, and “the security situation is deteriorating rapidly.” He also observed that the army and police seemed to be the national government’s priorities, not the intelligence agencies, remarking that a more effective Iraqi intelligence apparatus could better counter foreign influences. He pointedly stated, “We have neighboring countries with intelligence agents working in Iraq trying to make the American democracy experiment here fail.”<sup>277</sup>


The uncertain security situation has taken a toll on many residents. One provincial government official noted, “Right now we are completely confused. We call the occupier our friend. My friend who sits beside me—I don’t know if he will blow himself up.” Another added, “We now have cell phones, we have money, most of us here have houses and jobs. But we lack security. We send our children to school and don’t know if they will come back. We ride in nice cars but we don’t know if someone will plant a sticky bomb on them.”<sup>278</sup>

In a series of April 2011 meetings, Anbari officials and citizens expressed to SIGIR an almost unanimous desire for continued U.S. military support to help maintain security in Iraq after the scheduled withdrawal of U.S. forces in December. Moreover, they reported that they seek expanded interaction with American businesses and diplomats.<sup>279</sup>

### Restructuring Anbar’s Police Officer Corps

When the U.S. military raced to train sufficient ISF in Anbar to stem the tide of the insurgency, they were unable to identify enough qualified officers willing to fill high-level positions in the police force. Necessity drove them to convey “honorary” rank to about 800 personnel who were, by default, performing the roles of more senior officers. Unfortunately, that resulted in “brigadier generals who can’t even read,” said newly appointed Police Chief Brigadier General Hadi. The

FIGURE 3.8  
SELECTED SECURITY INCIDENTS IN ANBAR, 1/1/2011–4/11/2011



Source: SIGIR analysis of GOI and U.S. government documents and open-source information in Arabic and English.



Protesters burning down Falluja government center during February 2011 demonstration. (PRT photo)



U.S. Marine general and Governor Maamoun signing PIC documents. (DoD photo)

Ministry of Interior (MOI) is now stripping those who hold these positions of their inflated rank, resulting in the loss of about half of the provincial police’s senior officer corps (newly demoted policemen can still remain *shurta*, or rank-and-file police, at lower pay). Chief Hadi told SIGIR that he hopes to make up the balance by allowing Saddam-era officers from the rank of second lieutenant to major to return to the force once they pass vetting procedures being run by the Justice and Accountability Commission.<sup>280</sup>

Unhappiness with these terms could be a source of unrest in an already fragile security environment. The Deputy

Chairman of the Provincial Council, Sadoun al-Jumayli, noted that, “because these officers know it is a fake rank, they are now stealing as much as they can, causing corruption to increase. They are also derelict in their duties because they do not have the right experience to hold these high ranks.”<sup>281</sup> The MOI inspector general (IG) is aware of these issues and remarked that, given Anbar’s overwhelmingly Sunni population, replacement officers will likely be Sunnis. The MOI IG added that any attempt to use the righting of this problem to purge Sunnis from the police force will be closely monitored by his office.<sup>282</sup>



ISF forces cordon off recent protest in Falluja. (Radio Falluja photo)

## Governance

### Provincial Governments

Because Anbar’s population is almost exclusively Sunni Arab, its elections have been free of the sectarian strife that has defined political competition in more diverse provinces, such as Diyala, Tameem, and Baghdad. However, most Sunni Arabs boycotted Iraq’s first provincial elections in 2005, with only about 4,000 Anbar voters casting ballots. This changed dramatically in the next round of provincial elections, conducted in January 2009. Then, more than 300,000 Anbaris voted, and seven parties won at least two seats. The party headed by Awakening leader Sheik Abu Risha led the way, garnering eight seats and winning a plurality on the 27-seat council. Figure 3.9 compares the results of the 2005 and 2009 provincial elections.<sup>283</sup>

Since the end of Ba’athist rule, Anbar has had five provincial governors, all of whom have operated in the shadow of credible threats against their lives and the lives of their families. The first governor resigned in July 2004 after the kidnapping of four of his children. He was replaced by an interim governor until the newly elected Provincial Council appointed Raja Nawaf Farhan al-Mahalawi as governor in January 2005. Five months later, al-Mahalawi

was kidnapped and killed by insurgent forces. His replacement, Maamoun Sami Rashid al-Awani, survived more than two dozen assassination attempts and completed his term. He was replaced by Qasim Mohamad Abid Hammadi al-Fahadawi after the January 2009 provincial elections. Governor Qasim, in turn, has survived at least four attempts on his life, including a massive bombing in December 2009 that severely injured him and another car bombing in January 2011 that wounded several members of his staff.<sup>284</sup>


### Representation in Baghdad

In Baghdad, Anbar is currently represented by 14 members on the Council of Representatives: 11 from former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya bloc, 2 from the Iraqi Accord bloc, and 1 from the Iraqi Unity Alliance.<sup>285</sup> Sheik Abu Risha stated that the province’s overwhelming support for the Shia former Prime Minister demonstrates that Anbar’s Sunnis are willing to support Shia candidates “as long as they are Iraqis who love the country.”<sup>286</sup>

### Protests: An Incentive For Improved Governance

This quarter, large demonstrations in Ramadi and Falluja demanded Governor Qasim’s resignation. In response to the protesters’ demands for better public

FIGURE 3.9  
ANBAR PROVINCIAL ELECTION RESULTS



Note: The IIP, which controlled the Provincial Council after the 2005 provincial election, allied with several smaller parties to form the Coalition of Intellectuals and Tribes to contest the 2009 elections. The number of seats on all Provincial Councils was adjusted in the run-up to the 2009 vote, with Anbar losing 12 seats.

Sources: UNAMI, “Elections Results,” Issue No. 30, 2/2009; GOI, IHEC, SIGIR translation, [www.ihec.iq/arabic](http://www.ihec.iq/arabic), accessed 2/22/2009.

services, more jobs, and less corruption, Anbar’s government has formed several committees comprising concerned citizens to work with provincial officials to oversee contracting efforts and provide greater transparency.<sup>287</sup>

In recent meetings with SIGIR, Anbari officials were quick to point out that the demonstrations sweeping the Middle East and North Africa are generally driven by people throwing off decades of oppression. “We don’t have that oppression here in Anbar. We have democracy—elections every four years, where the people get to elect their leaders. What they are protesting here is the shortage of essential services,” recounted Governor Qasim.<sup>288</sup>

### Ramadi: A City Largely in Ruins

The provincial capital of Ramadi was the scene of several years of heavy fighting between Coalition and insurgent forces. Dilapidated, rubble-strewn, half-heartedly repaired, and largely abandoned, it remains one of the most devastated cities in contemporary Iraq. The markets are shuttered, and graffiti and debris line the major roadways. Investors—both Iraqi and foreign—have largely avoided



Area surrounding government buildings in Ramadi.

Ramadi, and police officials told SIGIR that until investment improves the lives of Ramadi's residents, the recent security gains will remain tenuous.<sup>289</sup>

### Governor Qasim and Sheik Abu Risha on Anbar's Future

Two prominent political leaders in Anbar have expressed a strong desire for some form of continued U.S. military presence in Iraq beyond 2011, emphasizing the need to support the still-immature ISF and guard against regional powers interfering in Iraq's domestic affairs:

- **Governor Qasim.** "Iraq is not able to secure its borders, not able to secure its cities. I am personally trying, talking to government officials in Baghdad. We have no choice; we should say the facts. If we lose security, we lose everything. I hope the Americans will not leave at the end of your time. All we are talking about will be lost."<sup>290</sup>
- **Sheik Abu Risha.** "If you stay, no one will ask you to leave. If you leave, we want you to continue to protect us. So continue your presence in one way or another."<sup>291</sup>

### Budgeting for the Future

There is near-universal agreement among Anbar officials that anticipated growth in the 2011 provincial budget will help maintain stability once U.S. troops depart at year's end. Governor Qasim's adversaries on the Provincial Council are maintaining relationships with him, as they must cooperate to get this money. The 2011 budget will be dramatically larger for three reasons:<sup>292</sup>



Governor Qasim and Deputy Governor Fu'ad meet with SIGIR officials.

- The Iraq Budget Law of 2011—shepherded through the CoR by the new Minister of Finance Rafi al-Eissawi, a native of Falluja—gives Anbar 100% of customs charges levied in the province, as opposed to the 2010 Budget Law that allowed for the retention of just 5% of such fees.
- Unspent provincial funds from 2008 and 2009 will be rolled over to 2011.
- About \$650 million that was not spent on electricity projects in Anbar will be included in the 2011 budget.

According to one Provincial Council member, the priority for 2011 will be improving essential services, whereas the priorities in 2009 and 2010 budgets were finishing old projects. "Everyone thinks this money is coming; there are huge expectations," said one Anbar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) official. "The governor has promised 12 hours of power for residential customers by July 1," as opposed to the 5 hours per day they currently receive. The provincial government is also planning to build major water treatment plants in Ramadi, Heet, and Haditha.

### Economic Development

#### Natural Advantages

Despite its arid landscape and small population, Anbar possesses distinct advantages that could allow it to reap significant economic benefits from the improved security environment and investment climate. Encompassing most of Iraq's major western trade routes, Anbar is



Sheik Ahmad Abu Risha meets with SIGIR Deputy Inspector General.

well positioned to benefit from increased economic ties with the bordering countries of Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Anbar is also home to many of the once-lush tourist complexes surrounding Lake Habbaniyah and Lake Tharthar, whose proximity to Baghdad made them a popular destination for Iraqis in more peaceful times. Indicative of its former prominence, Habbaniyah Tourist Village won the 1986 Gold Cup for best tourist city from the World Tourism Organization.<sup>293</sup> Currently, the Anbar Investment Commission (AIC) is considering a variety of plans to refurbish the hotels, parks, and recreational facilities serving eastern Anbar's major lakes.<sup>294</sup>

Anbar's natural resources also provide a potential foundation for prosperity. The province contains significant deposits of industrially useful minerals, such as gypsum, dolomite, phosphate, and silica.<sup>295</sup> The particular type of silica found in Anbar is especially useful in making high-quality glass products.<sup>296</sup>

Anbar also may contain extensive, as-yet-untapped oil and gas fields.<sup>297</sup> Largely unexplored, no accurate comprehensive estimates exist as to the amount of oil and gas lying beneath Anbar's deserts. With significant fields easily accessible in the Kurdish north and the Shia south, Iraq's Sunni west has been neglected by the central government and international firms. To remedy this, the Ministry of Oil has announced that it intends to include additional sites in Anbar province in an auction of exploration blocks, scheduled to be held later this year. This auction would open up unexplored regions of Iraq



Anbar PRT officials visit an outdoor market. (PRT photo)

to international oil companies to search for new oil and natural gas deposits. One such gas deposit is the Akkas non-associated natural gas field. Located near the Syrian border, Akkas is estimated to hold about 5.6 trillion cubic feet of gas. In October 2010, a consortium led by Korea Gas Corporation and Kazakhstan's national KazMunaiGas National Company won the right to develop Anbar's Akkas gas field. However, Anbar officials, led by Governor Qasim, immediately protested the potential deal on the grounds that Baghdad may prefer to export the gas extracted from Akkas to the lucrative European market instead of using those reserves to meet Anbar's energy needs.

In late February, it appeared that initial objections to the deal had been overcome and that the consortium would soon sign a final contract with the GOI. But on February 24, Ministry of Oil officials announced that the signing was postponed indefinitely because Anbar officials wanted greater control over how the revenue would be spent, as well as promises of additional jobs for Anbaris.<sup>298</sup>

### Anbar Investment Commission's Plans

Created in November 2008 to encourage domestic and foreign investment in the province, the AIC has issued licenses for 40 projects, including 13 in the housing sector, 9 in the industrial sector, 7 tourism projects, 6 projects in the commercial sector, and 5 in other sectors. Of these, the AIC reports that only 13 have begun. Examples of projects that have started include:<sup>299</sup>

- amusement parks in Ramadi, Falluja, and Heet



Anbar Economic Growth Council website (<http://www.egc-anbar.com/>).

- three residential housing complexes and a hotel in Ramadi
- factories for making plastics and animal feed
- a new medical complex in Ramadi

In the coming years, the AIC plans to emphasize agricultural redevelopment projects, while continuing to encourage investment in the tourism and housing sectors. Anbari officials and businessmen also emphasized the need for more banks to open outposts in the province, noting that the lack of access to financial institutions contributes greatly to Anbar's under development.<sup>300</sup>

The Anbar provincial government also recently formed the Anbar Economic Growth Council to encourage investment.<sup>301</sup> This body is intended to provide foreign investors with an easily accessible source for information on business opportunities in the province.

### Minimal Foreign Investment

Deterred by the unsettled security situation, foreign companies have been reluctant to invest in Anbar province. According to one study, projects based in Anbar accounted for less than 1% of all foreign money invested in Iraq between 2003 and 2009.<sup>302</sup> But improved security appears to be luring some foreign investors to Anbar. This quarter, a delegation

of companies from the People's Republic of China visited Anbar to discuss investment opportunities, focusing on potentially refurbishing the large, but archaic, cement production facilities at al-Qaim in the province's far northwest.<sup>303</sup>

### State-owned Enterprises: A Case Study

As of December 2010, 5 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were operating in Anbar province—most at suboptimal levels, relying on old equipment and inefficient management techniques. One example is the Anbar Ceramics Factory. Located in Ramadi, this factory produces wall tiles, floor tiles, and fixtures for health care facilities. Before 2003, the factory employed 700 people and three assembly lines. In 2005, after two years of irregular operations, it closed because of concerns about the security situation.

In 2007, the factory re-opened after the embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT) and the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) installed Italian-made ceramics machines and provided \$930,000 worth of training to its employees. As of December 2010, the factory employed 640 personnel, operated at 30% capacity, and concentrated on producing toilets and sinks using the Italian equipment. The Ministry of Industry and Minerals



Iraqi men prepare fruit trays for a bridge-opening ceremony in Anbar province. (DoD photo)

does not provide support to the factory, however, and factory managers informed SIGIR officials that they will need assistance from private investors to improve plant performance.<sup>304</sup>

### Agriculture

About 25% of Anbaris with jobs are employed in the agricultural sector, working on farms that grow the province's main crops: wheat, potatoes, barley, and vegetables. But severe droughts in 2009 and 2010 adversely affected production, and yields for 2011 remain uncertain. Anbar averages about 115 millimeters (mm) of annual rainfall. This places it on a par with Las Vegas—which gets approximately 114 mm per year—and well below the average annual rainfall in Baghdad (155 mm) and Basrah (149 mm), making its agricultural sector especially vulnerable.<sup>305</sup> As Iraq's upstream neighbors continue to construct dams on waterways crucial to irrigating Anbar's fields, the province's farms may face increasing difficulties in coming years.

### Electricity

Power shortages remain a severe problem in the province. According to a 2009 RAND study, all of the 1,200 Anbar households surveyed experienced either daily power cutoffs or stated that their electricity is off more than it is on.<sup>306</sup>

According to the Ministry of Electricity (MOE), the supply-demand situation in Anbar is on par with the national average. Estimated demand for electricity in the province averages 474 megawatts



U.S. soldier patrols agricultural region in eastern Anbar province. (DoD photo)

(MW), but the load served is just more than half that amount—255 MW.<sup>307</sup> In a December meeting with SIGIR, Anbar's Director General for Electricity Distribution, a representative of the MOE, stated that the province requires 900 MW to meet demand, but receives only about 120 MW. He also stated that Anbar's electricity infrastructure receives inadequate funding from both the national and provincial governments, citing an 80% shortfall in needed funds. According to the Director General, the province requires approximately 400 more transformers. Anbar PRT officials stated to SIGIR that they had provided 186 transformers to the Anbar provincial government along with transmission lines for two substations. PRT officials further stated that the central government had provided only 7 transformers, as of December 2010.<sup>308</sup>

As part of its plan to expand generating capacity throughout the country over the next five years, the MOE intends to locate one of the GE "Mega Deal" power plants, with a capacity of 250 MW, in Anbar. Three other plants, at various stages of consideration or planning, could add 120 MW to 1,250 MW more during this period, depending on if and when they are built.<sup>309</sup>

### Corruption

In the first nine months of 2010, the Commission of Integrity's (COI) Anbar field office obtained arrest warrants against 125 GOI officials on charges of corruption, serving 52 of them and detaining 26 suspects. But prosecuting these cases to their conclusion remains



Anbari widow receives donated food and toys. (PRT photo)

as difficult in Anbar as it does in the rest of Iraq. The COI was only able to obtain three corruption convictions against Anbari officials during the first nine months of 2010.<sup>310</sup>

### Living Conditions

#### Unemployment

The UN estimates Anbar's unemployment rate at about 14%, somewhat lower than its estimated national average of 18% and significantly lower than USAID's national estimate of 28%–38%.<sup>311</sup> According to the UN, however, more than 50% of all jobs in the province are "unwaged," with two-thirds of such positions found in the agricultural sector.<sup>312</sup>

#### Health Care

Anbar suffers from a shortage of medical professionals and health care facilities. As of late 2010, the AIC reported that 11 hospitals and 13 main health care centers were operating in the province. These facilities were staffed by approximately 550 doctors, 850 nurses, and 160 pharmacists.<sup>313</sup> Anbar's ratio of approximately 1 doctor for every 2,700 citizens places it on par with Nicaragua and Burma, near the bottom of all developing nations.<sup>314</sup>

Notwithstanding its dearth of medical personnel, Anbar slightly exceeds Iraq's national average in other health care indicators, as measured by the UN's Millennium Development Goals. For example, Anbar's under-five mortality rate per 1,000 live births is somewhat lower than the national average (30.0 versus 41.1), while

the percentage of one-year-old children immunized against measles is slightly higher (85% versus 81%). More than 25% of the province’s children, however, are considered “chronically malnourished.”<sup>315</sup>

**Education**

Anbar is home to two public universities, one private college, and more than 1,500 other educational institutions. Together they employ about 35,000 staff to serve approximately 650,000 students.<sup>316</sup>

**Internally Displaced Persons**

More than 50,000 residents of Falluja and Ramadi fled their homes in the aftermath of the February 2006 Samarra mosque bombing. As the security situation has improved, many internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned home only to find inadequate services to support their families. Ramadi, for example, hosts a large number of returned IDPs in temporary settlements rife with poverty and shortages. Of those returning IDPs polled by the UN, 97% cited food as their primary need, 81% required shelter, and 75% were in need of a job.<sup>317</sup>

**U.S. Reconstruction Initiatives**

Since 2003, the U.S. government has spent more than \$2 billion on reconstruction programs and projects in Anbar province, including funding a *Financial Times*-affiliated magazine supplement naming Governor Qasim as a “Global Personality of the Year.”<sup>318</sup> On a per capita basis, the United States has spent more money in Anbar than in any of Iraq’s 17 other provinces—about \$1,355 per resident. Figure 3.10 shows U.S. expenditures in Anbar province, by project category and fund.


**U.S. Army Corps of Engineers**

Examples of recently completed projects by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) include:<sup>319</sup>

FIGURE 3.10

**U.S.-FUNDED INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IN ANBAR PROVINCE, BY CATEGORY AND FUND**

% of \$2,033.82 Million



Note: Numbers affected by rounding.

Source: IRMS, *Global Benchmark*, 9/3/2010.

- a \$21.9 million Iraq Security Forces Fund project to construct an ISF command facility at Habbaniyah, former site of a World War II-era British aerodrome—completed in September 2010
- a \$5 million Economic Support Fund (ESF) project to renovate buildings associated with a hospital complex in Haditha—completed in April 2010

Ongoing projects being managed by USACE include building 64 kilometers of border roads, enhancing the facilities at a Saddam-era airbase in western Anbar, and constructing a vehicle maintenance warehouse in Ramadi. These projects are scheduled to be completed by the end of the year.<sup>320</sup>

**Iraq Strategic Partnership Office’s Ongoing Projects**

This quarter, DoS’s Iraq Strategic Partnership Office (ISPO) reported on three ongoing projects in Anbar province:<sup>321</sup>

- **Hussaiba 33/11-kV substation.** This \$2.4 million ESF project is currently in its final stages.
- **Ramadi 132-kV substation.** This \$29.2 million IRRF project is undergoing final tests before being

commissioned and transferred to the MOE.

- **Al Anbar University accreditation program.** The objective of this \$2.5 million ESF program is to attain American Board of Engineering and Technology accreditation for the university. If successful, it would be the first Iraqi school so accredited. The first phase of this project is complete, and the second phase is expected to commence later this year.

**USAID Activities in Anbar Province**

To date, USAID’s *Tijara* program has facilitated 13,034 microfinance loans in Anbar province for a total of \$27.7 million and helped disburse 133 small- and medium-enterprise (SME) loans through the Bank of Baghdad and North Bank for a total of \$3.41 million. The majority of SME loans funded businesses in the trade and agricultural sectors.<sup>322</sup>

USAID’s *Inma* agricultural-development program has several ongoing initiatives in Anbar province, including projects aimed at increasing the capacities of:<sup>323</sup>

- livestock feedlots
- forage sites
- fruit and vegetable packing facilities
- orchards and vineyards

- potato, mushroom, and strawberry fields

In addition to these programs, *Inma* also provides training to Anbari farmers at its nine Field-Based Learning Centers and supports industry roundtables that bring farmers together with vendors, wholesalers, and marketers.<sup>324</sup>

USAID was also active in other sectors, supporting the 2009 provincial elections and the 2010 national elections, providing employment opportunities for Anbari youth, and working with local civil-society organizations. Moreover, as part of the overall U.S. counterinsurgency effort, USAID’s Community Stabilization Program (CSP) began operating in Anbar in November 2006, concluding operations there in March 2009. During that period, the program issued 940 grants totaling \$6.1 million. Some of the most notable CSP projects included the establishment of educational training centers and the Ramadi Public Library.<sup>325</sup>

**Anbar Provincial Reconstruction Team**

Established in 2006, the Anbar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is scheduled to cease operations in September 2011. As of March 1, PRT Anbar had 32 projects left to complete, including projects in the water, transportation, education, and sewage treatment sectors. Tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 summarize the completed and ongoing work of the Anbar PRT.<sup>326</sup>

The Anbar PRT has the most seamless coordination between civilian and military components of any visited by SIGIR in the past four years. For example, CERP funds here are executed and managed by the PRT in coordination with seven PRT staff provided by the military. Moreover, some team members have spent 3–5 years in the same location. There are also several U.S. military and civilian personnel embedded with provincial government officials at their offices. According to PRT officials, all

TABLE 3.5  
ANBAR PRT ACTIVITIES

Objective 1: Build the capacity of Anbar’s provincial government.		
SECTORS	COMPLETED	IN EXECUTION PHASE
Water supply, treatment, and distribution	183	14
Sanitary wastewater treatment	1	4
Sewers	10	8
Transportation	2	2
Electricity	13	5
Safety and security	1	2
Education	0	1
Objective 2: Support GOI activities to sustain essential services.		
SECTORS	COMPLETED	IN EXECUTION PHASE
Initiatives in Water, Sewer, Power & Transportation	N/A	N/A
Economic development, governance, agriculture & rule of law	183	7
Education	0	1
Objective 3: Mentor and advise GOI officials to promote long-term essential services solutions for all Anbaris.		
<b>Activities include:</b> Conducting planning and strategy meetings with all technical directorates and mentoring both provincial and national government staff members.		

recent CERP projects and nearly all Quick Response Fund projects receive about 50% of their financing from Iraqi sources. In addition, these projects have Iraqi support from the start since they originate with local communities, non-governmental organizations, or provincial government officials.

**Anbari Perceptions of U.S. Reconstruction Effort**

Notwithstanding this substantial expenditure of U.S. funds, many Anbaris lament that these projects have not led to tangible improvements in their lives—often contrasting the United States unfavorably with Iraq’s former colonial masters, the British. However, most Anbari officials expressed gratitude to SIGIR for the U.S. expenditure in blood and treasure, noting that U.S.-created institutions of democratic governance democracy appear to have taken root in Anbar, with popular discontent increasingly channeled through non-violent channels.<sup>327</sup>

In a recent meeting with SIGIR officials, Governor Qasim compared the U.S. rebuilding program with projects built by the British during the first half of the twentieth century, declaring “What have the Americans built in Anbar? The British left a legacy in 1958—the Americans will not leave a physical legacy in Anbar.”<sup>328</sup> The Governor cited a railway, bridge, and the University of Baghdad as major British contributions that have left a lasting legacy in Iraq. By comparison, the Ramadi library is the most visible U.S. project in Anbar.<sup>329</sup> PRT officials later noted that the United States intentionally did not brand its projects because of security concerns and a desire to build support for the provincial government among the local populace.<sup>330</sup> Consequently, U.S. officials point out, many local residents may be unaware of the size and scope of the U.S. commitment to Anbar since 2003.

The Director General for Water in Anbar province stated that, before the chaos

TABLE 3.6  
ANBAR PRT, REMAINING PROJECTS,  
3/2011–7/2011

	PROJECTS LEFT	VALUE
March	8	\$2,490,075
April	9	\$2,688,599
June	11	\$3,267,636
July	4	\$4,693,496

TABLE 3.7  
ANBAR PRT TOTAL SPENDING  
FY 2010

Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)	\$57 million
Quick Response Fund (QRF)	\$7 million
Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee	\$5 million
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$69 million</b>

of 2003, there were laws; people did not illegally tap into water lines. But he also conceded that prior to 2003, there was not a single water treatment plant in the villages. Today, “there is not a single village without water treatment.” In commenting on the inherent messiness of democracy, he stated that he “now has more sheiks in his office than employees,” and they all have unrealistic demands about what he can provide to them. He added that all the U.S. money and projects have “spoiled them rotten,” adding that he cannot keep up with those demands.<sup>331</sup>

### SIGIR Oversight

Since 2004, SIGIR has published 17 reports on U.S.-funded programs and projects in Anbar province, including the Falluja Wastewater Treatment Plant, the Anbar Rule of Law Complex, and the 132-kV substation in Ramadi. Table 3.8 summarizes SIGIR’s oversight findings, and the following provide further details:

- **Falluja Waste Water Treatment Plant.** Begun in 2004, construction of the system has been subject to multiple delays due to security problems and



U.S.-funded library in Ramadi. (PRT photo)

a lack of local skilled labor. Funded by the Development Fund for Iraq, IRRF, and CERP, the project was originally supposed to cost \$32.5 million, be completed in 18 months (January 2006) by one contractor, and serve all homes in Falluja. However, a series of SIGIR inspections found that it will ultimately cost about \$98 million, under at least 46 separate contracts, and serve only 38% of Falluja’s homes. In an April 2011



follow-up visit to the facility, SIGIR learned that while complete, the plant is still not serving a single Falluja resident. Its future remains contingent on finding enough qualified engineers to operate the facility. Moreover, it will still be several months before there are enough homes hooked up to provide the sewage necessary to run the plant, but this will occur only if the plant is connected to the main power grid or receives enough fuel to run the temporary generators.

- **Anbar Rule of Law Complex.** This \$21.4 million project was funded from the IRRF, ISFF, and Iraq Interim

Government Fund. The objective was to design and construct a secure facility for Iraqi criminal justice officials



operating in Anbar province. SIGIR’s assessment of the complex did not find

any significant deficiencies, concluding that the project provided three separate courthouses for judges to hear cases, a pre-trial detention facility, and training and office facilities.

- **Ramadi 132-kV substation.** The objective of this unfinished \$29 million, IRRF-funded project was to provide a fully functional substation compat-



ible with the MOE’s transmission system. SIGIR’s review determined

that construction work associated with the substation appeared to meet the standards of the contract; however, the inspection provided recommendations for improvements in the contractor’s quality-control systems. ♦

**TABLE 3.8**  
**SIGIR OVERSIGHT IN ANBAR PROVINCE**

ASSESSMENT NUMBER	PROJECT NAME	PROJECT FUNDING	CONTRACTOR	MET CONTRACT SPECS
SIGIR PA-08-144	Falluja Waste Water Treatment Plant	\$83,297,392 (IRRF)	Fluor/AMEC	No
SIGIR PA-08-153	Ramadi 132-kV Substation	\$28,789,029 (IRRF)	Symbion-Ozdil-Al Namarq Joint Venture	Yes
SIGIR PA-08-152	Anbar Rule of Law/Judicial Complex	\$21,461,905 (IRRF, ISFF, IIGF)	ALMCO Limited	Yes
SIGIR PA-08-146	Falluja Waste Water Treatment Plant, Pump Station 1 and 2	\$7,223,472 (CERP)	Local	No
SIGIR PA-09-191	Al-Qaim 33/11kV Electrical Mobile Substation	\$6,460,630 (ESF)	Local	No
SIGIR PA-08-132	Haditha General Hospital	\$5,033,791 (ESF)	Local	Yes
SIGIR PA-09-172	Abu Ghraib Dairy	\$3,400,000 (IFF)	State Company for Dairy Products	No
SIGIR PA-08-145	Falluja Waste Water Treatment Plant, Area A Construction and Repair	\$2,906,420 (IRRF)	Local	No
SIGIR PA-08-148	Falluja Waste Water Treatment Plant, Earthwork for the Treatment Plant	\$2,768,877 (DFI)	Local	No
SIGIR PA-08-147	Falluja Waste Water Treatment Plant, Force Main for the Falluja Sewer	\$1,803,949 (DFI)	Local	No
SIGIR PA-09-170	Mujarrah Canal Bridge	\$1,261,500 (CERP)	Local	Yes
SIGIR PA-09-192	Haditha Dam Perimeter Security	\$997,500 (ESF)	Local	No
SIGIR PA-08-134	Haditha Primary Health Care Center	\$537,780 (IRRF)	Parsons/Local	No
SIGIR PA-08-133	Heet Primary Health Care Center	\$412,130 (IRRF)	Parsons/Local	No
SIGIR PA-08-140	Rebuilding of the Sagrah School	\$399,050 (CERP)	Local	Yes
SIGIR PA-08-142	Refurbishment of the Al Shurhabil School	\$268,000 (CERP)	Local	Yes
SIGIR PA-08-141	Refurbishment of Al Iqitadar School (RAWG)	\$200,000 (CERP)	Local	Yes