

## DETAILED SUMMARY OF OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

This appendix provides summaries of the audits listed in Section 6 of this Report. All information provided is current as of September 30, 2012.

### Defense Contract Audit Agency

The services of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) include professional advice to acquisition officials on accounting and financial matters to assist them in the negotiation, award, administration, and settlement of contracts.

In addition to DCAA's involvement in the negotiation and award of contracts, significant resources are also dedicated to overseeing the allowability,

allocability, and reasonableness of incurred and billed costs. Procedures that govern the costs incurred in-country are also tested through reviews of contractor timekeeping, subcontract management, and cash management/disbursement. Finally, to ensure that adequate internal controls are in place regarding the contractor's policies and procedures, DCAA performs audits associated with critical internal control systems, with an emphasis on estimating, subcontract management, and billing systems.

DCAA plans and performs work on a fiscal-year basis. Table G.1 shows both the Iraq-related audits closed during FY 2011 as well as audits closed in FY 2012 and that remain open as of September 30, 2012.

TABLE G.1  
DCAA AUDITS RELATED TO IRAQ FOR FY 2011 AND FY 2012

DESCRIPTION OF AUDIT AREA	FY 2011	FY 2012	
	CLOSED	CLOSED	OPEN
Price Proposals (1)	50	19	1
Other Special Requested Audits (2)	16	13	34
Incurred Cost (3)	41	64	337
Labor Timekeeping (4)	14	8	41
Internal Controls (5)	20	18	60
Pre-award Accounting Survey (6)	12	3	1
Purchase Existence and Consumption (7)	6	3	23
Cost Accounting Standards (8)	37	36	73
Other (9)	11	5	58
<b>Total</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>628</b>

**Note:**

1. Price Proposals—Audits of price proposals submitted by contractors in connection with the award, modification, or repricing of government contracts or subcontracts
2. Other Special Requested Audits—Audit assistance provided in response to special requests from the contracting community based on identified risks
3. Incurred Cost—Audits of costs charged to government contracts to determine whether they are allowable, allocable, and reasonable
4. Labor Timekeeping—Audits to determine if the contractor consistently complies with established timekeeping system policies and procedures for recording labor costs
5. Internal Controls—Audits of contractor internal control systems relating to the accounting and billing of costs under government contracts
6. Pre-award Accounting Survey—Pre-award audits to determine whether a contractor's accounting system is acceptable for segregating and accumulating costs under government contracts
7. Purchase Existence and Consumption—The physical observation of purchased materials and services and related inquiries regarding their documentation and verification of contract charges
8. Cost Accounting Standards—Audits of Contractor Disclosure Statements and compliance with Cost Accounting Standards
9. Other—Significant types of other audit activities including compliance with Truth in Negotiations Act, audits of provisional billing rates, and audits of claims and termination settlement proposals

## Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to face many challenges in executing its Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). The Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) has identified priorities based on those challenges and high-risks and has responded by expanding coverage of OCO operations and its presence in Southwest Asia. Matching the Department's current Southwest Asia operational tempo and focus, DoD OIG's primary oversight focus is operations in Afghanistan while maintaining the necessary oversight of the reset of equipment redeploying from Iraq. As the Department continues its OCO, such as Operation Enduring Freedom, DoD OIG plans to stay focused on issues important to accomplish the mission and ensure that the Department makes efficient use of its resources to support the warfighter.

The DoD OIG-led Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group coordinates and deconflicts federal and DoD OCO-related oversight activities. The Group held its 21st meeting in September 2012.

In September 2012, the Joint Planning Group issued the FY 2013 update to the Comprehensive Oversight Plan for Southwest Asia. The FY 2013 update includes descriptions of oversight projects that directly affect efforts in Southwest Asia and surrounding areas as of September 1, 2012. The projects may be conducted exclusively in theater, require travel into theater, or be conducted outside the theater. In addition to the audits of contracts, sub-contracts, and task and delivery orders for logistical support being conducted, this comprehensive plan addresses other oversight areas, including asset accountability, transition of security responsibilities in Afghanistan, financial and logistics management, security and the rule of law, and economic and social development. The plan update also includes ongoing oversight efforts related to Southwest Asia by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

## Completed Oversight Reports

### ***Wholesale Accountability Procedures Need Improvement for Redistribution Property Assistance Team Operations***

*(DODIG-2012-138, ISSUED SEPTEMBER 26, 2012)*

DoD OIG has issued its second report in its series of reviews focused on DoD accountability over major end items of equipment (Class VII) turned in at Camp Virginia, Kuwait. DoD OIG identified that the Army did not have adequate controls over the accountability of items turned in at the Camp Virginia Redistribution Property Assistance Team yard. Specifically, Camp Virginia Redistribution Property Assistance Team contractors did not use automated procedures to obtain wholesale accountability, properly upload items into the visibility system, or account for all Communications-Electronics Command items at Camp Virginia. This occurred because Army Sustainment Command and Army Contracting Command-Rock Island (ACC-RI) officials did not update the performance work statement, and ACC-RI and Defense Contract Management Agency-Kuwait officials did not appoint a contracting officer's representative until five months after the contractor began operations. In addition, the quality assurance representative and contracting officer representative's audits of the contractor did not provide assurance that the contractor met contract requirements.

As a result, of the 297 reviewed items turned-in at the Camp Virginia Redistribution Property Assistance Team yard, 84 items, valued at approximately \$6.0 million, were not accounted for; 149 items, valued at approximately \$33.0 million, were not accounted for timely; and 14 vehicles, valued at approximately \$5.5 million, had multiple records in the inventory systems. Inaccurate or delayed accountability of items in the inventory systems does not accurately represent the Army's assets and increases the vulnerability for loss or theft.

***Assessment of DoD Wounded Warrior Matters—Wounded Warrior Battalion—West Headquarters and Southern California Units***  
(DODIG-2012-120, ISSUED AUGUST 22, 2012)

DoD OIG continues its assessment reporting on DoD programs for the care, management, and transition of recovering servicemembers wounded during deployment in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom. In this fourth report in the series, DoD OIG identified several initiatives implemented by Wounded Warrior Battalion-West (WWBn-West) and other identified organizations that were believed to be noteworthy practices for supporting the comprehensive care, healing, and transition of warriors. Further, DoD OIG observed that the WWBn-West leadership and staff and other identified organizations were fully dedicated to providing the best available care and services for helping warriors heal and transition.

DoD OIG also identified a number of significant challenges that were recommended to the WWBn-West leadership and staff, as well as other identified organizations address. Resolving these challenges will increase program effectiveness in providing quality and timely care and services in support of the warriors' healing and transition.

Finally, DoD OIG recognized, as a result of this assessment, that it was important to give a voice to the warriors themselves. DoD OIG recommend that the WWBn-West leadership and staff, as well as other identified organizations, consider warriors' comments as discussed in this report so they are cognizant of warriors' views and concerns and can take appropriate action.

**Ongoing Oversight Activities**

***Assessment of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq Mission Capability***  
(PROJECT NO. D2012-D00SPO-0205.000, INITIATED AUGUST 16, 2012)

DoD OIG is assessing the adequacy of DoD support for executing security cooperation programs in Iraq and whether the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) is organized, equipped, and prepared to successfully accomplish its security cooperation mission. Specific objectives are to determine whether DoD goals, objectives, plans, and guidance for executing security cooperation programs in Iraq through OSC-I, performing under U.S. Department of State/Chief of Mission authority, are issued and sufficiently operative. In addition, DoD OIG is determining whether OSC-I is adequately structured and resourced to accomplish its security assistance/security cooperation mission. Also, DoD OIG plans to identify impediments to OSC-I mission accomplishment and provide suggested recommendations. Lastly, DoD OIG will assist the Department of State Inspector General in assessing the process used to determine short-term and long-term OSC-I staffing requirements.

***Contractor Logistics Support Contract for Stryker Vehicles with General Dynamics Land Systems***

(PROJECT NO. D2011-D000CH-0032.000, INITIATED OCTOBER 19, 2010)

DoD OIG is re-announcing the Audit of Material Purchases Made Through Partnership Agreements at Anniston Army Depot (D2010-D000CE-0190.000) to focus the audit on the contractor logistics support contract for Stryker

vehicles. The revised audit objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of the contractor logistics support sustainment strategy for Stryker vehicles. Specifically, DoD OIG plans to review contract funding procedures, contract type, performance metrics, contractor billings, and controls over government property that is being managed by the contractor. “Better Cost-Control Measures Are Needed on the Army’s Cost-Reimbursable Services Contract for Logistics Support of Stryker Vehicles” (Report No. DODIG-2012-0102, issued June 18, 2012) addressed the need for better cost control measures. Additional reports will be issued.

## **Assessment of DoD Wounded Warrior Matters**

*(PROJECT NO. D2010-D00SPO-0209.000, INITIATED APRIL 16, 2010)*

DoD OIG is performing this assessment in response to a congressional request (Rep. Jones-NC) to conduct a systematic review of DoD Wounded Warrior programs. DoD OIG will conduct this review, with a focus on traumatic brain injury (TBI) and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Four reports have been issued addressing wounded warrior matters: “Assessment of DoD Wounded Warrior Matters–Wounded Warrior Battalion–West Headquarters and Southern California Units” (Report No. DODIG-2012-120, issued August 22, 2012), “Assessment of DoD Wounded Warrior Matters–Fort Sam Houston” (Report No. SPO-2011-004, issued March 17, 2011); “Assessment of DoD Wounded Warrior Matters–Fort Drum” (Report No. SPO-2011-010, issued September 30, 2011); and “Assessment of DoD Wounded Warrior Matters–Camp Lejeune” (Report No. DODIG-2012-067, issued March 30, 2012). Additional assessments may be generated as issues arise.

## **Department of State Office of Inspector General**

### **Completed Oversight Reports**

The Department of State Office of Inspector General (DoS OIG) completed one oversight report related to Iraq for the quarter ending September 30, 2012.

#### ***Evaluation of Invoices and Payments for the Embassy Baghdad Operations and Maintenance Contract***

*(AUD-MERO-12-43, ISSUED AUGUST 1, 2012)*

DoS OIG initiated this evaluation to determine whether the Department of State paid the Embassy Baghdad operations and maintenance contractor in accordance with Federal and Departmental guidance and contract terms and conditions. DoS OIG determined that the contracting officer’s representative approved 86 invoices, totaling about \$4.4 million, that included unallowable and unsupported costs and costs for goods not delivered. As a result, the Department of State overpaid the contractor at least \$2.7 million. DoS OIG made recommendations for the Department of State to recover the \$2.7 million, to institute a mechanism for approving and certifying invoices, and to conduct a comprehensive review of all invoices to determine whether additional costs should be recovered. DoS OIG further recommended that the Department of State undertake a review and, if warranted, take appropriate administrative actions against the contracting officer’s representatives who did not follow federal and departmental guidance concerning contractor invoice certifications and approval.

## Ongoing Oversight Activities

### ***Audit of the Process for Realigning the U.S. Diplomatic Presence in Iraq***

(PROJECT NO. 12AUDXXX, INITIATED JUNE 29, 2012)

DoS OIG is assessing the process used to establish the short- and long-term staffing requirements for the U.S. Mission to Iraq and determine whether facility and infrastructure plans for the U.S. Mission align with those requirements. This project is ongoing.

### ***Audit of the Worldwide Protective Services Contract–Task Order 005***

(PROJECT NO. 12AUD050, INITIATED MARCH 22, 2012)

DoS OIG is determining the effectiveness of the Department of State’s management and oversight of the Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract. Specifically, DoS OIG plans to determine whether the contractor is performing in accordance with contract terms and conditions, the contractor’s work is adequately monitored, and invoice review and approval procedures are in place to ensure accuracy and completeness of costs. This project is ongoing.

## Government Accountability Office

GAO continues to respond to congressional interest and mandates to provide oversight of U.S. efforts in Iraq.

### **Completed Oversight Reports**

GAO completed five oversight reports related to Iraq for the quarter ending September 30, 2012.

### ***Operational Contract Support: Sustained DOD Leadership Needed to Better Prepare for Future Contingencies***

(GAO-12-1026T, ISSUED SEPTEMBER 12, 2012)

The Department of Defense (DoD) has relied heavily on contractors to support its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and is likely to continue to depend on contractors in future operations. For over 15 years, GAO has made recommendations intended to improve DoD’s ability to manage and oversee operational contract support in deployed locations, which DoD has taken some actions to address. GAO has called for a cultural change within DoD to emphasize the importance of institutionalizing operational contract support across the department. This testimony addresses three areas where sustained leadership is needed if DoD is to effectively prepare for the next contingency. These areas pertain to (1) planning for the use of operational contract support, (2) ensuring that DoD possesses the workforce needed to effectively manage and oversee contracts and contractors, and (3) improving DoD’s ability to account for contracts and contractors. DoD has made an effort to emphasize the importance of operational contract support at the strategic level through new policy and guidance and ongoing efforts. DoD has also recognized the need to translate strategic requirements into plans at the operational level, but GAO’s past work has shown that DoD’s progress in anticipating contractor support in sufficient detail in operation plans has been slow. As a result, DoD has risked not fully understanding the extent to which it will be relying on contractors to support combat operations and being unprepared to provide the necessary management and oversight of deployed contractor personnel. While DoD has taken steps to develop additional training, we have reported that commanders and senior leaders are not required to take these courses before assuming their contract management roles and responsibilities.

## ***Iraq and Afghanistan: Agencies Are Taking Steps to Improve Data on Contracting but Need to Standardize Reporting***

*(GAO-12-977R, ISSUED SEPTEMBER 12, 2012)*

The Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to provide a range of services, such as security, transportation, and base operations. Additionally, DoS and USAID have relied on recipients of grants and cooperative agreements—two types of assistance instruments—to implement infrastructure, governance, and economic development projects in the two countries. Reliable, meaningful data related to contracts and assistance instruments are a starting point for informing agency decisions and ensuring proper management and oversight. In recent years, the Congress has taken a series of actions to increase the oversight and availability of information related to Iraq and Afghanistan contracts and assistance instruments. Specifically, amendments from the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (NDAA for FY 2011) require those three agencies to submit annual joint reports to the Congress on their contracts and assistance instruments with work performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. In April 2012, the three agencies issued their second Annual Joint Report on Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, covering FY 2011 (hereafter, referred to as the 2011 joint report), to congressional committees. Their first joint report, covering FY 2010 (2010 joint report) was issued in May 2011. The joint reporting requirement builds upon earlier requirements for the three agencies to track information on contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel. The three agencies subsequently designated the DoD-managed Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) as their common database for such information. With the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (NDAA for FY 2010), the Congress expanded the requirement to cover grants,

cooperative agreements, and associated personnel. In response, the agencies agreed that SPOT was also their system of record for tracking statutorily required assistance instrument and personnel information. Although tracking this information should provide much of what the agencies are to include in their joint reports, there is no statutory requirement for the agencies to use SPOT as the basis for what they present in the joint reports or for any other purpose. Although SPOT was designated as the common database for the statutorily required information on contracts, assistance instruments, and related personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, officials from DoD, DoS, and USAID generally relied on other data sources they regarded as more reliable to prepare the 2011 joint report. Additionally, the agencies did not use consistent methodologies to obtain and present the data contained in the 2011 joint report, limiting comparability of data across the agencies. In this report, we are recommending that the Secretaries of Defense and State and the USAID Administrator work together to standardize the methodologies used to obtain and present information contained in the annual joint report on contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan to provide the Congress with comparable information across agencies and years.

## ***Iraq and Afghanistan: State and DoD Should Ensure Interagency Acquisitions Are Effectively Managed and Comply with Fiscal Law***

*(GAO-12-750, ISSUED AUGUST 2, 2012)*

The Department of State (DoS) has taken on unprecedented responsibilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. In doing so, it has relied heavily on contractors. For some critical goods and services, such as fuel, security, and basic support like dining and laundry services, DoS turned to the Department of Defense (DoD) to acquire the goods and services on its behalf through interagency acquisitions. Because of the risks associated with assisted interagency acquisitions, agencies need to carefully

consider whether their use is a sound business decision and formally document roles and responsibilities in interagency agreements. To better understand how DoS is managing its responsibilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO evaluated (1) the nature and extent of DoS's reliance on DoD for the acquisition of critical goods and services, (2) factors that contributed to this reliance, and (3) whether DoS and DoD are making and implementing decisions regarding this reliance consistent with regulation and guidance. GAO reviewed documentation for 22 acquisitions, including DoS's requests for assistance, comparing them to regulation and guidance. To help DoS meet its requirements for critical goods and services in Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD supported DoS on 22 acquisitions. On DoS's behalf, DoD awarded and manages 20 acquisitions, known as assisted interagency acquisitions, under the authority of the Economy Act with an estimated value of almost \$1 billion for basic support goods and services and security services. DoD also supported two of DoS's acquisitions for medical services and unmanned aerial vehicles. Across the 22 acquisitions, DoD has been involved in one or more aspects of the acquisition cycle, including planning, award, management, and oversight. GAO identified at least 128 DoD personnel with contracting and subject matter expertise who provided support for these acquisitions. In justifying requests in 2010 for DoD's acquisition assistance, DoS officials cited the urgency of ensuring requirements were met as the two departments prepared for U.S. military forces to withdraw from Iraq at the end of 2011. Underlying that sense of urgency was the insufficient capacity and expertise of DoS's acquisition workforce.

Specifically, DoS and DoD concluded that DoS lacked sufficient personnel, both in numbers and expertise, to conduct acquisition activities and that it did not have the requisite time to increase its workforce to the capacity required to have contracts in place following the transition to a

DoS-led presence in Iraq. DoS has taken some steps to address the acquisition workforce gaps that prompted it to seek DoD's help. However, DoS has not fully assessed whether its effort to increase its workforce is sufficient to meet requirements; it has the proper skill and government/contractor mix; or it has sufficient numbers of qualified oversight personnel to support its own acquisition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan in the future. DoS and DoD did not comply with requirements for use and management of assisted acquisitions. For 12 of the 20 assisted acquisitions GAO reviewed, DoS did not comply with Office of Management and Budget and Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements for determining that using DoD contracts was the best procurement approach. For example, DoS did not assess the cost-effectiveness of using DoD's contracts for five of the interagency acquisitions. Further, DoS and DoD did not meet requirements for interagency acquisition agreements in 13 cases, resulting in confusion regarding oversight responsibilities and payment for DoD's assistance. Accordingly, the departments' positions regarding DoS's payment of DoD's costs prior to 2012 in connection with the award and administration of some acquisitions remain unresolved and the departments risk noncompliance with fiscal law. Some lessons have been learned since DoS's 2010 requests for DoD's acquisition assistance in Iraq. However, poor compliance with interagency acquisition requirements and missed opportunities to fully understand costs and needs for goods and services continue to limit DoS's ability to conduct acquisition planning. Over the next 18 months, as key contracts for Iraq are set to expire and the U.S. presence in Afghanistan evolves, the departments' opportunity is shrinking to determine whether continued reliance is appropriate or DoS should develop its own capacity. Otherwise, DoS risks again relying on assisted acquisitions with DoD by default rather than through sound business decisions.

## ***Contingency Contracting: Agency Actions to Address Recommendations by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan***

*(GAO-12-854R, ISSUED AUGUST 1, 2012)*

Over the past decade, the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on contractors to help carry out their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Between FY 2002 and FY 2011, these agencies reported combined obligations of approximately \$159 billion for contracts with a principal place of performance in either country. The Congress established the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC) in 2008 to assess contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan and provide recommendations to the Congress to improve the contracting process. The CWC was directed by the Congress to assess contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan for reconstruction, logistics, and security function; examine the extent of waste, fraud, and abuse; and provide recommendations to the Congress to improve various aspects of contingency contracting, including defining requirements and identifying, addressing, and providing accountability for waste, fraud, and abuse. In a series of interim and special reports and in a culminating final report, the CWC made multiple recommendations about contracting practices in current and future contingency environments. The recommendations in the final report were organized into 15 strategic areas related to improvements in contingency contracting. Some recommendations were made specifically to DoD, DoS, and USAID; others were made to the Congress; and the remaining recommendations were not made to a specific entity. Only one recommendation from the final report included a date by which implementation should be completed, with the CWC noting that some reforms will take many years for agencies to fully implement because of the complexity of the issues involved. DoD, DoS, and USAID have taken

different management approaches for addressing the CWC's recommendations. For example, at DoD, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) established a senior-level board that used a formal process for determining which recommendation DoD would address and assigning responsibility for addressing them to specific DoD offices. The board also monitors the status of efforts to implement the recommendations. At DoS, officials told GAO that the Office of the Under Secretary for Management has general responsibility for coordinating DoS's efforts to address the CWC's recommendations.

## ***Mission Iraq: State and DoD Have Not Finalized Security and Support Capabilities***

*(GAO-12-759RSU, ISSUED JULY 26, 2012)*

This report is restricted.

## **Ongoing Oversight Activities**

As of September 30, 2012, GAO has no ongoing oversight activities in Iraq.

## **U.S. Army Audit Agency**

As of September 30, 2012, the U.S. Army Audit Agency had ended its operations in Iraq.

## **U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General**

### **Completed Oversight Reports**

This quarter, the USAID Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG) issued one performance audit related to Iraq reconstruction. As of September 30, 2012, 30 financial audits by DCAA and public accounting firms are underway, with 13 additional

audits in the planning phase. One financial audit was issued this quarter.

### ***Audit of USAID/Iraq's Performance Evaluation and Reporting for Results Management Program***

*(E-267-12-004-P, ISSUED JULY 30, 2012)*

USAID OIG conducted this audit to determine whether the Performance Evaluation and Reporting for Results Management Program (PERFORM) improved program management and oversight of USAID/Iraq programs.

USAID/Iraq awarded a contract to the QED Group (QED) to provide monitoring and evaluation services under the PERFORM program. The contract, managed by the mission's program office, began in October 2009 and totaled \$7.5 million for a 2-year base contract. In June 2011, the mission exercised the option year, which extended the program to August 2012 and increased the amount to \$14.3 million. The mission had disbursed \$9.2 million as of April 1, 2012. The mission was also designing a new monitoring and evaluation program. To assess how well ongoing operations conformed to guidance and to aid the design of the follow-on, the mission requested a performance audit of its monitoring and evaluation program.

The audit determined that the program did not operate as intended, and therefore, the contract did not significantly improve program management and oversight at USAID/Iraq. The audit disclosed the following weaknesses:

- The mission did not fully use PERFORM's monitoring services. Technical offices relied instead on other arrangements. As a result, monitoring was inadequate.
- Some statements of work issued to contract for evaluations and some evaluation reports were technically flawed, weakening their credibility and usefulness.
- The mission did not manage the program effectively, contributing to unsatisfactory, late reports.

- The mission did not completely implement recommendations from a USAID OIG audit of the program before PERFORM, predecessor program, the Monitoring and Evaluation Performance Program, Phase II.

The report included five recommendations to address these issues.

## **Ongoing Oversight Activities**

### ***Audit of USAID/Iraq's Access to Justice Program***

*(PROJECT NO. EE100412, INITIATED JULY 2, 2012)*

The objective is to determine if USAID/Iraq's Access to Justice Program is achieving its goal to improve the vulnerable and disadvantaged populations' awareness of and access to Iraq's legal system.

### ***Survey of Security Contractor Services Employed by USAID/Iraq's Contractors and Grantees***

*(PROJECT NO. EE100212, INITIATED APRIL 22, 2012)*

The objectives are:

- To compare and analyze differing security mechanisms employed by implementing partners and their effect on costs and efficiency.
- To follow up on Recommendations 1 and 3 of Report No. E-267-11-001-S, "Survey of Security Incidents Reported by Private Security Contractors of USAID/Iraq's Contractors and Grantees," to ensure that mission-implementing actions have been effective.

### ***Audit of USAID/Iraq's Legislative Strengthening Program***

*(PROJECT NO. EE100112, INITIATED NOVEMBER 22, 2011)*

The objective is to determine if the USAID/Iraq's Legislative Strengthening Program improved the sustainability of democratic governance in Iraq.

## Defense Criminal Investigative Service

As of September 30, 2011, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) had ended its operations in Iraq and will no longer be reported on in this section. DCIS began deploying special agents to Iraq in May 2003, and at the close of their operations in Iraq, DCIS had deployed a total of 71 personnel to Iraq.

## U.S. Department of the Treasury

This quarter, U.S. Department of the Treasury did not conduct any work related to, in support of, or in Iraq. Additionally, as of September 30, 2009, the Department had no plans to conduct any work in the future and will no longer be reported on in this section.

## U.S. Department of Commerce

This quarter, the Department of Commerce did not conduct any work related to, in support of, or in Iraq. Additionally, as of September 30, 2009, the Department of Commerce had no plans to conduct any work in the future and will no longer be reported on in this section. ♦