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Lessons Learned Initiative
Begun in September 2004, the Lessons Learned Initiative focused on three areas of the
U.S. relief and reconstruction effort in Iraq:
- Human Capital Management (published in February 2006)
- Contracting and Procurement (published in July 2006)
- Program and Project Management (published in March 2007)
The Initiative’s goals are to use expert forums and research to
identify the significant challenges facing the U.S. reconstruction mission in
Iraq, to develop actionable recommendations that enhance ongoing efforts, and
to inform future U.S. reconstruction and stabilization operations.
Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Human Capital Management
In February 2006, SIGIR released Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital
Management. The report is the product of SIGIR audits, other research, and the
Lessons Learned Forum held in September 2005 at the Johns Hopkins University’s
Washington, D.C. campus. The document identifies and discusses four key
components of effective human resource management:
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Policy Alignment
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Workforce Planning
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Recruitment
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Continuity
Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement
In July 2006, SIGIR published its second report of the Initiative: Lessons in Contracting and
Procurement. In December 2005, SIGIR hosted two Lessons Learned Forums to evaluate the
procurement and contracting processes associated with Iraq reconstruction. The
first panel–held at the George Washington School of Law in Washington,
D.C.–gathered senior officials from key U.S. government agencies and
distinguished members of the academic and independent research communities.
SIGIR held a second panel of executives from a broad spectrum of industry
service providers supporting the reconstruction mission in Iraq; this meeting
was held at the Professional Services Council in Arlington, Virginia.
It begins by examining contracting activity early in the Iraq program and traces
its evolutionary development through the effort’s succeeding phases. The
concluding section lays out a series of key lessons followed by six
recommendations for improving the U.S. government’s capacity to support and
execute contracting and procurement in contingency environments.
Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management
Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management The third and final
Lessons Learned report, published in March 2007, focuses on the program and project
management of the U.S.–led reconstruction mission, and captures the evolution of the
key agencies charted to oversee the effort. A forum of experts gathered on April 12,
2006 at the National Defense University to discuss this issue and provide recommendations
for improving the U.S. government’s capacity to manage programs and projects in
contingency environments. The panel included senior U.S. government officials, academics,
and industry executives. The report tracks the evolution of the three organizations
responsible for providing the strategic oversight and tactical direction for the
reconstruction program: The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance,
the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the U.S. Mission–Iraq. The report begins
with an overview of the planning environment, which had a direct effect on the capacity
of program managers to execute and control reconstruction projects. It then analyzes
CPA’s Program Management Office–the entity established to plan and manage the $18.4
billion infrastructure–focused program–and the delays in executing reconstruction projects
during the winter and spring of 2004. The final section of the report describes how program
managers met the challenge of constant change, particularly the reprogramming that occurred
during the summer and fall of 2004.
For each of the forums, SIGIR published a separate
report with findings and recommendations based on SIGIR research and the
input of forum participants.
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SIGIR Continues Compiling Lessons Learned Reports From the Iraq Experience
Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,
published in March 2007, tracks the evolution of the three organizations responsible
for providing the strategic oversight and tactical direction for the reconstruction
program: The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, the Coalition
Provisional Authority, and the U.S. Mission–Iraq.
The report offers nine recommendations based on the lessons learned derived from the
program and project management experience in Iraq:
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The Congress should consider legislating a “Goldwater Nichols”–like reform measure to promote better
integration among DoD, USAID, and DoS, particularly with respect to post–conflict contingency operations.
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The Congress should adequately fund the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.
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The U.S. government should clarify the authorities of the multiple agencies involved in post–conflict
operations to avoid ambiguity over who is in charge.
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Implementing agencies should institutionalize the most effective project management systems, procedures,
policies, and initiatives developed during the Iraq reconstruction effort.
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Program managers should integrate local populations and practices at every level of the planning and execution process.
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Funding designated for post–conflict contingency programs should support flexible programs and projects that yield
both short– and long–term benefits.
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Develop policies and procedures to manage non–U.S. appropriated funds.
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Develop comprehensive planning for capacity development.
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Future post–conflict contingency planning should provide for well–resourced and uninterrupted oversight of relief and
reconstruction programs to ensure effective monitoring from the outset and permit real–time adjustments.
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