http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/default.aspx SIGIR Quarterly Reports en-us Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Fri, 08 Jun 2007 10:00:12 EST Fri, 08 Jun 2007 10:00:12 EST http://www.sigir.mil/images/logo_trans.gif http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/default.aspx 60 60 March 2012 marked the ninth anniversary of the start of the U.S.-led intervention that toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime. This quarter, Iraq took another significant step toward rejoining the international community, successfully hosting the 33rd meeting of the League of Arab States in late March. Held in Baghdad amid a citywide security lockdown, the event unfolded largely free of violence. Among the signature attendees were the Emir of Kuwait and senior officials from the new Libyan and Tunisian governments. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/April2012.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/April2012.html Mon, 30 Apr 2012 00:01:00 EDT Entering 2012, the U.S. commitment to Iraq remains substantial and expensive, with nearly 14,000 personnel (mostly contractors) under Chief of Mission authority in Baghdad. In addition to traditional diplomatic and development activities, U.S. Embassy- Baghdad is deeply involved in supporting the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), with sizable programs dedicated to building the capacity of the police and military. Through the Police Development Program (PDP), the Department of State’s (DoS) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs works with the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to mentor senior police officials. But the PDP faces a number of challenges, not the least of which is the MOI’s apparent reluctance to embrace fully the program. Moreover, the threatening security environment, especially in Baghdad, makes it difficult for advisors to engage with their MOI interlocutors. The newly established Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) manages U.S. efforts to advise and equip Iraq’s armed forces, including the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program through which the GOI has purchased M1 Abrams tanks, F-16 aircraft , naval patrol boats, and more. OSC-I maintains significant ties to the senior ranks of the Ministry of Defense (MOD), conducting regular meetings with key commanders and assisting the MOD with a wide variety of projects aimed at building a more professional and more effective ISF. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/January2012.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/January2012.html Mon, 30 Jan 2012 00:01:00 EST December 31, 2011, will signal the beginning of a new phase in the continuing strategic partnership between the United States and the Government of Iraq (GOI). With all U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) bases soon to be closed or transitioned to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the U.S. military's mission in Iraq will be coming to an end. Beginning in 2012, the U.S.-GOI relationship will resemble the ties that the United States enjoys with other sovereign countries receiving signifi cant amounts of U.S. military, economic, and development assistance. Preparations for this new era have been underway for several years. Th e Department of State (DoS) has increased the size and scope of its mission. On October 1, 2011, the new Offi ce of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) opened. It is now the focal point for U.S. security cooperation with Iraq. October 1 also marked the start of the DoS police-assistance mission. It will diff er fundamentally from the previous larger and more tactically focused police training initiatives managed by the U.S. military. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October2011.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October2011.html Sun, 30 Oct 2011 00:00:00 EDT Negotiations continued this quarter between the U.S. government and the Government of Iraq (GOI) on the possibility of a continuing U.S. military presence in Iraq after December 31, 2011. While Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is open to that possibility, the fractious Iraqi political situation—and the ominous opposition of Muqtada al-Sadr and his restive supporters—have made it difficult to forge support for an extension within the GOI. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/July2011.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/July2011.html Sat, 30 Jul 2011 00:00:00 EDT As the Department of State (DoS) moves forward with its transition plans and U.S. troops prepare to depart Iraq by December 31, 2011, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his coalition partners continued this quarter with the process of forming a new government. Th ese various transitions create fi scal, political, and security vulnerabilities that, if not carefully tended, could have signifi cant adverse eff ects. For example, in taking over the police-training mission from the Department of Defense (DoD), DoS will assume enormous management and policy responsibilities—and do so with less than 200 personnel assigned to the mission. It will implement its Police Development Program (PDP) in a still-fragile security environment, working closely with an as-yet-unappointed Minister of Interior, who will oversee Iraq's police. As of mid-April, neither the Ministry of Interior nor the Ministry of Defense had a permanent leader. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/April2011.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/April2011.html Sat, 30 Apr 2011 00:00:00 EDT Over the next 11 months the nature of the U.S. Presence in Iraq will fundamentally alter, with certain reconstruction elements either ceasing operations or transitioning responsibilities to other agencies. By September, the final Provincial Reconstruction Teams are slated to close as two new consulates (in Basrah and Erbil) and two temporary Embassy Branch 0ffices (in Kirkuk and Mosul) become operational. In October, one of the most crucial U.S. transitions will occur: the Department of State will assume Responsibility for police training from the Department of Defense (DoD). Finally, pursuant to the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement (SA), all U.S. military forces will withdraw from Iraq by December 31,2011; a contingent of military personnel will remain under Chief of Mission authority, staffing the new 0ffice of Security Cooperation-Iraq. Maintaining a more sizeable military presence in Iraq would require the United States to renogotiate the terms of the SA with the Government of Iraq (GOI). http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/January2011.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/January2011.html Sun, 30 Jan 2011 00:00:00 EDT Under the terms of the current U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, all U.S. military forces are scheduled to depart Iraq by December 31, 2011. This quarter, continued withdrawal of U.S. troops proceeded apace, with the last U.S. combat brigade rolling out in August, signaling the end of Operation Iraqi Freedomand the beginning of Operation New Dawn. Concurrent with U.S. military reductions, the Department of State (DoS) is continuing to expand its presence. Over the next year, DoS will open several key hubs across Iraq and will assume responsibility fromthe Department of Defense (DoD) for police training. Overseeing these changes are General Lloyd Austin, who took command of U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) this quarter, and the new U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, James Jeffrey. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October2010.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October2010.html Mon, 01 Nov 2010 00:00:00 EDT On June 14, 2010, Iraq's new Council of Representatives (CoR) convened for the first time—99 days after the March 7 parliamentary elections. In a session lasting less than 30 minutes, 325 deputies took the oath of office and then adjourned. Th e CoR was scheduled to meet next in late July and attempt to fill the key positions of Speaker of the CoR and President of the Republic. The closely contested nature of the March elections left uncertain the future composition of the Government of Iraq (GOI). None of the political blocs won the 163 seats needed to form a government; negotiations to construct a ruling coalition continue. Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's al-Iraqiya alliance won the most seats (91) on a nationalist platform that attracted Shia and Sunni supporters but was not sufficient to form a government. On June 10, the second and third place finishers— Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law Coalition (89 seats) and the Iraqi National Alliance (70 seats) announced their intent to ally, but they have yet to agree on who should be prime minister. Consequently, four months after the vote and on the eve of the CoR's second meeting, Iraq's post-election trajectory remains uncertain. Once the new government is formed, the prime minister and new cabinet will turn to address a substantial legislative docket. Among the myriad contentious issues to be considered are the need to pass the long-postponed package of hydrocarbon laws, the future of Iraq's anticorruption institutions, the dynamics of the Kurdistan Region's relationship with Baghdad, and amendments to the Iraqi Constitution. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/July2010.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/July2010.html Fri, 30 Jul 2010 00:00:00 EDT New Players and Priorities in the Next Chapter of U.S.-Iraq Relations Over the next 20 months, a series of events will alter the dynamics of bilateral relations between the United States and the Government of Iraq (GOI): a new government will take the reins of power in Baghdad and conduct Iraq's first nationwide census in a generation; the United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) will see a change in leadership, and a new commander will oversee the conclusion of the U.S. military's advise-and-assist mission; a new Chief of Mission at U.S. Embassy-Baghdad will be responsible for the evolving U.S. diplomatic presence in Iraq; and—in December 2011—the last U.S. troops will withdraw from Iraq, 8 years after deposing the totalitarian regime of Saddam Hussein. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/April2010.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/April2010.html Fri, 30 Apr 2010 00:00:00 EST This 24th Quarterly Report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction analyzes the latest events in Iraq as the U.S. relief and reconstruction effort continues to transform itself into a more traditional foreign assistance mission. The most notable event from the past quarter was the December round of bidding for new oil service contracts. Iraq's Ministry of Oil accepted bids on seven oil fields, including one from a Russo-Norwegian consortium for the largest field. But, to succeed, the winning bidders must overcome Iraq's aging infrastructure, rampant corruption, and fragile security. This quarter, SIGIR published what was certainly one of its most significant audits to date: the follow-up review of the Department of State's oversight of DynCorp International's police–training contract. This audit identified more than $2.5 billion in taxpayer funds that are vulnerable to waste and fraud because of weak contract oversight. SIGIR's finding is particularly salient given that management of the police training program will be transitioned to the Department of State in 2011. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/January2010.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/January2010.html Sat, 30 Jan 2010 00:00:00 EST As the U.S. military draws down across Iraq, the capacities, roles, and responsibilities of the civilian reconstruction agencies inevitably will be affected. Moreover, the drawdown will occur against the backdrop of a still-fragile (though markedly improved) security situation and a season of campaigning for Iraq's upcoming parliamentary elections, the most important electoral event in Iraq since 2005. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October09.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October09.html Fri, 30 Oct 2009 00:00:00 EST On June 30, 2009, the Iraqi people celebrated what Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki dubbed “National Sovereignty Day,” marking the complete withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq's cities. Although incidents of violence marred the run-up to and immediate aftermath of this historic event, the June 30 transition underscored Iraq's strengthening sovereignty. This quarter, the U.S. military and the Department of State (DoS) took significant steps to reshape their presence in Iraq. On the military side, the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq will conclude its mission in December 2009, transitioning its responsibility for training the Iraqi Security Forces to two successor organizations: one will assist the Iraqi Army; the other will train Iraq's police forces. On the diplomatic side, Ambassador Christopher Hill restructured the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad to have two Deputy Chiefs of Mission (DCMs): one will serve as the primary DCM and supervise political matters, including provincial affairs and host-nation diplomatic relations; the other will focus on overseeing U.S. reconstruction programs and ensuring the successful transition of these initiatives to the GOI. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/July09.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/July09.html Thu, 30 Jul 2009 00:00:00 EST Several landmark events shaped continuing relief and reconstruction efforts this quarter: * Governance. On January 31, 2009, the Government of Iraq (GOI) conducted longawaited provincial elections in 14 of Iraq's 18 provinces, choosing new Provincial Councils that will play increasingly important roles in Iraq,s reconstruction. In several ethnically and denominationally mixed provinces, election results corrected representational imbalances caused by the Sunni boycott of the 2005 provincial elections. Moreover, the provincial elections inaugurated a "year of elections" in Iraq, which will culminate in December with parliamentary elections, the first plebiscite on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's governing coalition. * Security. Pursuant to the January 1, 2009, Security Agreement (SA), the GOI now has responsibility for security across the entire country. The GOI also has assumed management control of the U.S.-sponsored Sons of Iraq (SOI), which had comprised almost 100,000 Sunni men, many of whom previously participated in or were subject to insurgent activity. The new U.S. Administration also announced its strategy to draw down U.S. forces in Iraq over the next several years. * Economy. On April 2, 2009, Iraq's Presidency Council ratified a $58.6 billion budget for 2009. Oil price fluctuations forced the GOI to downwardly revise its budget three times before finally passing it (the initial proposal was about $80 billion). The GOI is pursuing new means for revenue generation, including increasing efforts to attract more foreign investment. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/April09.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/April09.html Thu, 30 Apr 2009 00:00:00 EST This year will bring change in Iraq that will fundamentally affect every aspect of the reconstruction program. This change began on January 1 when the Security Agreement and the Strategic Framework Agreement became effective, redefining the bilateral relationship between Iraq and the United States. The turn-of-the-year transfer of the International Zone to Government of Iraq control symbolized the new era that has begun to unfold in U.S.-Iraqi relations. As this new era begins, several salient challenges confront the reconstruction program. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/January09.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/January09.html Fri, 30 Jan 2009 00:00:00 EST This penultimate quarter of the Year of Transfer witnessed the emergence of nascent normalcy in Iraq. As U.S. reconstruction assistance continued to target civil and military capacity building, Iraq achieved progress on the security, political, and economic fronts. Violent incidents dropped to their lowest levels since 2004; the long-awaited Provincial Election Law finally passed; and commercial activity, spurred by Iraq's oil-revenue windfall, continued to increase. But, as General Ray Odierno, the new Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), recently noted, Iraq "was a failed state [in 2006]. In 2008, it's a fragile state. We've got to move it to a stable state." To sustain progress in this direction, Iraq must improve its provision of security and essential services, such as electricity, potable water, sewage systems, and health care services. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October08.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October08.html Thu, 30 Oct 2008 00:00:00 EST This 18th Quarterly Report to the Congress provides a new look at the relief and reconstruction effort in Iraq, presenting a province-by-province review of progress on reconstruction and capacity-building in four key areas of concern—economics, essential services, governance, and security. This new review catalogues a series of informative snapshots on the achievements and challenges affecting each of Iraq's 18 provinces. Total Iraqi funds made available for reconstruction since 2003 have now reached the $50 billion mark, roughly equaling the total amount of U.S. funds appropriated to date to support Iraq's relief and reconstruction. The picture of provincial progress in this Report further amplifies how that money has been spent, updating the markedly mixed story that SIGIR has unfolded over the past four-and-a-half years through nearly 250 audits and inspections. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/July08.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/July08.html Wed, 30 Jul 2008 00:00:00 EST Since April 2003, the United States Congress has appropriated more than $46 billion for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. This Quarterly Report provides a comprehensive update on how that money has been spent, with information on the top five projects in each construction sector, the top contractors by income, an overview of reconstruction management, and SIGIR's new audits and inspections. In addition, with Iraq's oil revenue income on course to hit $70 billion for 2008—twice what was expected—Iraq is in a position to take on more responsibility for its own reconstruction. The Year of Transfer in Iraq continues, with three major issues unfolding: * Transferring funding responsibility * Transferring reconstruction assets * Transferring responsibility for security SIGIR will continue to monitor all of these issues as the reconstruction effort in Iraq continues to evolve. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/April08.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/April08.html Wed, 30 Apr 2008 00:00:00 EST Success in the continuing U.S. relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq in 2008 will depend substantially on the Government of Iraq's capacity to employ its own reconstruction resources in support of a national recovery plan. 2008 will be a Year of Transfer for the U.S. program, with a number of important milestones to meet. Three key developments will affect the Year of Transfer. First, Iraq's national income could substantially exceed expectations because of the rise in oil prices and production. This potential windfall underscores the need for the GOI to pursue its duty to fight corruption with renewed vigor. Second, four pending legislative and constitutional measures could significantly affect governance in Iraq: the regions law, the provincial powers law, the elections law, and Article 140 of the Iraq Constitution. How Iraq resolves these measures will shape decisions on how the United States continues to support the reconstruction program. Third, Iraq is expected to assume primary security responsibility for all 18 provinces in 2008. This evolution in security will affect the U.S. role in Iraq's reconstruction. SIGIR will monitor all of these issues throughout 2008 as we provide continued oversight of the U.S. relief and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/January08.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/January08.html Wed, 30 Jan 2008 00:00:00 EST $100 billion, 100 audits, 100 inspections. Two notable developments provide a backdrop for SIGIR's work this quarter. First, total relief and reconstruction investment for Iraq from all sources-the United States, Iraq, and international donors-passed the $100 billion mark. And second, total attacks on Coalition forces and Iraqis dropped to their lowest levels in over a year, primarily because of successes achieved through the surge strategy. SIGIR's oversight team also achieved two noteworthy milestones this quarter. Both the total number of audits produced and the total number of inspections produced by SIGIR since we began our oversight mission passed the 100 mark. This collective body of published reporting, together with the many investigations SIGIR has carried out, stands as a testament to the important benefits that consistent and rigorous oversight can contribute to the important mission in Iraq. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October07.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October07.html Tue, 30 Oct 2007 00:01:00 EST As of the July 2007 Quarterly Report, the United States Congress has appropriated approximately $44.5 billion for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. This quarter, SIGIR provides information on the expenditure of those funds, including approximately: $21 billion appropriated to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF); $14 billion appropriated to the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF); $3.1 billion appropriated to the Economic Support Fund (ESF); $2.5 billion appropriated to the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP); and $4 billion appropriated to 26 smaller accounts. In terms of expenditures, approximately 90 percent of IRRF, around 47 percent of ISFF, about half of CERP, and only 4 percent of ESF appropriated to date has been spent. SIGIR has oversight of 70 percent of these appropriations. This quarterly report also includes information on 8 new audits containing 21 recommendations and 5 audit lessons learned. SIGIR's audits addressed issues such as: A review of the work of Bechtel, the first of a series of focused financial reviews of large contractors in Iraq; An analysis of KBR's life-support services for the U.S. Embassy in Iraq; The reporting of the cost to complete construction projects; Sources and uses of FY 2006 appropriations and funds; and The roles and responsibilities of U.S. government agencies involved in Iraq relief and reconstruction. SIGIR also completed five new project assessments, including an inspection of the Doura Power Plant and a discussion of the challenges in repairing key generators at this key Baghdad facility. In three of the four sustainment reviews completed this quarter, SIGIR found that projects were not being sustained properly. The report also summarizes 57 ongoing investigations into fraud, waste, and abuse in Iraq reconstruction, 28 of which are at the Department of Justice for prosecution. As of July 30, 2007, SIGIR investigations have resulted in 5 convictions, 13 arrests, and 8 pending trials. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/July07.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/July07.html Mon, 30 Jul 2007 00:01:00 EST Moving Beyond the IRRF: In 2003, the Congress appropriated nearly $21 billion to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). Today, more than 98% of these taxpayer dollars have been obligated, and more than 84% have been expended. Most IRRF projects are now complete, and most of the remaining ones are estimated to be complete by the end of 2007. U.S. support to Iraq thus is evolving toward a more traditional relief and development program, with U.S.funds and activities now focusing more on targeted technical assistance to enhance the operating capacity of the Government of Iraq (GOI), to promote political and economic reform, and to stimulate growth. Considerable effort continues to center on improving security so that meaningful economic and political development can occur. With the end of the IRRF, SIGIR will now provide broader reviews of what was achieved through the overall program. Section 2 of this Quarterly Report compares the original goals and expectations of IRRF 2 with the projects and activities actually completed and provides a review of the continuing funding streams supporting Iraq: the Iraq Security Forces Fund; the Economic Support Fund; and the Commander's Emergency Response Program. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/April07.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/April07.html Mon, 30 Apr 2007 00:00:00 EST The Year of Transition in Review:Last January, SIGIR identified 2006 as the year of transition, highlighting many challenges to effective turnover of projects and programs to Iraqi control. SIGIR observed limited progress on these issues during 2006: • supporting anticorruption efforts • enhancing infrastructure security • building ministerial capacity • ensuring the sustainability of reconstruction programs and projects • increasing support for reconstruction by the international community • improving coordination of all U.S. agencies involved in reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/January07.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/January07.html Tue, 30 Jan 2007 00:00:00 EST The Year of Transition Enters the Fourth Quarter: Foremost among the challenges confronting transition this quarter was the U.S. government's effort to ensure the obligation of remaining money in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) by the September 30, 2006 statutory deadline. As of October 18, 2006, SIGIR had yet to obtain complete information on this effort, but it appears that the goal of full and effective obligation of the IRRF was met. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October06.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October06.html Mon, 30 Oct 2006 00:00:00 EST Midway Through the Year of Transition: At the end of June 2006, $18.94 billion of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 1 & 2) had been obligated, and $14.85 billion had been expended. The U.S. government's authority to obligate the remaining funds in the IRRF expires September 30, 2006, so any IRRF dollars not under contract by that date will revert to the U.S. Treasury. U.S. contracting entities in Iraq are now focused on rapidly obligating the balance of the IRRF. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/July06.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/July06.html Sun, 30 Jul 2006 00:00:00 EST As U.S. relief and reconstruction in Iraq enters the second quarter of this Year of Transition, the program is ensuring project execution, contract close-out, and program transition. Sustaining reconstruction in Iraq at this critical juncture requires the U.S. to coordinate closely with the new Iraqi government and international donors to sustain the substantial investment in Iraq's infrastructure. SIGIR has identified five critical issues, the resolution of which will help secure a successful reconstruction transition in Iraq. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/April06.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/April06.html Sun, 30 Apr 2006 00:00:00 EST 2006 will be a year of transition in Iraq reconstruction. To aid in that effort, SIGIR is announcing an audit to review overall transition planning. The audit will answer whether the United States has effectively planned to sustain what it has built in Iraq. SIGIR is concerned about whether there are suffi cient resources to support capacity development for national and local government officials, operations and maintenance, infrastructure security, development of strategic cities, and private sector development. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/January06.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/January06.html Mon, 30 Jan 2006 00:00:00 EST The Year of Transition Enters the Fourth Quarter: Foremost among the challenges confronting transition this quarter was the U.S. government's effort to ensure the obligation of remaining money in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) by the September 30, 2006 statutory deadline. As of October 18, 2006, SIGIR had yet to obtain complete information on this effort, but it appears that the goal of full and effective obligation of the IRRF was met. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October05.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October05.html Sun, 30 Oct 2005 00:00:00 EST As the reconstruction effort in Iraq matures and shifts focus from planning and design to implementation and handover, U.S. agencies must ensure that their efforts leave the Iraqis with a firm foundation on which to build. During this reporting period, the SIGIR continued to conduct discussions and interviews with key members of Iraq reconstruction management teams in Baghdad and Washington, D.C. Based on first-hand knowledge of the current situation in Iraq, existing SIGIR initiatives, and continuing oversight work, the SIGIR is actively pursuing two emerging issues: • Cost to complete: Can the U.S. government agencies managing Iraq reconstruction projects produce reliable estimates of the costs of completing those projects (and thus avoid over-obligating funds)? • Sustainability: Can reconstruction projects funded by the U.S. government be sustained after handover to the Iraqis? A failure on either of these points puts at risk the important legacy of success that the U.S. intends to leave. As of July 5, 2005, approximately 75% of the $18.4 billion IRRF had been obligated, and 35% had been disbursed. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/July05.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/July05.html Sat, 30 Jul 2005 00:00:00 EST The U.S. Mission Iraq is responsible for leading reconstruction efforts and setting reconstruction priorities, but at least 12 U.S. government agencies have or had direct responsibility for some portion of the $18.4 billion Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). The decentralization of responsibility and management complicates efforts to evaluate how U.S. appropriated funds are being used in Iraq. The SIGIR has the following concerns about: • whether U.S. government organizations can generate a reliable, consolidated view of all activities funded by the IRRF • whether U.S. government organizations can implement reliable estimates of the costs to complete current reconstruction projects • whether systems that are used to track reconstruction projects can produce reports that tie these projects to the contracts that fund them • whether contract data from IRRF-funded contracts is accessible, reliable, and complete • whether contract offi cials are able to verify that work is completed satisfactorily before issuing payment http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/April05.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/April05.html Sat, 30 Apr 2005 00:00:00 EST The continuing insurgency remains the most significant challenge to the reconstruction of Iraq, according to the Department of State (DoS) Section 2207 Report of January 5, 2005. During this reporting period, the U.S. Mission Iraq continued to shift the focus of U.S. reconstruction efforts to address the need for improved security, to improve Iraq's economic and political environment, and to create jobs for Iraqis. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/January05.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/January05.html Sun, 30 Jan 2005 00:00:00 EST Since beginning operations in late January 2004, the CPA-IG has focused its resources on high-value oversight issues to improve the Iraq reconstruction process. As of October 21, 2004, the CPA-IG was operating with 83 staff and contractors–28 in Baghdad and 55 in Washington, D.C. The CPA-IG has: • initiated 23 audits and completed 13 final reports on the CPA's financial management, procurement practices, and management controls • managed or coordinated 113 criminal investigations: 75 have been closed or referred to other U.S. agencies, and 38 remain open • opened case files on 272 Hotline contacts received by e-mail, telephone, and walk-in, of which 178 were received in the United States and 94 in Iraq http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October04.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/October04.html Sat, 30 Oct 2004 00:00:00 EST As the reconstruction effort in Iraq matures and shifts focus from planning and design to implementation and handover, U.S. agencies must ensure that their efforts leave the Iraqis with a firm foundation on which to build. During this reporting period, the SIGIR continued to conduct discussions and interviews with key members of Iraq reconstruction management teams in Baghdad and Washington, D.C. Based on first-hand knowledge of the current situation in Iraq, existing SIGIR initiatives, and continuing oversight work, the SIGIR is actively pursuing two emerging issues: • Cost to complete: Can the U.S. government agencies managing Iraq reconstruction projects produce reliable estimates of the costs of completing those projects (and thus avoid over-obligating funds)? • Sustainability: Can reconstruction projects funded by the U.S. government be sustained after handover to the Iraqis? A failure on either of these points puts at risk the important legacy of success that the U.S. intends to leave. As of July 5, 2005, approximately 75% of the $18.4 billion IRRF had been obligated, and 35% had been disbursed. http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/July04.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/July04.html Sat, 30 Jul 2005 00:00:00 EST The U.S. Mission Iraq is responsible for leading reconstruction efforts and setting reconstruction priorities, but at least 12 U.S. government agencies have or had direct responsibility for some portion of the $18.4 billion Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). The decentralization of responsibility and management complicates efforts to evaluate how U.S. appropriated funds are being used in Iraq. The SIGIR has the following concerns about: • whether U.S. government organizations can generate a reliable, consolidated view of all activities funded by the IRRF • whether U.S. government organizations can implement reliable estimates of the costs to complete current reconstruction projects • whether systems that are used to track reconstruction projects can produce reports that tie these projects to the contracts that fund them • whether contract data from IRRF-funded contracts is accessible, reliable, and complete • whether contract offi cials are able to verify that work is completed satisfactorily before issuing payment http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/March04.html http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/March04.html Tue, 30 Mar 2004 00:00:00 EST