http://www.sigir.mil/reports/testimony.aspx SIGIR Testimony en-us Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Tue, 19 Jun 2007 14:00:00 EST Tue, 19 Jun 2007 14:00:00 EST http://www.sigir.mil/images/logo_trans.gif http://www.sigir.mil/reports/testimony.aspx 60 60 The Inspector General testified on SIGIR's views on the current state of oversight in Iraq and on ways to improve contingency oversight in the future. He supported the idea of a standing, expandable Special Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations as recommended by the Commission on Wartime Contracting for Iraq and Afghanistan. He noted that the advantages of such an entity would include quick reaction and continuous oversight at the inception of stabilization and reconstruction operations; cross-jurisdictional oversight; flexibility; experience; and a staff committed to deployment. Staffing for contingencies through a Special IG would improve coordination and complement the work of Departmental Inspectors General while reducing the burden of contingency operation oversight on their staff which has significant, ongoing responsibilities. A Special Inspector General office would save taxpayers money and improve outcomes. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_11-004T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_11-004T.pdf Wed, 07 Dec 2011 13:30:00 EST The Inspector General testified about Department of State's Police Development Program (PDP) in the light of SIGIR's October 2011 audit as well as his November 2011 visit to Iraq during which he visited with Embassy and Iraqi government officials to discuss the PDP. The Inspector General reviewed the history of United States government efforts to assist the Iraqi police forces, which began in 2003. He noted that SIGIR had completed six audits of U.S. government assistance to the Iraqi police; significant program and contract management problems had been found in the past. The current effort is hampered by a failure to assess the state of the Iraqi police and the impact of prior U.S. assistance to it. A proper assessment is necessary to determine what is needed at this stage. In addition, PDP lacks a plan setting out in detail what it intends to accomplish, a comprehensive set of intermediate and longer- term milestones, and sufficient measures of program outcomes. The request for an appropriation of $877 million for the PDP in Fiscal Year 2012 is probably in excess of actual needs; the Department of State estimates that it will only require about $500 million to carry out the PDP in the present circumstances; SIGIR believes State has between $200 and $300 million on hand from prior-year appropriations for the PDP. SIGIR does not believe that the Iraqi government that has "bought in" sufficiently to the PDP; it has not, for example, made any financial commitment to the program, as required by law, and its expressions of support have varied over time. The Inspector General met with senior staff at the Embassy in Baghdad; those meetings gave him reason to be encouraged by progress made in putting SIGIR's recommendations to the Department into effect. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_11-003T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_11-003T.pdf Wed, 30 Nov 2011 13:30:00 EST The Inspector General testified about (a) how the United States could improve defense wartime contracting – explaining and summarizing key results of our audits, inspections, and lessons learned reports; (b) the status of the implementation of SIGIR's recommendations; (c) updated the Commission on trends in SIGIR's criminal investigations, including path-breaking programs such the SIGIR Prosecutorial Initiative; and (d) commented on the Commission's recommendations in its Second Interim Report. He said: I view the Commission's proposal to create “[a] new, dual-hatted position at OMB and the NSC to provide oversight and strategic direction for contingency operations” as a meaningful step in the right direction, but one that would not sufficiently strengthen U.S. management capacities in SROs. The past eight years in Iraq demonstrated that high level “coordination” between agencies, and especially between and among State, USAID, and Defense, will not ensure the level of integration and accountability required to achieve success in these difficult missions. Moreover, the Interagency Management System within the NSC has not proven itself to be an enduring and effective model for managing SRO activities. The most compelling SRO issue now before U.S. policymakers is not simply the contracting or oversight components of SROs, but how the SRO operations are to be planned and managed in toto. A little over a year ago, the Commission convened a hearing with representatives from Defense, State, and USAID, and was unable to get a clear answer to the simple question of who is in charge of the Afghanistan reconstruction operation. That salient and disturbing reality remains true today. The “whole of government” approach, ostensibly driven by the NSC and OMB, has been largely unsuccessful as an SRO management tool. Experts seem to be coming to agreement on this point, and thus the time is ripe for developing and implementing new reforms. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_11-002T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_11-002T.pdf Mon, 25 Apr 2011 09:30:00 EDT The Inspector General testified about how the mission of the Department of State will change with the impending withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq. The Inspector General noted SIGIR has uncovered an insufficient focus by program managers on program outcomes and effects. He expressed concern about whether State could manage large reconstruction projects, such as the Police Development Program, given the problems SIGIR has documented in the past. Specifically, he observed that State must apply the hard lessons learned from previous Iraq experiences, correcting in particular the limited in-country oversight that SIGIR previously identified. He observed that the central questions about Departmental capacities include executing program elements in a post-DoD setting, ensuring adequate oversight, and simply to function in the unpredictable security situation that will exit after troop withdrawal. He recommended that Congress consider conditioning the availability of funds for large programs on the submission by State of a plan describing how it will manage such programs and a certification that it has the resources and personnel in place to manage the activities in question. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_11-001T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_11-001T.pdf Wed, 2 Mar 2011 10:30:00 EST The Inspector General testified on the advantages of Special Inspectors General in the oversight of contingency operations. Responding to an inquiry in the Chairman’s letter of invitation, the Inspector General noted that it has been difficult for standing Inspectors General to free up and deploy the resources required to deal with contingency operations. It has also proven expensive and time consuming to establish, staff, and deploy new Special Inspectors General for specific overseas contingencies. As an alternative, the Inspector General supported establishing a small, standing “Special Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations” (SIGOCO) which would have the task of preparing to quickly expand and deploy auditors, investigators, and other professionals in contingency situations. With its leadership chosen and procedures established in advance, effective oversight could be provided at the earliest possible moment, saving taxpayer money and helping to assure more effective outcomes. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_10-006T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_10-006T.pdf Thu, 18 Nov 2010 10:30:00 EST The Inspector General testified on the problems that the Department of State will face as it assumes responsibility for overseeing an ongoing assistance program that, while smaller than the Iraq programs of recent years, will still be among the largest State has ever assumed responsibility for. The problems State will face will be exacerbated by an insecure environment and a lack of information about reconstruction activities previously administered by other government agencies. SIGIR recommended that (a) State should sharpen its focus on improving its program controls and business practices, including on-the-ground program oversight and contract and grant management; (b) State should conduct an inventory of what has been accomplished in Iraq’s reconstruction thus far and act, as best as it can, to assure tha tour investments are not wasted by neglect in the asset- transfer phase or by subsequent neglect to sustain by the Iraqi government; and (c) Congress should continue to focus attention on these questions and closely monitor the plans and actions of State and other civilian agencies. If resources for improved business practices are required, they are likely to prove to be a bargain compared with waste that may occur if State’s program management and acquisition efforts continue to be under-resourced. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_10-005T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_10-005T.pdf Thu, 23 Sep 2010 10:30:00 EST The Inspector General appeared as part of panel examining the problems associated with sub contracting -- and contracting -- in contingency operations. His testimony noted that government leaders need to take steps to prevent contractors and those layered below them from undermining the government's interests. Transparency, which might prevent bad practices from occurring, is too often lacking; for example, entities executing government programs have been found to be unable to maintain records as simple as rosters of those employed. The Inspector General recalled two key recommendations SIGIR has made in the past: the implementation of a "Contingency Federal Acquisition Regulation" and the creation of a new integrated office to manage stabilization and reconstruction operations. He called for more careful, thoughtful balancing of the benefits of, possibly, contracting to achieve program objectives, and the various risks inherent in the practice of using contractors in a combat zone. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_10-004T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_10-004T.pdf Tue, 29 Jun 2010 10:30:00 EST On May 24, 2010, SIGIR’s Deputy Inspector General Ginger Cruz and Assistant Inspector General for Investigations Jon Novak testified before the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their remarks addressed issues related to general controls over funds and contracting in Iraq and the extent of fraud in Iraq reconstruction program. They also briefed the Commission on the resources and processes SIGIR uses to investigate allegations of fraud, specific cases that have been prosecuted, and reforms that SIGIR believes are needed to prevent and detect fraud in current and future stabilization and reconstruction operations. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_10-003T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_10-003T.pdf Mon, 24 May 2010 10:30:00 EST As part of SIGIR’s ongoing effort to ensure that the lessons of Iraq are incorporated into the planning and execution of other stabilization and reconstruction operations (SROs), the Inspector General testified before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight on February 24, 2010. His testimony focused on SIGIR’s innovative proposal for reforming the U.S. government’s approach to SROs: the establishment of the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations. Details of this proposal can be found in SIGIR’s fifth Lessons Learned report, Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_10-002T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_10-002T.pdf Wed, 24 Feb 2010 10:30:00 EST On February 22, 2010, SIGIR formally presented its report on reforming the U.S. government’s approach to planning for and conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations (SROs) in contingency environments. Entitled Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, this report provides background information on previous attempts to improve the management of SROs, identifies ten specific reforms that could improve the execution of SROs, and proposes a new structural solution that could more comprehensively remedy existing weaknesses in SRO planning and management — namely, the creation of the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_10-001T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_10-001T.pdf Mon, 22 Feb 2010 10:30:00 EST The Inspector General testified on how the use and misuse of reconstruction funding affects counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq. Supporting the testimony with findings from SIGIR's 350-page HARD LESSONS report, SIGIR provided key recommendations that can be considered for current and future contingency reconstruction and stabilization operations. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_09-002T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_09-002T.pdf Wed, 25 Mar 2009 10:30:00 EST The Inspector General testified before this legislative-branch commission on SIGIR's latest lessons learned report. The research for Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience comprised hundreds of interviews with key participants in the reconstruction effort and the review of thousands of documents. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_09-001T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_09-001T.pdf Mon, 2 Feb 2009 10:00:00 EST The Inspector General presented testimony on the effectiveness of efforts by the U.S. to control corruption, waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq, summarizing the results of SIGIR's efforts over the years. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_08-002T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_08-002T.pdf Tue, 11 Mar 2008 10:30:00 EST The Inspector General provides observations based on SIGIR's work on contingency contracting and recommends improvements to oversight and contract management in an environment fraught with serious vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, and abuse. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_08-001T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_08-001T.pdf Thu, 24 Jan 2008 14:30:00 EST SIGIR provides testimony on the effectiveness of reconstruction and development in Iraq as its 15th Quarterly Report is released. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-017T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-017T.pdf Tue, 30 Oct 2007 14:00:00 EST SIGIR testifies on the release of its third audit of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program, noting that progress has been made in certain geographic areas and in certain policy domains. However, the planning work recommended in prior audit work has not been accomplished, which limits the effectiveness of the program. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-016T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-016T.pdf Thu, 18 Oct 2007 10:00:00 EST The SIGIR provided testimony reviewing U.S. anticorruption assistance in Iraq and assessing the progress the Iraqi government has made fighting corruption -- the "second insurgency" in Iraq. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-015T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-015T.pdf Thu, 04 Oct 2007 14:00:00 EST SIGIR reports on the development and operation of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) program in Iraq - a $2 billion 800-person effort. Drawing upon the results of two audits completed in October 2006 and July 2007, SIGIR looks at key operational challenges facing PRTs including staffing, civil-military integration, security, and coordination. We also examine the progress of a civilian surge that aimed to double the number of staff at the 25 PRTs around Iraq, and provide insight into future challenges facing the program. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-014T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-014T.pdf Wed, 05 Sep 2007 14:30:00 EST SIGIR provides an overview of the $44.5 billion in U.S. funds dedicated to relief and reconstruction programs in Iraq. In addition, SIGIR provides snapshots of recent audits and inspections that examined issues including asset transfer, provincial reconstruction teams, and sustainment. An overview of SIGIR's first focused financial review of Bechtel National Inc. is also provided. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-013T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-013T.pdf Tue, 31 Jul 2007 14:00:00 EST SIGIR provides an overview of corruption in Iraq and of U.S. government support for the development of key anti-corruption initiatives in the Government of Iraq. SIGIR also provides an overview of its ongoing investigative work and discusses proposed Congressional legislation on war profiteering. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-012T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-012T.pdf Tue, 19 Jun 2007 14:00:00 EST SIGIR provides an updated assessment from Inspector General Stuart W. Bowen Jr., who recently returned from a 16th visit to Baghdad. In addition to the overview of current reconstruction and oversight efforts in Iraq, SIGIR examines future relief and reconstruction funding and recommendations provided for improved accountability. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-011T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-011T.pdf Tue, 22 May 2007 12:00:00 EST SIGIR examines the challenges of contracting in Iraq reconstruction, provides an overview of Lessons Learned and recommendations to improve contracting processes and execution, and presents a series of case studies from SIGIR audits and inspections. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-010T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-010T.pdf Thu, 10 May 2007 12:00:00 EST SIGIR reviews the question of whether Iraq can pay for its own reconstruction. The testimony goes through some of the key variables at play including corruption, budget execution, and Iraqi government capacity and concludes that it will take some time before Iraq has the financial and technical resources to undertake a fast–paced reconstruction on its own. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-009T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-009T.pdf Tue, 27 Mar 2007 12:00:00 EST SIGIR releases its third and final lessons learned report, focusing on Program and Project Management. Key recommendations include Congressional consideration of a "Goldwater Nichols"–like reform measure to better promote integration among DoD, USAID and DoS; clarifying who is in charge of post–conflict reconstruction; and integrating local populations and practices at every level of the planning and execution process. The full report is found under on the SIGIR Website (http://www.sigir.mil/reports/lessons.aspx). http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-008T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-008T.pdf Thu, 22 Mar 2007 12:00:00 EST SIGIR provides a high–level overview of its investigative work in Iraq and considers whether enough is being done to combat fraud in Iraq. While SIGIR has found limited examples of outright theft in the U.S. funded portion of the program, waste continues to be a serious issue. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-007T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-007T.pdf Tue, 20 Mar 2007 12:00:00 EST SIGIR discusses the findings of two audits: an audit of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) Logistics Plans which found shortcomings in capacity at the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI); and an audit of ISF weapons which found that DoD had not fully complied with a requirement to register the serial numbers of weapons purchased for Iraq. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-006T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-006T.pdf Fri, 9 Mar 2007 12:00:00 EST SIGIR provides a review of its oversight of the Iraq reconstruction program, including a look at shortcomings in the contract award fee process, the failure to complete construction of 150 planned public health centers, and the problems encountered with the Basrah Children’s Hospital and Baghdad Police College projects. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-005T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-005T.pdf Thu, 15 Feb 2007 12:00:00 EST SIGIR provides an overview of current and on–going audits, inspections and investigations, lessons learned reports, and discusses its coordination with other oversight organizations in the Iraq Inspectors General Council. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-004T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-004T.pdf Thu, 8 Feb 2007 12:00:00 EST SIGIR presents a summary of a 2005 audit of the Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA’s) controls over Iraqi funds maintained in the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). The audit found that the CPA’s internal controls for approximately $8.8 billion in Iraqi money disbursed to Iraqi ministries through the national budget process failed to provide sufficient accountability for the use of those funds. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-003T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-003T.pdf Tue, 6 Feb 2007 12:00:00 EST SIGIR provides an update on ongoing and recently completed audits, inspections and investigations of the Iraq reconstruction program. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-001T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_07-001T.pdf Thu, 18 Jan 2007 12:00:00 EST SIGIR provides details of recently released audits, inspections and investigations with an emphasis on an audit of a contract to provide 150 Primary Healthcare Clinics; an audit of the Basrah Children’s Hospital, and summarized the findings of the Contracting Lessons Learned Report. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_06-005T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_06-005T.pdf Thu, 28 Sep 2006 12:00:00 EST SIGIR releases its second lessons learned report, focusing on Contracting and Procurement. Key recommendations include exploring the creation of an enhanced Contingency Federal Acquisition Regulation (CFAR), creation of a deployable reserve corps of contingency contracting personnel, and pre–competing and pre–qualifying a diverse pool of contractors with expertise in reconstruction. The full report is found under on the SIGIR Website (http://www.sigir.mil/reports/lessons.aspx). http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_06-004T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_06-004T.pdf Wed, 2 Aug 2006 12:00:00 EST SIGIR reviews significant issues in Iraq reconstruction including the need to improve infrastructure security, close the Reconstruction Gap, and fight corruption. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_06-003T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_06-003T.pdf Thu, 8 Jun 2006 12:00:00 EST SIGIR provides updates on key issues including transition, sustainability, cost–to–complete, anti–corruption efforts, and information systems management. View the fact sheet (http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_06-001Ta.pdf). http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_06-002T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_06-002T.pdf Wed, 8 Feb 2006 12:00:00 EST SIGIR provides details on its audits of the award of sector design–build construction contracts, the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) for 2004–5, and contracting processes in South–Central Iraq. Also provided were details of an attestation engagement that examined the award of non–competitive contracts to contractor Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR). View the fact sheet (http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_06-001Ta.pdf). http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_06-001T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_06-001T.pdf Tue, 7 Feb 2006 12:00:00 EST SIGIR takes a deeper look at the Reconstruction Gap –the difference between the number of projects that the U.S. proposed to build when it first began committing money to reconstruction programs and the number of projects that the U.S. will ultimately complete. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_05-003T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_05-003T.pdf Tue, 18 Oct 2005 12:00:00 EST SIGIR provides an overview of its work to date and presents insight into key issues including cost–to–complete and sustainability. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR-05-002T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR-05-002T.pdf Wed, 7 Sep 2005 12:00:00 EST SIGIR provides a review of its work in Iraq reconstruction with a focus on the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), its management by the United States, and the four audits done by SIGIR of the management of the DFI. http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_05-001T.pdf http://www.sigir.mil/files/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_05-001T.pdf Tue, 21 Jun 2005 12:00:00 EST