Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction : Audit Reports

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Reports

Audit Reports

The following is an archived list of all completed audits performed by SIGIR.


Report Number	Report Title	PDF Size	Report Date


10-011	Iraq Reconstruction Funds: Forensic Audits Identifying Fraud, Waste, and Abuse – Interim Report #2	1,179 KB	January 28, 2010
	Public Law 108-106 requires SIGIR to prepare a final forensic audit report on all funding appropriated for the reconstruction of Iraq, which to date totals over $50 billion. This interim report presents the results of SIGIR’s ongoing forensic auditing program, including an update on the review of agency expenditures and an update on SIGIR’s efforts to identify questionable financial activity. The report also presents information on data-mining methodology and discusses the metrics SIGIR is using to measure progress. SIGIR is reporting results quarterly, and a final cumulative report will eventually address all available reconstruction funds.



10-007	Wamar International Successfully Completed Contracts, but Unanticipated Problems Affected Costs and Schedules	2,472 KB	January 28, 2010
	SIGIR has a legislative requirement to prepare a final forensic audit report on amounts made available for Iraq reconstruction. To fulfill this requirement, SIGIR has undertaken audits examining major Iraq reconstruction contracts. The objective of these audits is to review the key requirements and provisions of the contracts to determine contract costs, outcomes, and oversight, emphasizing issues related to vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and abuse. This audit focused on three contracts awarded to Wamar International, Inc. (Wamar): one indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract to purchase and deliver armored vehicles for U.S. and Iraqi forces and two firm-fixed-price contracts to inspect and repair turbine generators at power plants near Baghdad. The contracts were funded mostly from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), the Economic Support Fund (ESF), and the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF). According to SIGIR’s October 30, 2008 Quarterly Report, Wamar was in the top 10 of contractors receiving ESF funds: about $70 million had been obligated. The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) administered the contracts, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division (GRD), provided contract performance oversight.



10-012	Department of State Grant Management: Limited Oversight of Costs and Impact of International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute Democracy Grants	3,113 KB	January 26, 2010
	This report addresses the Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) management of 12 grants issued between 2004 and 2009, valued at approximately $248 million, to the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) for democracy-building activities in Iraq. SIGIR’s objective for this report is to examine the DoS’s oversight of the costs and outcomes of IRI and NDI democracy-building grants in Iraq.



10-010	Department of State Contract to Study the Iraq Reconstruction Management System	445 KB	January 26, 2010
	In late 2004, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Regional Division (GRD) and the Project and Contracting Office developed the Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS). The IRMS was originally intended to be a data base for projects funded by the IRRF. However, through the years, data has been added from ISFF projects, Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) projects, and ESF projects. SIGIR’s last IRMS report was issued in July 2008 and was intended to assess the overall data system management, policies, procedures, uses, and benefits.454 However, in the course of conducting the review, SIGIR learned that GRD was preparing a draft plan for the future of the IRMS. As a result, SIGIR stopped its review and issued a report to alert the Embassy and GRD of certain issues that needed to be addressed. Foremost, SIGIR pointed out that when the IRMS was initiated in 2004, it had a design life of five years (completing in 2009). A life-cycle maintenance program was not implemented, and the system, then in its fourth year of operation, was becoming operationally unreliable and unstable. SIGIR also reported that the IRMS had had few system upgrades, and many of its critical system components were no longer under warranty. In some cases, the manufacturer no longer supported the system. SIGIR recommended that the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, jointly direct the establishment of an interagency planning process to address the future operation and use of the IRMS. In written comments on a draft of SIGIR’s July 2008 report, GRD stated that it had authorized one of its contractors to conduct a study of the IRMS and that the study would consider factors such as the system’s age, compatibility of hardware platforms, and software and network infrastructure. The study would also provide GRD with recommendations for the future needs of stakeholders. DoS did not respond to the July 2008 draft report until December 20, 2008, but concurred with all the report recommendations. In the response, the U.S. Ambassador appointed the Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO) as the executive agent for the IRMS. In addition, the Ambassador stated that the recommendation regarding current and future system requirements of stakeholders and the need for a common operating picture was particularly important. As of November 2009, neither GRD nor ITAO had developed the plans they had committed to in their formal comments to SIGIR’s draft report.



10-008	Long-standing Weaknesses in Department of State’s Oversight of DynCorp Contract for Support of the Iraqi Police Training Program	2,548 KB	January 25, 2010
	The Department of State (DoS) Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) contract with DynCorp International includes task orders to support DoD’s Iraqi police training program. Under the task orders, DynCorp has provided police advisors and in-country support for those and other advisors. INL’s Afghanistan,Iraq, Jordan Support (AIJS) Division is primarily responsible for oversight of the DynCorp contract. SIGIR examined INL’s oversight of the task orders because they cost over $2.5 billion, and INL has had a history of weak oversight of the task orders. Specifically, SIGIR examined: (1) the costs, funding, and award process for the largest and most recent task orders; (2) DoS oversight of the task orders; and (3) the status of INL’s implementation of SIGIR’s prior recommendations.



10-005	Iraq Security Forces Fund: Weak Contract Oversight Allowed Potential Overcharges by AECOM to Go Undetected	878 KB	October 30, 2009
	SIGIR conducted this study as part of its efforts to meet a congressional mandate to forensically audit U.S. funds spent on Iraq reconstruction activities. This report examines expenditures on the Global Maintenance and Supply Services (GMASS) contract. This contract supports a Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq program to assist the Iraqi Army in developing a self–sufficient logistics capability. This is one of the largest contracts funded by the Iraq Security Forces Fund. As of September 2009, the U.S. government had obligated more than $683 million and disbursed over $567 million on the GMASS contract. In a prior audit of this contract, SIGIR could not find support in contract documents or other records for all costs charged by the contractor, AECOM Government Services (AECOM). In particular, SIGIR could not reconcile Army and AECOM financial data on repair parts purchases. SIGIR's reporting objective was to determine whether potential overcharges may have occurred for selected GMASS contract invoices.



10-006	Development Fund for Iraq: Policy Guidance Needed To Enhance Accountability of USACE-managed Funds هذه الصفحة متوفرة أيضا باللغة العربية	2,179 KB	October 29, 2009
	The Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) was created by UN Security Council Resolution 1483 for: (1) economic reconstruction of Iraq, (2) continued disarmament of Iraq, (3) costs of Iraqi civilian administration, and (4) other purposes benefiting the Iraqi people. The funds were to be used in a transparent manner. During the Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA) administration of Iraq, the CPA Comptroller managed DFI funds. CPA Regulation 2, “Development Fund for Iraq,” describes the responsibilities for the administration, use, accounting, and auditing of the DFI. When the CPA was disestablished in June 2004, responsibility for administering DFI funds shifted to the U.S. Army’s Joint Area Support Group-Central. The U.S. government’s stewardship of the DFI ended on December 31, 2007, and all remaining funds were to be returned to the Government of Iraq (GOI) per a GOI request. Several Department of Defense (DoD) components received DFI funds, including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). The purpose of this audit is to determine if USACE properly accounted for DFI funds it received.



10-004	Iraq Reconstruction Funds: Forensic Audits Identifying Fraud, Waste, and Abuse – Interim Report #1	2,095 KB	October 28, 2009
	Public Law 108–106, as amended, requires that SIGIR prepare a final forensic audit report on all funding provided for the reconstruction of Iraq, which to date totals about $50 billion. To keep the Congress apprised, this first in a series of interim reports describes the methodology and results of SIGIR's forensic auditing efforts. The results will be reported cumulatively, and a final report will encompass total reconstruction funds. Over the past 2 years, SIGIR has conducted a series of 17 audits of major reconstruction contracts. Th ese audits were intended, in part, to identify internal control weaknesses that could provide opportunities for fraud, waste, and abuse. SIGIR used the results of these audits to develop targeted forensic auditing approaches to identify potential instances of wrongdoing. SIGIR recently initiated forensic audits of all Iraq relief and reconstruction expenditure transactions made by the Department of Defense, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development. These audits are systematic examinations of Iraq reconstruction program expenditures to identify anomalies in transactional data that may indicate fraud, waste, or abuse. SIGIR's approach combines automated datamining with standard audit and investigative techniques to detect questionable transactions and develop relevant evidence for use in administrative actions or civil or criminal fraud prosecutions. SIGIR has also initiated a review of Iraq relief and reconstruction program areas known to have weaknesses in internal controls. Th is proactive effort, the SIGIR Audit/Investigative Initiative, focuses on programs that aff ord easy access to cash with weak controls over expenditures. Th e SIGIR forensics team is now managing several proactive projects and has identified a number of instances of questionable activity.



10-003	Iraq Commander's Emergency Response Program Generally Managed Well, but Project Documentation and Oversight Can Be Improved هذه الصفحة متوفرة أيضا باللغة العربية	3,789 KB	October 27, 2009
	In April 2008, Multi–National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) and the Government of Iraq (GOI) signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) establishing the Iraq–Commander's Emergency Response Program (I–CERP). Since then, more than 800 projects have been completed, and approximately $229 million of the initial $270 million allocated for I–CERP has been obligated. Under I–CERP, MNF–I executes GOI funds for reconstruction and other projects for the benefit of Iraqi citizens. The objectives of this report are to examine the extent to which MNF–I met the terms of the MOU with GOI and the extent to which Multi–National Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) has maintained I–CERP project records in accordance with requirements. SIGIR and Iraq's Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) agreed to conduct a joint review of I–CERP; however, in July 2009, BSA issued a separate I–CERP report.



10-002	Data Provided to the Government of Iraq on U.S. Reconstruction Projects Lacked Clarity هذه الصفحة متوفرة أيضا باللغة العربية	68 KB	October 26, 2009
	This report responds to concerns raised by the President of the Iraq Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) that duplicate project and payment data is being reported in U.S. government management information systems. The SIGIR analysis of the system's data did not identify duplicate projects or payments; nevertheless, the data provided to the Government of Iraq (GOI) was unclear and gave the appearance of duplicate projects and payments. SIGIR's analysis reinforces the need to maintain clear and accurate data on U.S. Iraq reconstruction projects and illustrates the issues that can arise when unclear data is provided to GOI representatives or other users of reconstruction project data. SIGIR conducted this review during September 2009 as a nonaudit service.



10-001	Iraqi Security Forces Facilities: Environmental Chemical Corporation Projects Achieved Results, but with Significant Cost Increases and Schedule Delays	1,901 KB	October 22, 2009
	SIGIR has a legislative requirement to prepare a final forensic audit report on amounts made available for Iraq reconstruction. To help fulfill this requirement, SIGIR has undertaken audits examining major Iraq reconstruction contracts to determine contract costs, outcomes, and oversight, emphasizing issues related to vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and abuse. This audit focuses on the use of $1.12 billion spent for task orders issued from April 2004 to March 2008, primarily for constructing numerous facilities for the Iraqi Security Forces throughout Iraq. Issued under two contracts to the Environmental Chemical Corporation (ECC), the task orders were funded with $350.87 million from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund and $768.82 million from the Iraq Security Forces Fund. They were managed and overseen by the Multi–National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC–I) and the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE).



09-027	Developing a Depot Maintenance Capability at Taji Hampered by Numerous Problems	3,297 KB	July 30, 2009
	This report discusses a $350 million Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) contract, funded by the Iraq Security Forces Fund, to complete the Taji National Maintenance Depot (TNMD) in Iraq. Constructing the depot was a seven-phase project, and this contract supports the final four phases: procuring and installing equipment training Iraqi soldiers and civilians in depot maintenance and operations initiating operations transitioning the depot to Iraqi control The contract was awarded by the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan to AECOM Government Services. SIGIR’s objectives are to review the key requirements and provisions of the contract to determine cost, outcome, and management oversight, with an emphasis on the controls to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse.



09-024	Tikrit Location Command Project Achieving Contract Goals by Using Sound Management Practices	1,615 KB	July 30, 2009
	SIGIR has a legislative requirement to prepare, prior to its termination, a final forensic audit on funds made available for Iraq relief and reconstruction prior to its termination. This review examines the Tikrit Location Command, a $37.8 million project to construct a new area support base for the Iraqi Army. The project is a joint effort between the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission-Army (ITAM). The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan awarded the contract and is responsible for contract oversight. The Gulf Region-North District (GRN) of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provides program management and engineering oversight. The project is funded by the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF). SIGIR’s objectives were to examine contract costs, outcomes, management oversight, and issues related to the transfer and sustainment of the project, with an emphasis on vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and abuse. This is the third SIGIR review of contracts funded by ISFF.



09-023	Investigation and Remediation Records Concerning Incidents of Weapons Discharges by Private Security Contractors Can Be Improved	1,766 KB	July 28, 2009
	This report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) responds to congressional requirements to conduct audits of serious incidents involving private security contractors (PSCs) in Iraq. It focuses on Department of Defense (DoD) oversight of incidents involving the fi ring—or discharge—of weapons reported from May 2008 through February 2009 by its PSCs. Specifi cally, the report examines: the number and types of serious incidents involving weapons discharges the extent to which actions that were taken to investigate and remediate these incidents can be verified This report follows up on information on serious incidents provided in “Opportunities To Improve Processes for Reporting, Investigating, and Remediating Serious Incidents Involving Private Security Contractors in Iraq” (SIGIR 09-019, 4/30/2009). DoD delegated its oversight responsibilities to Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), which established Contractor Operations Cells (CONOCs) to gather and distribute information on serious incidents involving PSCs. DoD also delegated to the Armed Contractor Oversight Division—now called the Armed Contractor Oversight Branch (ACOB)—the responsibility to manage the serious incidents.



09-022	Field Commanders See Improvements in Controlling and Coordinating Private Security Contractor Missions in Iraq	1,985 KB	July 28, 2009
	Since April 2003, private security companies and individuals, commonly known as private security contractors (PSCs), have provided physical security services to protect U.S. personnel, facilities, and property, as well as U.S. government contractors, subcontractors, and other parties supporting the U.S. mission in Iraq. Th e use of contractors, however, has not been without problems, including incidents between PSCs and Iraqis and between PSCs and U.S. forces. In late 2007, the Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DoS) began making organizational and procedural changes to strengthen their oversight, coordination, and control of PSC activities, including PSC movements in areas of combat operations. This audit was conducted to determine whether the changes have improved the oversight, coordination, and control of PSC missions in Iraq. It also addresses Section 842 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), which states that audit agencies shall examine one or more of a number of issues relating to the control of PSCs, including: the extent to which fi eld commanders were able to coordinate or direct the performance of contractors in an area of combat operations the nature and extent of any activity by contractor employees that was inconsistent with the objectives of operational fi eld commanders



09-026	Commander’s Emergency Response Program: Hotel Construction Completed, But Project Management Issues Remain	5,973 KB	July 26, 2009
	SIGIR has issued fi ve reports on the management controls and accountability of Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. This report focuses on the outcomes, cost, and oversight of the Baghdad International Airport Caravan Hotel, one of the larger CERP projects. A $4.2 million contract was awarded to TAMA Design Consultancy and Construction, an Iraqi contractor, to provide international travelers and the public with hotel accommodations near the Baghdad Airport. SIGIR’s reporting objectives for this audit are to examine: contract outcome, cost, and schedule project justification and compliance with CERP guidelines contract oversight coordination of the project among U.S. government agencies and with the Government of Iraq (GOI) transfer of the project to the GOI



09-025	Commander’s Emergency Response Program: Muhalla 312 Electrical Distribution Project Largely Successful	1,031 KB	July 26, 2009
	Since October 2005, SIGIR has issued four reports on the management controls and accountability of Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. Th is report focuses on the outcome, cost, and oversight of one CERP project—the Electrical Distribution Grid in a Baghdad neighborhood known as Muhalla 312. Muhalla 312 is the most expensive project undertaken with CERP funding in Iraq: the project encompassed the entire Muhalla 312 (estimated to be 10 square blocks). SIGIR’s objectives were to examine: the project outcome in terms of final costs and completion time the effectiveness of the contracting process and oversight of the contract the coordination of the project with other reconstruction funds and programs the transfer to and sustainment eff orts of the Government of Iraq (GOI)



09-021	Joint Audit of Blackwater Contract and Task Orders for Worldwide Personal Protective Services in Iraq	921 KB	June, 2009
	The joint audit addressed the following four objectives pertaining to the Blackwater task orders under the Department of State Worldwide Personal Protective Services II contract: (1) What was the contracting process? (2) What were the key requirements and provisions of the contract and task orders? (3) What are the costs and funding sources of the contract and task orders? (4) How did the Department administer the contract and task orders to provide proper oversight of Blackwater’s cost and performance in Iraq? Links to memoranda transmitting the Joint Audit to three Department of State officials: Ambassador - US Baghdad 133KB PDF A - Steven J. Rodriguez, Acting 371KB PDF DS - Eric J. Boswell 176KB PDF



09-019	Opportunities To Improve Processes for Reporting, Investigating, and Remediating Serious Incidents Involving Private Security Contractors in Iraq	5,692 KB	April 30, 2009
	This report responds to a congressional mandate that audits be conducted of the incidents involving private security contractors (PSC). It focuses on the Department of Defense's (DoD's) oversight of serious incidents (such as attacks, death, injury, and property damage) involving PSCs in Iraq. The report examines DoD's (1) policies, procedures, and practices for reporting, investigating, and remediating those incidents and (2) efforts to identify trends and lessons learned. SIGIR found that the U.S. military and the U.S. Embassy have improved their information sharing concerning PSC operations and serious incident reporting. They have established policies for reporting serious incidents and have assigned responsibility to specific organizations for overseeing that serious incidents are reported and investigated. Although these improvements are significant, SIGIR identified a number of opportunities to improve the accuracy and consistency of the serious incident information, the analysis of that information, and the consistency of policies and procedures pertaining to investigating and remediating incidents.



09-018	Information on Government of Iraq Contributions to Reconstruction Costs	527 KB	April 29, 2009
	The Congress has appropriated more than $50 billion for Iraq reconstruction and has authorized and funded a variety of programs including the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, the Economic Support Fund, the Commander's Emergency Response Program, and the Iraq Security Forces Fund. Since the start of the reconstruction effort, the U.S. government has increased requests for the Government of Iraq to assume a greater share of the costs of reconstruction. The objectives of this report are to provide: Information on Executive Branch guidance on soliciting GOI contributions for U.S. development programs. Examples of GOI contributions to the U.S. reconstruction program. SIGIR found that overall, the Department of State (DoS) points to Government of Iraq (GOI) budget expenditures for cost sharing, the Department of Defense (DoD) points to specific GOI expenditures for security requirements, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) points to GOI's direct support for individual programs. The report also provides various cost sharing examples



09-015	Construction of Primary Healthcare Centers Reported Essentially Complete, but Operational Issues Remain	2,150 KB	April 29, 2009
	In March 2004, the U.S. Army issued a contract to Parsons Delaware, Inc. Subsequent task orders under the contract providing for the design and construction of 150 primary healthcare centers (PHCs). Two years later, the U.S. government terminated the PHC task orders; the PHCs throughout Iraq were in various construction phases. In our report, Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects (SIGIR-06-011, 4/29/2006), we reported on the need for a strong management team, in cooperation with the Iraq Ministry of Health (MoH), to complete the partially constructed PHCs. The objectives of this report are to show the costs and outcomes of efforts to complete the PHCs, the extent to which completed PHCs have been transferred to the MoH, and the operational status of the PHCs. SIGIR found that the Army has completed construction of most of the PHCs despite poor security conditions that led to incidents such as bombing of some facilities. The Army awarded follow-on construction contracts to Iraqi contractors to complete the PHCs partially constructed under the Parsons design-build contract and now reports that most construction is complete. The Army estimates the completed facilities will provide outpatient treatment for over 4 million Iraqis annually. However, the program has cost substantially more than planned, taken much longer to complete, and produced fewer facilities.



09-020	Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Developing a Cost-Tracking Process Will Enhance Decision-Making	1,876 KB	April 28, 2009
	In October 2005, the U.S. government established the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) program in Iraq. This program is a civil-military, interagency effort that acts as the primary government interface between the United States, Coalition partners, and provincial and local governments. However, to date agencies have not separately tracked PRT operating costs. SIGIR's initial work focused on the cost of operating individual PRTs and the overall PRT program. We quickly found that the agencies involved are not required to capture these costs at the program or individual level. Consequently, SIGIR's reporting objectives are to (1) identify the major PRT program cost categories (2) estimate program costs using available information (3) assess the feasibility and usefulness of tracking PRT costs. SIGIR found that U.S. agencies have had no requirement to capture PRT costs, so these costs are not routinely tracked.



09-014	Security Forces Logistics Contract Experienced Certain Cost, Outcome, and Oversight Problems	719 KB	April 26, 2009
	This report discusses one of the largest Department of Defense contracts funded by the Iraq Security Forces Fund. The contract was awarded to AECOM Government Services (AECOM) for Global Maintenance and Supply Services in Iraq (GMASS). This contract supports a Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) program to assist the Iraqi Army develop a logistics capability so that it can be self-sufficient. The objectives of this report are to determine (1) the cost of the three task orders, (2) the outcome of the three task orders, and (3) the adequacy of contract oversight. SIGIR found that the cost to develop a maintenance capability within the Iraqi Army has been substantial. As of January 31, 2009, the value of the three task orders issued under the AECOM contract for this purpose was $628.2 million, of which $572.0 million had been disbursed. Task order costs were affected by a number of issues, including: The task order scopes of work were poorly defined, and thus the task orders were modified 161 times, adding $420.5 million to their cost ceiling. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense has not accepted responsibility for maintenance and supply operations; as a result MNSTC-I is in the process of extending the period of performance for Task Order 5 at U.S. expense.



09-016	Asset-transfer Process for Iraq Reconstruction Projects Lacks Unity and Accountability	1,678 KB	April 26, 2009
	After more than four years of reconstruction activity, U.S. reconstruction agencies continue to experience difficulties transferring completed projects to the Government of Iraq (GOI). GOI recognition of projects is important to ensure ongoing support for the projects, to inform its own reconstruction planning, and to leverage completed projects to obtain financing for future initiatives from world markets. This review follows up on SIGIR's earlier work to determine (1) the extent to which U.S. reconstruction agencies working in Iraq have made progress in establishing a uniform policy and procedure for transferring projects to the GOI, and (2) whether the Embassy has made progress in obtaining GOI support for a formal asset-transfer agreement. SIGIR found that U.S. Iraq reconstruction agencies have yet to develop a uniform process and procedure for transferring completed projects to the GOI.



09-017	Need To Enhance Oversight of Theater-Wide Internal Security Services Contracts	1,333 KB	April 24, 2009
	Private security contractors (PSCs) play an important role in Iraq by protecting U.S. personnel, facilities, and property related to reconstruction efforts. In September 2007, the Department of Defense competitively awarded five Theater-Wide Internal Security Services (TWISS) contracts to five PSCs for static, or fixed site security services in Iraq. The contracts have a combined not-to-exceed maximum value of $450 million. The companies are among the seven largest private security service providers in Iraq. This report responds to a mandate in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2008, (Public Law 110-181) that SIGIR and other audit agencies in Iraq conduct audits of the performance of security functions. These audits should address the manner in which contract and task order requirements were developed and awarded; and the manner in which the Department of Defense exercised control over the performance of contractors. This report examines the cost of the contracts, the requirements for the static security forces, the government's process for awarding the contracts, task orders, and modifications, and the oversight provided by the Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs). SIGIR found that, between February 2008 and March 2009, DoD had spent $154.6 million on the TWISS contracts. Almost all contracts and task orders were awarded under full and open competition, with a well-supported decision-making process. Full and open competition has lowered the costs of these services.



09-009	Full Impact of Department of Defense Program to Restart State-owned Enterprises Difficult to Estimate	569 KB	January 30, 2009
	In June 2006, the Defense Department established a Task Force to focus on efforts to stimulate economic development and employment in Iraq. One of the Task Force's major efforts has been to revitalize Iraqi state-owned enterprises (SOE) and has received about $103 million to revitalize state-owned factories. SIGIR undertook this audit to determine the baseline data and performance metrics the Task Force used to assess the impact of its program to restart state-owned enterprises, the adequacy of internal control procedures used to mitigate risk and ensure that the funds are used for intended purposes, and future Task Force plans. We found that the Task Force efforts have served to help restart state-owned enterprises and provide employment in a difficult security environment. However, the full measure of the Task Force's impact is difficult to estimate because of the absence of good baseline data and weaknesses in the methodology used to identify the number of jobs impacted by the effort. Additionally, the Task Force has not impacted employment as quickly as initially expected because projects have taken longer to implement than planned. The Task Force anticipated that most of the FY 2007 projects would be implemented within six months. However, only one project was completed within six months and implementation of most projects is now estimated to take more than 13 months from inception. SIGIR's work identified three areas where internal controls can be improved. First, SIGIR found that although the Task Force verifies that items purchased directly by SOEs are received, it does not obtain copies of invoices to verify the cost of these items. Second, SIGIR found two cases in which the Task Force provided the equivalent of $229,400 in Iraqi dinars to two SOEs, but has not verified how these funds were used. Third, SIGIR found that items purchased on U.S. contracts are often paid for before verifying receipt of the items by the SOEs.



09-011	Opportunities to Improve Management of the Quick Response Fund	1,691 KB	January 29, 2009
	The Quick Response Fund program (QRF) was created by the State Department in 2007 to allow Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq to support initiatives that promote efforts by community-based leaders and organizations to improve their communities' access to public services, economic opportunities, employment, and education. The U.S. Embassy's Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) reviews and selects projects and either OPA or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) carries them out. The USAID component of the QRF is the Iraq Rapid Assistance Program (IRAP). For this report, SIGIR's objectives were to answer the following general questions: (1) Are appropriate management controls in place and properly implemented to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse of QRF resources? (2) Have performance goals, metrics, and processes been developed and implemented to assess program performance and results? (3) How have program funds been allocated and expended? SIGIR found that OPA has developed a sound process for reviewing and selecting projects to be funded by the QRF program. However, improvements are needed in OPA's and USAID's processes for assessing whether their projects were successful and met their intended goals. OPA received $35 million for QRF activities, and USAID received $100 million. OPA has largely finished its portion of the program, obligating $34.99 million of its $35 million. USAID hired a contractor to manage its part of the program and considers its $100 million as fully obligated when it signed the contract. As of January 15, 2009, USAID reports that $52.1 million in projects have been approved. We noted some opportunities to improve program management in several other areas. These include the need to ensure that complete documentation is in project files, and a need for improved training in awarding and managing large IRAP projects.



09-013	Provincial Reconstruction Teams' Performance Measurement Process Has Improved	1,686 KB	January 28, 2009
	Since October 2006 SIGIR has issued three reports examining the status, expansion, and effectiveness of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs) throughout Iraq. Those reports recommended that the U.S Mission - Iraq and Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) establish a performance measurement system with clear objectives, performance measures, and milestones for the PRTs in Iraq. SIGIR's objectives for this audit were to review the PRT program and answer these general questions: 1) Have program objectives and performance measures or metrics been established? (2) What is the status of future program plans in relation to the reduction in U.S. military forces? (3) Are lessons learned being captured that could be useful in other contingencies? (4) What actions have been taken based SIGIR's prior recommendations? SIGIR found that OPA has developed a performance assessment system for evaluating provincial capabilities; however, OPA has not consistently required the PRTs and ePRTs to develop and submit work plans that identify planned activities to address areas of weakness identified by the assessment system. During the course of this review, OPA improved its procedures for preparing, submitting, and reviewing work plans. SIGIR's analysis of OPA strategy and plans for the eventual drawdown and close out of the PRTs shows these plans are condition based; that is the transition strategy identifies key events that will trigger the drawdown and close out of PRTs rather than a specific timeline for close out. SIGIR believes that given the recently signed security agreement and the deadlines for withdrawal, it is uncertain whether military resources will be available to support PRTs until all conditions for close out are met. Further, the relationship between the U.S. and the Iraqi governments continues to evolve raising additional questions about the future role of PRTs in terms of the assistance that may be desired by the Government of Iraq and how it will be provided. The PRTs have put effective processes in place to capture lessons learned. These include weekly situation reports, U.S. State Department cables, the Center for Army Lessons Learned playbook, and quarterly meetings of PRT team leaders in Baghdad. Additionally, State is developing a database to compile PRT lessons learned in Iraq. In prior reports SIGIR has made 12 recommendations to improve PRT program effectiveness. Prior to this review, SIGIR closed eight recommendations based on management action. Our current review found management action sufficient to recommend closing three of the four remaining open SIGIR recommendations. A recommendation to require PRTs to submit work plans for accomplishing objectives within established milestones remains open pending further action.



09-012	The U.S. Has Reduced Its Funding for the Iraqi Security Forces, but Continued Support Will Likely Be Necessary	907 KB	January 26, 2009
	Since 2005, the Congress has appropriated millions of dollars to the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) to allow the Commander, Multi- National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), to provide equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repairs, renovations, and construction to the Iraqi Security Forces. Until Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, the use of these funds was unrestricted. However, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2009 restricted the use of the FY 2009 funds for infrastructure projects. Given the new NDAA restriction and guidance, SIGIR further examined (1) MNSTC-Is use of appropriated funds and its spending plans for the remaining unobligated funds, (2) MNSTC-Is process for making ISFF spending decisions, and (3) the relationship of U.S. spending to Iraqi spending for the Iraqi Security Forces. As of November 2008, the Congress had appropriated $18.04 billion to the ISFF, of which $14.3 billion had been obligated for sustainment, equipment, training, infrastructure, and other related support for Iraqs security forces. Of the remaining funds, $277.1 million has expired and cannot be used for new obligations, and about $3.5 billion is available for obligation until September 30, 2009. After accounting for its needs through FY 2009, MNSTC-I has about $730 million for which no requirements have been identified. When preparing its spending plans, MNSTC-I considers several factors, including operational orders and priorities, spending criteria and funding guidance, and input from Iraqs Ministries of Defense and Interior. MNSTC-Is Commanding General, however, is the final arbiter for all funding decisions. In the last two years, Iraqs contribution to the development of the Iraqi Security Forces has greatly increased, and U.S. funding has decreased. MNSTC-I estimates that Iraq will have spent almost $16 billion to support its security forces by the end of 2009, excluding military pay. The amount of Iraqi spending is expected to outpace the U.S. contribution in 2009. Despite this improvement, MNSTC-I anticipates that it will still need ISFF funding to support the development of key capabilities, consolidate security gains, and foster a long-term strategic relationship with Iraq. Iraqs funding for its security forces has increased over the last two years due in part to MNSTC-Is efforts to encourage the Iraqi government to become more self-reliant. Although these efforts continue under the direction of MNSTC-I leadership, internal documentation of cost-sharing negotiations and arrangements is insufficient. Despite the improvement, continued ISFF support will likely be sought to ensure that the Iraqi Security Forces possess the key capabilities necessary to provide for its security. These funds will be needed until Iraqs budgeting and funding execution processes can more quickly respond to requirements.



09-010	Oversight of Aegis' Performance on Security Services Contracts in Iraq with the Department of Defense	1,492 KB	January 14, 2009
	Congress directed SIGIR to develop a comprehensive plan for audits of PSCs operating in Iraq, in consultation with other Inspectors General. This review examines three contracts between the Department of Defense and Aegis Defence Systems. As of November 2008 DoD obligated $679.7 million and spent $612.8 million on the three contracts. The majority of costs for all three contracts are for labor and labor is projected to represent about 97% of total costs for the base year. Other cost-reimbursable items include travel, materials, and equipment. In addition to the $612.8 million in contract costs, the government provides life support services (e.g., food, water, shelter) and vehicles to Aegis personnel at substantial cost, estimated to exceed $57 million per year. The government also furnishes Aegis with other services and supplies such as ammunition, vehicle maintenance, and fuel at costs which are not readily available. Aegis has almost 1,400 personnel under the contract providing DoD a variety of security services, including personal security, facilities security, and coordination and control of security detail movements. SIGIR found well supported contract awards to Aegis; appropriate government oversight of Aegis' bills, inventories, performance, and operations; and contract performance assessed as satisfactory to outstanding. Aegis is adhering to its personnel screening and selection process, which should help to ensure that it hires individuals with the qualifications and personal qualities required by the contract. Aegis is also adhering to its training program, which should help ensure that individuals working on the contract are properly trained. Aegis has reported about 80 of the 380 serious incidents reported by all security contractors since February 2008. Aegis is complying with requirements to coordinate its operations and report serious incidents involving attacks, injuries, and property damage. SIGIR plans to audit the incident reporting process.



09-008	Cost, Outcome, and Oversight of Iraq Oil Reconstruction Contract with Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.	2,172 KB	January 13, 2009
	SIGIR has a legislative requirement to prepare a final forensic audit on funds made available for Iraq relief and reconstruction prior to its termination. This report, the ninth in the series of such reviews, examines construction work contracted for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and performed by Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc. for rebuilding the southern portion of Iraq's oil infrastructure. SIGIR found that costs under this contract totaled approximately $722.3 million, pending adjustments based on contract close-out. Approximately $562.7 million came from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund and $159.6 million came from the Development Fund for Iraq. A total of 30 task orders were issued under this contract; 6 for contractor support costs totaling $241.3 million (33.4% of contract cost); and 24 for construction projects or services. Although KBR accomplished much under the contract, the various task orders took longer than planned; were frequently modified, scaled back, and/or terminated; and increased in cost over time.



09-005	Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors	1,492 KB	October 30, 2008
	DoD, DoS, and USAID have not been required to systematically identify financial data for private security contractors (PSCs) providing physical security services such as guarding sites, escorting individuals and equipment convoys, and providing security advice and planning. Consequently, financial management systems do not routinely capture data that would show how much has been obligated and spent for these individual services. Having more complete financial data would provide managers with better information in two key areas to support future decisions to invest resources. SIGIR recommends that the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Administrator, USAID, take certain actions.



09-007	Improvements Needed in Reporting Status of Reconstruction Projects to Chief of Mission	1,204 KB	October 28, 2008
	In July 2008, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq—as Chief of Mission (COM)–asked SIGIR to examine the availability of management information needed for oversight of agency reconstruction projects, particularly as it related to the Falluja wastewater treatment project. The Ambassador had become concerned after belatedly being made aware of various issues impacting the successful completion of the project. The Department of State has various avenues for communicating information on Iraq reconstruction projects, but they fall short of ensuring that the COM receives information critical for making decisions on reconstruction projects. SIGIR makes two recommendations. One is for the U.S. Ambassador to establish policy and guidance to ensure uniform reporting on reconstruction projects, and the second is for CETI to establish a process to ensure that all projects, regardless of funding source or agency management, are accurately and adequately reported to the U.S. Ambassador.



09-006	Status of Department of State Economic Support Fund Interagency Agreements with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Iraq	2,920 KB	October 28, 2008
	SIGIR has frequently been asked why expenditure rates for the Economic Support Funds (ESF) are relatively low as compared to other appropriations being used in Iraq. SIGIR analyzed ESF obligations and expenditures for three interagency agreements to better understand why this occurs. SIGIR identified three significant and interrelated issues that affect the rate of obligation and expenditure for the ESF appropriations funding these agreements. This report is presented for information purposes only and does not contain any recommendations.



09-004	Iraq Reconstruction Project Terminations Represent a Range of Actions	1,196 KB	October 27, 2008
	SIGIR has often been asked about the extent to which contracts have been terminated because of poor performance on the part of the contractor. Government contracts generally contain clauses allowing the U.S. government to end a contract when the need for the supplies or services no longer exists, the contractor’s performance becomes unsatisfactory, or some other situation develops that warrants contract closure. As of June 2008, SIGIR identified 1,262 DoD Iraq reconstruction projects that have been terminated, including 732 for the convenience of the government, and 530 for default on the part of the contractor. SIGIR reviewed 135 terminations for convenience and 56 terminations for default. SIGIR recommends actions to reinforce the importance of screening contractors against lists of those debarred or suspended from receiving contracts and to deobligate excess funds that remain obligated against terminated contracts.



09-001	Opportunities to Enhance U.S. Democracy-Building Strategy for Iraq	1,321 KB	October 22, 2008
	Since 2004, the Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have obligated more than $1.9 billion for democracy-building programs in Iraq. Our reporting objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which the U.S. strategy for democracy and governance contains the characteristics of an effective strategy and (2) DoS and USAID efforts to assess their progress in meeting the goals and objectives of the strategy. DoS and USAID have developed a U.S. strategy for advancing and strengthening democracy and governance in Iraq. The strategy contains a number of characteristics that are necessary for an effective strategic plan. At the same time, the strategy can be enhanced as a planning tool and vehicle for informing the Congress about progress toward achieving the plan's strategic objectives. To increase the effectiveness of the strategy as a planning tool and to improve its usefulness to the Congress, SIGIR recommends that the Secretary of State direct that certain actions be taken.



09-003	Cost, Outcome, and Oversight of Local Governance Program Contracts with Research Triangle Institute	1,780 KB	October 21, 2008
	SIGIR has a legislative requirement to prepare a final forensic audit on funds made available for Iraq relief and reconstruction prior to its termination. This report, the eighth in the series of such reviews, examines two contracts for Local Governance Program (LGP) activities awarded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to the Research Triangle Institute (RTI) to assist the Iraqis in creating a more favorable environment for local governance and to build the capacity of representative councils and sub national offices of central government ministries. SIGIR found that (1) costs are not easily linked to outcomes, (2) contract achievements were initially unclear, and (3) contract management and oversight has improved over time. SIGIR recommends that USAID’s Mission Director-Iraq take actions to improve operational guidance to facilitate contract oversight; ensure the review of payment vouchers and invoices before payments are made; and take action to recover general and administrative and fixed fees that may have been improperly paid to the contractor as allowable expenses against $185,000 in government funds lost by the contractor.



09-002	Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on Iraqi Security Forces Continue	842 KB	October 21, 2008
	This is a follow–up to a report SIGIR issued in April 2008 (SIGIR–08–015) that identified limitations in the reported data on Iraqi security forces. The objectives for this current report include updating and expanding on prior data to include (1) assessing the process for compiling data on Iraq Security Forces (ISF) assigned and trained, including the accuracy and usefulness of data subsequently used for U.S. reporting, and its comparability over reporting periods; (2) the status of and challenges to improving data accuracy and reliability by developing automated human resource and payroll systems to be used by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. The data on ISF assigned and trained continue to contain inaccuracies, and comparability among reports is difficult because of changing metrics and definitions. Challenges remain even with ongoing efforts to develop automated data systems. This report does not contain recommendations.



08-023	Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq: U.S. and Iraq Take Actions but Much Remains to be Done	1,615 KB	July 30, 2008
	Since 2004, SIGIR’s mandate was largely tied to the sizeable Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund; therefore, SIGIR focused heavily on audits of Iraq reconstruction projects. But in recent years, the Congress has increased SIGIR’s oversight authority over other funds that provide support to Iraq relief and reconstruction activities. This report provides information on the Department of Defense (DoD) Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq (Task Force), and its efforts to support economic development and recovery in Iraq. Specifically, it provides information on the financial resources devoted to the Task Force, and the major areas of economic development assistance, along with examples of completed and planned projects. This is the first of several reviews planned by SIGIR to compare, contrast, and otherwise assess the various economic support initiatives in Iraq that are funded by the United States.



08-024	Information on a Special Department of Defense Program to Foster Economic Recovery in Iraq	1,062 KB	July 29, 2008
	Since 2004, SIGIR’s mandate was largely tied to the sizeable Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund; therefore, SIGIR focused heavily on audits of Iraq reconstruction projects. But in recent years, the Congress has increased SIGIR’s oversight authority over other funds that provide support to Iraq relief and reconstruction activities. This report provides information on the Department of Defense (DoD) Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq (Task Force), and its efforts to support economic development and recovery in Iraq. Specifically, it provides information on the financial resources devoted to the Task Force, and the major areas of economic development assistance, along with examples of completed and planned projects. This is the first of several reviews planned by SIGIR to compare, contrast, and otherwise assess the various economic support initiatives in Iraq that are funded by the United States.



08-019	Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons Delaware, Inc.	1,356 KB	July 28, 2008
	This report, the seventh in a series of focused contract audits, examines reconstruction work contracted by the U.S. government and performed by Parsons Delaware, Inc. In March 2004, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded Parsons a cost-plus award-fee contract to provide design and construction services in Iraq's security and justice sector. The objectives of this audit were to examine contract outcome, cost, and management oversight; emphasizing issues related to vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and abuse. The scope of our audit work was limited by incomplete contract documentation. Far less was accomplished under this contract than originally planned, with only about one-third of the planned projects completed. While the failure to complete some of the work is understandable, given the complex nature and unstable security environment in Iraq, millions of dollars in waste are likely associated with incomplete, terminated and abandoned projects under this contract. However, precise amounts of waste are not easily aggregated because of the uncertain future of incomplete projects. SIGIR's work identified significant weaknesses in the U.S. government's oversight of the contract. The report includes recommendations and lessons learned.



08-020	Key Recurring Management Issues Identified in Audits of Iraq Reconstruction Efforts	1,278 KB	July 27, 2008
	As of July 2008, the U.S. Congress had appropriated approximately $50 billion for all relief and reconstruction activities. As of July 31, 2008, SIGIR and its predecessor (CPA-IG) have issued 122 audit reports. SIGIR decided to evaluate its overall body of work to identify issues that may help guide improvements in the ongoing Iraq reconstruction efforts. SIGIR has identified four broad recurring issues that were the key contributing causes to the deficiencies noted in the body of SIGIR's audit work: (1) The need to better understand the problems associated with implementing reconstruction programs in an unstable security environment. (2) The impact of not having an integrated management structure to provide clear lines of authority on program coordination and successful delivery of projects. (3) The importance of anticipating staffing needs and reducing staff turnover. (4) Recognition of how essential working closely with host governments is to the long-term success of U.S. investments in reconstruction projects.



08-022	Government of Iraq Increasingly Funding Iraqi Security Forces Infrastructure Development, but Substantial U.S. Support Remains	893 KB	July 26, 2008
	A congressional committee raised concerns that significant U.S.-appropriated money from the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) continues to be spent on infrastructure projects related to developing the Iraqi Security Forces and that the Government of Iraq (GOI) should shoulder more of the financial burden for infrastructure development. SIGIR evaluated: (1) the status of U.S.-appropriated ISFF funds used for infrastructure projects in Iraq, (2) factors affecting program execution and use of these funds, (3) spending plans for unobligated funds and unliquidated obligations, and (4) the factors indicating and affecting a shift toward greater use of Iraqi funding to support Iraqi Security Forces infrastructure projects. The Congress may wish to examine the MNSTC-I's infrastructure spending plans for the remaining ISFF monies that have not yet been obligated or expended to identify further opportunities to transfer funding responsibility to the GOI—either on a full-funding or cost-sharing basis.



08-021	Comprehensive Plan Needed to Guide the Future of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System	1,119 KB	July 25, 2008
	This report addresses the Iraq Reconstruction Management System. Public Law 108-106 created the $18.4 billion Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF), and established a requirement for the IRRF-implementing agencies to submit reports to the Congress on how the funding was being used. The management information system developed to meet the IRRF reporting requirements is known as the Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS). However, IRMS is four years old; its hardware and software systems are becoming obsolete and in need of immediate management action to sustain reporting capabilities. Without appropriate action, the Congress and the Department of State and Department of Defense risk losing the only integrated management information on Iraq reconstruction projects. To provide the necessary senior leadership that supports the development and use of a management information system that meets the needs of its stakeholders, SIGIR recommends that the U. S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, jointly direct the establishment of an interagency planning process to address the future operation and use of IRMS and develop a coordinated management plan. Congress may wish to request that the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense provide it with a copy of the plan.



08-018	Review of Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Water Sector Reconstruction Contract with FluorAMEC, LLC	1,452 KB	July 15, 2008
	This report is part of a series of focused contract audits conducted to comply with a December 2006 amendment to SIGIR's enabling legislation that requires SIGIR to prepare a report "on all amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Iraq." The objective of these audits is to examine contract outcome, cost, and management oversight, emphasizing issues related to vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and abuse. This report also addresses issues associated with transferring completed projects to the Government of Iraq. Work on this contract was deemed generally successful; however, less was accomplished under the contract than expected for two reasons. First, the funding planned for water-sector projects was reduced. Second, water-sector projects proved to be significantly more costly than initially estimated. More than $2 billion of the $4.2 billion originally allocated for the water sector projects was redirected to other sectors. Of four construction task orders issued, two were completed (Nassriya and Basrah), and two were terminated for the convenience of the government because of funding constraints (Diwaniya and Najaf). SIGIR noted several management issues that adversely affected the projects. SIGIR recommends that JCC-I/A establish timeframes for closing task orders to minimize costs and administrative expenses. As Task Orders 4 and 5 are closed out, JCC-I/A should ensure that excessive award fees paid are recovered. SIGIR also identified a number of lessons that U.S. government organizations could apply to future reconstruction projects in a contingency environment.



08-011	Review of Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Electricity-Sector Reconstruction Contract with Perini Corporation	2,199 KB	April 29, 2008
	This report, the fifth in the series of focused contract audits, examines reconstruction work contracted by the U.S. government. This report discusses work performed under a major design-build contract in the electricity sector awarded in 2004 to Perini Corporation. The contract had a not-to-exceed amount of $500 million. The government subsequently issued 10 task orders for constructing electrical transmission and distribution facilities in the southern region of Iraq. Five of the task orders were completed, but several were significantly descoped, and five were terminated for the convenience of the government. In all cases the decision to reduce task order scope or terminate a task order was made after a site assessment was completed, but prior to the start of construction. No projects that were started were left unfinished by Perini. Nevertheless, less was accomplished under this contract than expected because the contractor's projected costs for the projects were perceived by the U.S. government to be too high, primarily due to its indirect costs. Although PCO appeared to make a good business decision on this contract, U.S. government recordkeeping was problematic and its oversight of this contract uncertain. SIGIR identified lessons learned that may be applicable to future contract-management strategies in environments like those characterizing Iraq reconstruction.



08-017	Transferring Reconstruction Projects to the Government of Iraq: Some Progress Made but Further Improvements Needed to Avoid Waste	2,219 KB	April 28, 2008
	This is the latest in a series of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) reports on the transfer of U.S. government-funded reconstruction assets to the Government of the Republic of Iraq (GOI). The objective of this review was to determine U.S. progress on implementing one key SIGIR recommendation directed at improving the adequacy of U.S. policies, plans, and procedures for transferring U.S.-funded reconstruction projects to the GOI. ITAO, DoD, and USAID have made efforts to improve plans, policies and procedures for the transfer of assets to the GOI. However, the U.S. program continues to have serious weaknesses that ultimately could place much of the U.S. reconstruction investment at risk. The U.S. program suffers from the lack of a management structure that provides clear authority and accountability, as well as a transparent set of uniform transfer policies and procedures. These program weaknesses are further compounded by the lack of a timely response to a formal asset transfer agreement proposed by the U.S. government. The program currently lacks clear management accountability among the involved agencies—State, USAID and DoD—for the transfer process. To address longstanding issues that have affected-and will likely continue to adversely affect-the implementation of the asset transfer program, and to reduce the risk that U.S.-funded capital assets in Iraq are not utilized, or in some cases wasted, SIGIR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador and Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), working jointly, direct that a number of actions be taken.



08-013	Interim Report on Iraq Reconstruction Contract Terminations	2,915 KB	April 28, 2008
	Rebuilding Iraq is a U.S. national security and foreign policy priority, and constitutes the largest U.S. assistance program since World War II. Since the beginning of Iraq reconstruction activities in 2003, approximately $42.23 billion has been appropriated for Iraq reconstruction activities and, as of January 2008, approximately $35.30 billion of this amount has been obligated, much of it under contractual arrangements. SIGIR has often been asked about the extent to which contracts have been terminated because of poor performance. Government contracts generally contain clauses allowing the U.S. government to end a contract when the need for the supplies or services no longer exists, the contractor's performance becomes unsatisfactory, or some other situation develops that warrants closure. To address this issue, SIGIR assessed the availability of aggregate information on such contract actions involving Iraq reconstruction. This interim report provides an overview of the termination for convenience and default processes and available information regarding contract terminations. Although information on contract terminations is incomplete, available data show that approximately 855 Iraq reconstruction contracts–or task orders within individual contracts–have been terminated for the convenience of the U.S government or because of default on the part of the contractor. It is important to note that contracts that incur problems are sometimes modified to change or reduce the scope of work to be performed, rather than terminated. Descoping is an appropriate process but does mask problem projects to the extent they occur.



08-015	Interim Analysis of Iraqi Security Force Information Provided by the Department of Defense Report, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq	1,710 KB	April 25, 2008
	Section 9010 of the Defense Appropriations Act of 2007, requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a quarterly report to the Congress that presents a comprehensive set of performance indicators and measures of progress toward military and political stability in Iraq. One indicator being reported is information on the number of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) authorized (required), assigned (on-the-payroll), and trained. The objectives of this audit were to (1) assess the reliability and usefulness of information on the number of forces authorized, assigned, and trained, as reflected in the March 2008 9010 report, and (2) review the methodology for gathering the information, including the extent to which DoD reviews and/or validates this information. The results of SIGIR's work to this point show that efforts have been made to improve the information on the numbers of Iraqi Security Forces authorized, assigned, and trained included in DoD's 9010 reports. However, the details included in the reports, and other available information suggests a continuing need for caution in relying on the accuracy and usefulness of the numbers.



08-016	U.S. Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq: Progress Made in Implementing Revised Management Plan	827 KB	April 24, 2008
	This is the latest in a series of reports by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) assessing U.S. anticorruption activities in Iraq. SIGIR instituted reviews of these programs in recognition of the significant detrimental effect corruption has on Iraq's economic, social, and political reconstruction. SIGIR has described corruption in Iraq as the "second insurgency." Previous SIGIR reports concluded that U.S. efforts in this area lacked a comprehensive plan featuring metrics that tie programs to an overall strategy as well as baselines from which progress can be measured. Moreover, SIGIR found that U.S. anticorruption efforts have gone through periods of high activity and periods when they have languished. In a January 2008 report, SIGIR reported that the U.S. Embassy in Iraq had taken, or planned to take, steps to improve U.S. anticorruption activities as part of a new anticorruption management plan. If those measures were effectively implemented, SIGIR said, they would address all SIGIR recommendations. Our objective for this report was to review U.S. Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Embassy progress in that regard.



08-014	Progress on Recommended Improvements to Contract Administration for the Iraqi Police Training Program	847 KB	April 22, 2008
	This is a follow-up to SIGIR's October 2007 report.¹ It updates the status of (1) improvements undertaken by the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in its management of the DynCorp contract for the Iraqi Police Training Program (IPTP), and (2) INL's implementation of SIGIR's recommendation in that report. This report also updates the status of recommendations made in the January 2007 joint report of SIGIR and the Department of State (DoS), Office of Inspector General, on Task Order 0338 of the DynCorp contract.² That report had found poor contract administration resulting in property unaccounted for and million of dollars put at unnecessary risk. ¹ Interim Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Spending Under Its Contract for the Iraqi Police Training Program, (SIGIR-07-016, October 23, 2007) ² Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Contract Number S-LMAQM-04-C-0030, Task Order 0338, for the Iraqi Police Training Program Support (SIGIR-06-029 and DoS-OIG-AUD/IQO-07-20, January 30, 2007)



08-012	Attestation to Development Fund for Iraq Cash in the Possession of the Joint Area Support Group-Central	1,773 KB	March 13, 2008
	In December 2007, the Joint Area Support Group - Central (JASG-C) asked the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction to attest to the amount of Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) cash controlled by the JASG-C Comptroller/DFI Account Manager. The JASG-C stores the cash in the basement vault of the U.S. Embassy Annex, in Baghdad. The JASG-C wanted to ensure that the cash on hand agreed with government accounting records. SIGIR was also asked to attest to the transfer of the cash to the Government of Iraq. SIGIR conducted two cash counts on January 11 and February 26, 2008, and each count showed that the amount of cash in the vault matched the DFI entry in the JASG-C accounting records. Two counts were made because the expected transfer of the funds to the Government of Iraq did not occur. Our review also showed that JASG-C complied with applicable regulations for maintaining accountability for the funds. SIGIR's attestation applies to the time the attestation occurred. After the second count, the JASG-C still had not finalized procedures for the funds transfer. Therefore, this report provides only an attestation to the amount of cash-on-hand relative to the accounting records on February 26, 2008.



08-005	Differences in Services and Fees for Management and Administration of Iraq Reconstruction Contracts	1,654 KB	January 29, 2008
	A number of different organizations have been involved in managing and administering reconstruction contracts in Iraq. However, the Gulf Region Division (GRD) of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE), a field operating agency of the Air Force Civil Engineer, are two primary organizations providing project management and contract administration services. Officials involved in reconstruction efforts have expressed interest in an analysis of the two organizations' management and administration procedures, particularly the fees they charged. SIGIR found that collectively, as of September 30, 2007, USACE-GRD and AFCEE have managed and administered over $10.3 billion of Iraq reconstruction contracts and charged about $535 million in fees for their services. GRD managed and administered about $6.3 billion, or over 60 percent, of the total amount and charged about $418 million in fees. AFCEE had about $4.0 billion of reconstruction contracts and charged about $117 million in fees. Both USACE-GRD and AFCEE provided construction services that included project management and design, contract administration, fiscal and administrative management, and quality assurance; however, they used differing approaches to managing and administering U.S.-funded reconstruction projects. A major difference was GRD's work on design-build contracts that required more direct and extensive involvement in the design and construction phases, and AFCEE's use of an approach that did not include detailed design. Another distinction between the organizations' business models is that GRD primarily depended on its military and civilian employees for quality assurance and other management and administrative services, while AFCEE relied on contractors to provide many of its services. SIGIR's ability to make a full comparative analysis was limited by insufficient data regarding the differences in fee structures and services provided and a lack of comparability and transparency in the fees and services. At the same time, SIGIR found that no DoD analysis of the two organizations' business models, services provided, and fee structures has been made and that such an analysis could provide the basis for enhanced policy guidance.



08-010	Report on Review of Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Iraq Reconstruction Contract W914NS-04-D-0006	1,433 KB	January 28, 2008
	This report is a part of a series of reports that SIGIR is issuing examining Iraq reconstruction contracts. The report examines a cost-plus-award-fee contract to Parson's Delaware, Inc. to provide design and construction series. In total, 14 task orders were issued under the contract of which 11 were for construction projects and three were for mobilization, program support, and contract closeout. Of the 11 construction task orders, three were completed and eight were terminated for the convenience of the government. SIGIR examined the management and contract oversight structure for the contract and found numerous weaknesses. Most of these problems were originally identified in our earlier report on PHCs (SIGIR 06-011, Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Project, April 29, 2006) and to the extent they are discussed in this report they are only to illustrate problems that affected the contract before it was terminated. GRD and the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) have taken action to resolve some of these issues and management actions are discussed later in this report.



08-007	Efforts to Implement a Financial-Management Information System in Iraq	3,916 KB	January 25, 2008
	This report discusses a U.S. Agency for International Development project to develop a financial management information system for the Government of Iraq (GOI) that would improve its budget and financial control processes. USAID awarded a broad-based contract to develop the system to BearingPoint, Inc. in 2003 and issued a follow-on contract in September 2004. IFMIS achieved limited functionalities before it was shut down in June 2007. Its cost at that time were estimated at $26 million. Lack of support within the GOI and security issues were the key contributing factors to the shut-down. In November 2007, USAID began initiatives to ensure GoI support for the system in the future, and in mid-January 2008 the Iraqi Minister of Finance and Acting Mission Director of USAID signed a memorandum of understanding to restart the system.



08-006	Commander's Emergency Response Program in Iraq Funds Many Large-Scale Projects	1,241 KB	January 25, 2008
	This SIGIR report contrasts funding devoted to small-scale projects typically associated with the CERP program with funding devoted to more expensive, large-scale CERP projects; it also provides observations regarding the applicability of selected management issues identified in prior SIGIR reviews, and lessons learned noted in this review that could be important to managing such projects. Improved management controls over CERP projects, particularly those that are costly, will help ensure each project's long-term benefit and viability, as well as the effective investment of U.S. funds. Since the inception of CERP in Iraq in 2003, more than 18,000 projects have been initiated and more than 14,000 have been completed. According to CERP guidelines, the program's undertakings should primarily be small- scale, urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects for the benefit of the Iraqi people—and to some extent that has been the case. For example, since Fiscal Year 2004 CERP projects estimated to cost $25,000 or less have represented over 44 percent of total CERP projects in Iraq—but just four percent of total dollars obligated for the program. Conversely, since Fiscal Year 2004, CERP projects estimated to cost $500,000 or more have represented less than three percent of all CERP projects, but nearly 37 percent of total dollars obligated. Projects in the water sector have been the predominant large-scale CERP projects receiving about $567 million, more than 28 percent of all CERP obligated funds; electricity projects and transportation projects have also been heavily funded. SIGIR has previously reported that the Iraqi government is not yet fully prepared to take over the near- or long-term management and funding of many U.S. funded infrastructure projects and that additional efforts are needed to ensure their viability. Although MNC-I officials told us that they have increased their emphasis on transition and sustainment issues, SIGIR is concerned that the MAAWS guidance still contains little specific direction on unit responsibilities in these areas. These issues take on greater importance for Iraq reconstruction projects because most funding from the principal source of reconstruction funding, the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, has been obligated—now leaving CERP as a significant source.



08-009	Report on Use of Appropriate Award-Fee Conversion Scales Can Enhance Incentive for Contractor Performance	1,015 KB	January 24, 2008
	This report discusses the use of conversion scales in determining contractor performance-award fees. The report is based on an observation SIGIR made in an earlier review of program management support contracts (see SIGIR 08-003 Review of the Use of Contractors in Managing Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Projects) that contractors were receiving relatively large award fees for average performance. The contracts and related guidelines did not specify the type of award-fee conversion scale that was to be used in calculating award fees under these contracts, and the government agencies involved in managing the contracts used the same scale for calculating award fees for all sectors and all award-fee periods. The conversion scale used, however, was not a type recommended by the U.S. Army in that it did not provide proper incentives for contractors to strive for better-than-expected results. For example, the scale awarded no fee for a performance score of less than 60, but did award a fee of at least 60 percent of the fee pool for a score of at least 60. Thus, a performance score of 65, which is in the "Good" range and barely above the award threshold, would bestow on the contractor 65 percent of the award-fee pool. Use of this scale represented a departure from best practices recommended by the Army and reduced the incentive for improved contractor performance.



08-008	U. S. Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq: Sustained Management Commitment is Key to Success	807 KB	January 24, 2008
	This is the latest in a series of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) reports on U.S. government anticorruption efforts in Iraq. The review found that the U.S. Embassy in Iraq has taken or planned steps to address previous SIGIR recommendations that if effectively implemented would address SIGIR concerns. Most notably, the Ambassador has identified actions to improve the oversight and coordination of the U.S. anticorruption effort and in December 2007 proposed to the Secretary of State a reorganization of personnel and assets to elevate the importance of anticorruption programs. Moreover, the Embassy has recognized the need to design and implement a comprehensive, integrated anticorruption strategy to assist the Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Iraqi people combat the corruption permeating government agencies, private business and other institutions of Iraqi society. SIGIR supports these actions but notes that past efforts to revitalize and coordinate U.S. anticorruption efforts have been largely ineffective and suffered from a lack of management follow through. The success of these new efforts will, therefore, depend in large part on sustained management commitment, particularly in terms of day-to-day leadership and senior-management oversight.



08-004	Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Reconstruction of Taji Military Base and Baghdad Recruiting Center	1,630 KB	January 15, 2008
	This audit is the second in a series of focused contract reviews of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund conducted by SIGIR. In January 2004, at the request of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellance--now known as the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment —awarded a cost-plus fixed-fee task order under an existing contract to Parsons Infrastructure and Technology Group, Inc. (Parsons). The objectives of the review were to examine contract outcome, cost, and management oversight, emphasizing vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and abuse. Between May and June 2004, Parsons and its subcontractors largely completed facility construction and repair work at the Taji Military Base and the renovation of the Baghdad Recruiting Center. The government expressed satisfaction with the overall project, and particularly the work of AFCEE. The cost of the project was approximately $11.1 million more than originally projected because of changes in the scope of work and security issues. SIGIR identified a few problems including limitations to full and open competition in awarding subcontracts; government oversight; contract-billing system weaknesses; and a delay in closing out the contract because of inventory discrepancies.



08-002	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Task Orders 130 and 151: Program Management, Reimbursement, and Transition	4,797 KB	October 30, 2007
	This report on the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Task Orders 130 and 151 issued to Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. is another in a series of reports SIGIR has completed on this contract. If follows up on a report we previously issued that discussed the support provided under Task Order 130 and whether that support was reasonable, efficient, and cost-effective. This report includes Task Order 151, the successor to Task Order 130, and focuses on steps taken to address the management issues identified in our previous report.



08-003	Review of the Use of Contractors in Managing Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Projects	879 KB	October 29, 2007
	Because the Corps of Engineers lacked the capacity to oversee a reconstruction program as large as planned for Iraq, the CPA elected to develop a new program-management office that would rely on contractors for both the management and execution of reconstruction projects. This review looked at the practice of using contractors for program management services and the extent to which the government benefited from the services. The contract award- fee process is the primary means of assessing contractor performance and this review discusses some shortcomings in that process.



07-010	Agency Management of the Closeout Process for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Contracts	934 KB	October 24, 2007
	In the course of implementing the $20.9 billion Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) program, thousands of contracts were issued for activities ranging from the purchase of supplies to billion-dollar construction programs. Most of the work performed under the IRRF program involved the use of contracts, and contract closeout is the final phase in a contract's life cycle. This report discusses contract closeout activities at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Joint contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The review found that the agencies were making good progress in closing contracts, however, agency officials expressed concern in one area-closing out large design-build contracts. These contracts could take years to finalize.



08-001	Interim Report on Efforts and Further Actions Needed to Implement a Financial Management System in Iraq	2,005 KB	October 24, 2007
	This report discusses a contract between the U.S. Agency for International Development and Bearing Point, Inc. for a broad range of tasks related to economic and financial reforms for Iraq. One of the task orders under that contract was to develop and implement a new Iraq Financial Management System. SIGIR found it difficult to determine specifically what had been developed and implements and how much was expended in developing the system. The Iraqi Ministries continue to operate their legacy financial system and Iraqi user requirements have not been identified and incorporated in the system's development. In July 2007, the U.S. Embassy ordered the suspension of the IFMIS project pending clarification of Iraqi government support for the system. At present, the Embassy does not have a firm plan or strategy for addressing the next steps in the development of the system.



07-011	Controls Over Unliquidated Obligations in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	1,434 KB	October 23, 2007
	This report was to determine the amount of IRRF unliquidated obligations retained by the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development and whether those agencies have established adequate management controls over their unliquidated obligations. The report discusses each agency's policies and procedures for monitoring obligations, its compliance with Federal Acquisition Regulations, and opportunities for them to improve their performance, document the results of their reviews, and expedite the deobligation of funds.



07-016	Interim Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Spending Under Its Contract for the Iraqi Police Training Program	2,493 KB	October 23, 2007
	This audit was to be the second in a series of focused financial reviews of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund conducted by SIGIR. On March 22, 2007, SIGIR announced the subject review to determine: (1) what the Government required under contract S-LMAQM-04-C-0030, (2) what the contractor provided, (3) how the money was spent, and (4) what contract oversight was provided. However, shortly after the work began, SIGIR learned that these objectives could not be fully accomplished. Officials with the DoS Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), the program execution office, told SIGIR that INL did not have the information needed to identify what DynCorp International, LLC (DynCorp) provided under the contract or how funds were spent. INL has a number of initiatives to improve its management and oversight of the contract and recoup funds inappropriately paid to DynCorp. Because of these problems and initiatives, SIGIR has temporarily suspended this work and plans to follow up later on INL's progress in implementing the initiatives and addressing the serious contract management issues. This report is an interim report that summarizes the information SIGIR has gathered.



07-015	Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq	4,434 KB	October 18, 2007
	This report discusses the results of the SIGIR review of the effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) program in Iraq. It is our third report on PRTs and examines the PRT program and provinces in Iraq across five selected areas of program emphasis: governance, rule of law, economic development, reconstruction, and political reconciliation. SIGIR found that the PRT program is making incremental progress in developing the nation's provincial and local government capacity to effectively govern and manage its own reconstruction, despite continuing political and ethnic conflicts, as well as the difficult security situation. However, Iraq's complex and overlapping sectarian, political, and ethnic conflicts, as well as the difficult environment continue to hinder progress. Despite the efforts of PRT civilian and military officials who are working under dangerous and austere conditions to accelerate the Iraqi transition to self reliance, resolving these problems will likely be a slow process, requiring years of steady engagement and will depend heavily on the security environment and political settlement at the national level. This report contains two recommendations; one for measuring progress at the PRTs and one for deconflicting civil/military reconstruction activities.



07-005	Fact Sheet on Sources and Uses of U.S. Funding Provided in Fiscal Year 2006 for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction	1,416 KB	July 27, 2007
	The Congress appropriated about $5.4 billion, in additional non-IRRF funding made available in FY 2006, to four separate funds, for various relief and reconstruction projects in Iraq. However, the Congress did not legislate the same requirements for reporting the proposed uses of these funds as it had for IRRF. This fact sheet provides information on the FY 2006 funding made available by the Congress for Iraq relief and reconstruction activities, the reporting requirements for that funding, and the plans and procedures for the funds that have been put in place by the U.S. government organizations carrying out the relief and reconstruction activities. To obtain this information, SIGIR conducted a survey with applicable U.S. government organizations, which identified between 29 and 230 calendar days had elapsed from the time the funds were made available by the Congress until they reached the field-level implementing organizations through a series of agency apportionment, allotment, allowance, and other funding transactions.



07-008	Fact Sheet on the Roles and Responsibilities of U.S. Government Organizations Conducting IRRF-funded Reconstruction Activities	1,275 KB	July 26, 2007
	The Congress appropriated nearly $21 billion to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) through Public Law 108-11 and Public Law 108-106. Leadership of the reconstruction effort has changed several times, and many U.S. government organizations are currently participating under the overall responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense. The leadership changes and myriad participants have contributed to complex organizational relationships that could potentially cause confusion. To provide context to the U.S. government organizations' roles and responsibilities in Iraq reconstruction, SIGIR conducted a survey of each U.S. government agency with responsibility for at least one activity in Iraq. We identified at least 62 agencies or major sub-organizations within these agencies. We performed the survey from April 2006 through May 2007, capturing information in these areas: Authority/Mission, Roles/ Responsibilities in Iraq, Organizational Structure, Policies/Procedures, Funding, Performance Reporting, and Mission Cessation/Transfer.



07-003	Cost-to-complete Reporting for Iraq Reconstruction Projects	856 KB	July 26, 2007
	This report discusses the results of the SIGIR review of cost-to-complete reporting and follows up on our earlier reviews to determine the progress in implementing our previous recommendations. As of the quarter ending March 31, 2007, the Department of State has yet to meet its mandate to provide the Congress with information on the uses of all Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds (IRRF) monies on a project-by-project basis, including the cost to complete each project. SIGIR was told that systems limitations related to automating the data have continued to result in unreliable data. However, SIGIR's review found that the Gulf Region Division (GRD) of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers prepares and reports project status to the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) Deputy Director and these reports contain detailed project-level cost-to-complete information. Since May 8, 2007, GRD has provided these reports to IRMO's successor, the Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO). SIGIR believes that this project status information meets the intent of what the Congress has requested, yet neither IRMO nor ITAO have forwarded the GRD reports to NEA. SIGIR also believes that utilizing this project status report would not impose any additional reporting requirement on GRD—the organization with project oversight for most of the ongoing IRRF-funded reconstruction projects. In SIGIR's prior reports, we made a total of 20 recommendations for improving cost-to-complete reporting; 2 remain open. The Congress has appropriated an additional $10.2 billion for Iraq through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) and the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF). Neither law included a requirement for cost-to-complete reporting. This report contains three new recommendations and two Lessons Learned regarding the congressional requirement for reporting on cost to complete.



07-014	Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq	1,327 KB	July 25, 2007
	This report provides the status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) expansion, as well as an update on actions taken to recommendations we made in SIGIR's earlier report, Status of Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, SIGIR-06-034, issued on October 29, 2006. On January 10, 2007, President Bush announced a "New Way Forward" to accelerate Iraq's transition to self-reliance. The strategy called for a surge of civilian and military personnel into the provinces and a doubling of the number of PRTs and personnel to support and sustain the transition to Iraqi control. The PRT Program is currently in phase two of a three-phase expansion program and is on course to meet the Administration's goal of doubling the number of PRTs and supporting staff in Iraq. Since SIGIR's October 2006 report, the PRT Program has made strides in overcoming problems with civil-military integration, operational support issues, and resource and staffing shortfalls. The deployment of several hundred personnel to carry out the PRT mission has strained staffing and support capabilities, but the PRT Program expansion is on course. SIGIR made recommendations relating to the development of a performance monitoring system, objectives within milestones, and a workforce plan. DoD and the U.S. Embassy-Iraq generally concurred with the recommendations.



07-004	Transferring Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Capital Projects to the Government of Iraq	1,102 KB	July 25, 2007
	The Congress appropriated nearly $21 billion to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) through Public Law 108-11 and Public Law 108-106. Leadership of the reconstruction effort has changed several times, and many U.S. government organizations are currently participating under the overall responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense. The leadership changes and myriad participants have contributed to complex organizational relationships that could potentially cause confusion. To provide context to the U.S. government organizations' roles and responsibilities in Iraq reconstruction, SIGIR conducted a survey of each U.S. government agency with responsibility for at least one activity in Iraq. We identified at least 62 agencies or major sub-organizations within these agencies. We performed the survey from April 2006 through May 2007, capturing information in these areas: Authority/Mission, Roles/ Responsibilities in Iraq, Organizational Structure, Policies/Procedures, Funding, Performance Reporting, and Mission Cessation/Transfer.



07-009	Review of Bechtel's Spending under Its Phase II Iraq Reconstruction Contract	1,688 KB	July 24, 2007
	This audit is a first in a series of focused financial reviews of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). Our intent is to perform individual contract reviews of the larger contractors and, at the end of the series, identify lessons learned and any leading practices for future reference. This audit specifically sought to identify the costs incurred and the results of the work performed by Bechtel that was funded by the IRRF under the direction of the U.S. Agency for International Development. SIGIR also identified the methods used to record and report associated costs. The Phase II contract was awarded on January 5, 2004, for $1.8 billion. On March 31, 2007, the contract ended, and the total estimated cost reported was $1.33 billion. This report focuses on the Phase II contract and the 24 job orders through which the contracted work was accomplished. The 24 job orders were allocated to sectors as follows: 14 in water and sanitation, 8 in power, 1 in telecommunications, and 1 in buildings. Overall, the Phase II contract accomplished a substantial amount of work that contributed to the reconstruction of Iraq, particularly in the electricity and water and sanitation sectors. However, the outcomes on individual projects were mixed: some were completed as originally envisioned, others were cancelled, and still others were partially completed and transferred to other organizations for completion. This report contains no recommendations, but SIGIR identified three important lessons to be learned from the contracting, execution, and oversight of the Phase II contract for future reconstruction in Iraq and elsewhere.



07-007	Status of U.S. Government Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq	910 KB	July 24, 2007
	This report discusses the results of the SIGIR assessment of U.S. government anticorruption efforts in Iraq and follows up on our earlier review to determine the U.S. Embassy's progress in implementing our prior recommendations. Addressing the issue of corruption remains a top Embassy priority for Iraq. SIGIR's analysis generally shows two levels of effort—one aimed at economic, financial, and public integrity reforms and one aimed at technical and law enforcement reforms. Nevertheless, since our July 2006 audit report (SIGIR-06-021), several challenges impeded the progress in implementing a coherent anticorruption program. On balance, there has been some progress by individual initiatives. One initiative included the development of a financial management tool, the Iraqi Financial Management Information System (FMIS); but, because of security and safety issues, the contractor has suspended work on this project. As of June 30, 2007, limited progress has been made implementing recommendations SIGIR made in its July 2006 audit report. The Embassy stated that it supported and was committed to pursuing SIGIR's recommendations, and provided additional information on actions underway.



07-001	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program Task Order 130: Requirements Validation, Government Oversight, and Contractor Performance	2,855 KB	June 22, 2007
	The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) performed a review, at the request of the Management Counselor, U.S. Embassy-Iraq, to determine whether the U.S. government is receiving the services paid for under the U.S. Department of the Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Task Order 130 and whether the support provided is reasonable, efficient, and cost effective. The focus of this review is LOGCAP Task Order 130, awarded April 27, 2006, to Kellogg Brown and Root Services Inc., (KBR), to provide services necessary to support, operate, and maintain the Chief of Mission and Multi-National Force-Iraq staffs located at the U.S. Embassy-Iraq, and at other Chief of Mission sites within Iraq located in Baghdad, Basra, Hilla and Kirkuk.



07-012	Review of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Unmatched Disbursements at the Department of State	801 KB	April 26, 2007
	This report discusses the results of SIGIR's review of internal controls over disbursements of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds (IRRF) apportioned to the Department of State (DoS). DoS has adequate internal controls to minimize the occurrence of unmatched disbursements of IRRF funds. SIGIR tested DoS's internal controls for a sample of the approximately $1.6 billion in funds obligated, and $1.3 billion in funds disbursed, as of September 30, 2006. In general, SIGIR found that IRRF obligations and disbursements recorded in DoS's accounting system were supported by proper documentation; and that disbursements could be properly matched to existing obligations. This report contains no recommendations.



07-006	Management of the Commander's Emergency Response Program in Iraq for Fiscal Year 2006	1,353 KB	April 26, 2007
	In fiscal year 2006, the Congress appropriated $923 million for the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), of which $510 million was allocated to the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), a subordinate command of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). CERP enables U.S. military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to undertake a variety of non-construction and construction activities to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements in their areas of responsibility. This review specifically sought to determine whether the MNC-I had established and implemented adequate management controls over the Commander's Emergency Response Program for fiscal year 2006; and to assess actions taken by U.S. government officials on recommendations SIGIR made in three previous reports. SIGIR found: MNC-I has improved controls over fund accountability, but weaknesses remain in project documentation. Using applicable guidance and SIGIR's sample review of available documentation for 122 projects, we determined that fiscal year 2006 CERP funds were used for intended and authorized purposes. MNC-I has continued to make improvements in coordinating its CERP projects with the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) and the U.S. Agency for International Development, as well as with Iraqi provincial and national government entities. However, according to IRMO staff, the level of coordination for CERP activity outside of Baghdad was dependent on the province where the project was occurring and varies on the strength of the provincial reconstruction and development committee and the operational abilities of the provincial reconstruction team. Measuring the effect of a CERP project is often complex and difficult. MNC-I coordinates the efforts of several staff offices (project management, financial management, etc.) to determine the intended effects of CERP projects in a city or region. Although SIGIR made a recommendation to address transfer and sustainment in its previous report, this condition remains since we determined that there is no specific MNC-I guidance for the transfer or sustainment of CERP projects to the Government of Iraq. SIGIR made three recommendations in this report to MNC-I officials who concurred and have identified corrective actions that have been initiated or planned.



07-002	Status of the Advanced First Responder Network	846 KB	April 25, 2007
	The Advanced First Responder Network (AFRN) project is intended to address the limited communications capabilities of Iraq's emergency first responders-police, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel-by enabling interoperable communications for the Iraqi Ministry of Interior security and safety forces throughout Iraq. The AFRN system was transferred to full Government of Iraq ownership and control on June 26, 2006. As of March 28, 2007, U.S. government organizations had expended $200.4 million in U.S. funds and $16 million in Development Funds for Iraq money for AFRN development, operations, and maintenance. The objective of this review was to assess the management actions taken by the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) to correct the AFRN communications deficiencies and property accountability conditions, as well as the progress made by the Ministry of Interior to sustain the system, since SIGIR's previous report, Review of the Advanced First Responder Network, (SIGIR-06-020, July 28, 2006). SIGIR found: MNSTC-I has taken effective corrective actions for the five recommendations made in the previous report. Operational effectiveness of the AFRN system has improved, as demonstrated by increased usage by both the first responders and Iraqi citizens. After the turnover of AFRN to the Government of Iraq, a sustainment contract managed by the U.S. government and funded by the Government of Iraq was in place until it expired on December 31, 2006. Since then, MNSTC-I has provided about $2.5 million from the Iraqi Security Forces Fund to continue the sustainment of AFRN while the Ministry of Interior is in the process of solicitation and award of its own sustainment contract. The temporary bridging contract will end on March 31, 2007, and the Ministry of Interior may not have completed an award for a follow-on sustainment contract. Without a timely award of their contract for sustainment, the Government of Iraq jeopardizes the gains that the AFRN system has already made and the AFRN system itself. However, this is an action that must be taken by the Government of Iraq, and therefore this report contains no recommendation on this matter for U.S. government action. This report contains no recommendations.



06-044	Fact Sheet on Major U.S. Contractors' Security Costs Related to Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Contracting Activities	795 KB	January 30, 2007
	SIGIR initiated this project in order to capture the following information: (1) the extent to which major U.S. contractors have identified, captured, and reported the security costs of their IRRF contracting activities; and (2) the impacts of these security costs in relation to the overall original project estimates. The following contractors were asked to respond to SIGIR's survey: Bechtel National, Inc.; FluorAMEC, LLC; Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc.; Lucent Technologies; Parsons; Parsons Iraq Joint Venture; Perini Corporation; Washington International/Black & Veatch; and Washington International, Inc. All nine contractors responded to SIGIR's request for information. The contractors generally provided security costs, total costs, and security costs as a percentage of total costs. Four of the nine contractors did not provide a summary of all total cost data; in these cases SIGIR calculated total costs based on the information provided. Contractor security costs ranged from a low of 7.6% to a high of 16.7%. The average for all contractors when identifying percentage of security costs to total costs was 12.5%. Detailed responses to SIGIR's request for information from each of the nine contractors are included in SIGIR's Fact Sheet on Major U.S. Contractors' Security Costs Related to Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Contracting Activities (Restricted Distribution), SIGIR-06-042, January 30, 2007. This detailed fact sheet is available on a need-to-know basis because some of the contractor-provided information is marked proprietary by the provider. Requests by mail can be made to SIGIR Office of General Counsel, 400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202.



06-043	Review of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Unmatched Disbursements	838 KB	January 30, 2007
	This report discusses SIGIR's review of internal controls over disbursements of the IRRF apportioned to DoD and USAID. SIGIR's results were limited to an assessment of DoD and USAID because DoS officials did not provide access to the detailed IRRF obligations and disbursements data needed for the review. SIGIR plans to perform a separate audit of unmatched DoS disbursements at a later date. DoD has effective internal controls to prevent unmatched disbursements. We tested DoD controls over $9.2 billion in disbursements and found no unmatched disbursements. USAID has effective internal controls to prevent unmatched disbursements. We tested controls over $4.3 billion in disbursements and found no unmatched disbursements.



06-040	Improper Obligations Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 2)	900 KB	January 30, 2007
	On January 28, 2006, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division (GRD), developed an internal plan, including financial guidance. The plan underwent legal review at multiple levels within DoD. In February or March 2006, the senior official in the DoD Office of General Counsel (Fiscal) orally indicated to the Director, Management and Control in the Army Budget Office, that the proposed plan to obligate IRRF 2 funds for contingencies was permissible, but in June 2006, this decision was reversed. On September 22, 2006, SIGIR issued an interim audit report on improper obligations using IRRF 2. The review determined that $362 million recorded in USACE financial records did not constitute proper obligations. A series of actions were taken between September 29, 2006, and October 4, 2006, to ensure that the funds in question remained available consistent with appropriations law. These funds were returned to the Department of the Army, moved to the custody of USACE, allowed to expire, and then returned to GRD for its use. On September 29 and 30, 2006, $385.2 million in IRRF 2 funds were returned to the Department of the Army: $378.8 million in deobligated funds that were returned by GRD on September 29-30, 2006, which included the $362 million questioned in SIGIR's interim report $6.4 million still held for the defunct Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, the original agency established for Iraq reconstruction The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) has developed procedures for the use of expired funds, Updated Procedures for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) Expired Funds, November 28, 2006. They require each IRRF-implementing organization to notify or receive approval from IRMO on the use of the expired funds, depending on the amount involved. While GRD has quantified its requirements for the use of the expired funds, IRMO's procedures call for its approval on a case-by-case basis to ensure the best use of limited funds. SIGIR believes that having IRMO's approval is a good start, but it may be challenging from a strategic perspective.



06-030	Status of Medical Equipment and Other Non-construction Items Purchased for PHCs	1,229 KB	January 30, 2007
	At the time of SIGIR's July 2006 report on medical equipment, 20 of the 151 medical and dental equipment sets procured under the Parsons contract were physically located at the sites of 20 PHCs that were fully or partially constructed by Parsons. Another 115 full or partial sets were located at a U.S. government-controlled warehouse in Abu Ghraib. The total number of sets in Abu Ghraib was 130, as of July 30, 2006. The location of one set is unknown. Since then, the Gulf Region Division (GRD), as the program manager of the PHC project, has examined 102 equipment crates that were damaged, and opened and inspected 61 of the most damaged. In 59 of the crates, GRD found that all of the equipment was accounted for, and almost all of the equipment was missing in 2 crates. GRD did not test the medical equipment to ensure that it was in working order. On January 21, 2007, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) told SIGIR that that for one manufacturing contractor, warranties are effective for 15 months from the invoice date or 12 months from the commissioning date (whichever is sooner). SIGIR identified that approximately $38 million had been disbursed for three additional contracts. GRD and JCC-I/A modified a generator/transformer contract to have the contractor store and secure the items until required at the PHC sites. GRD and JCC-I/A, however, did not take effective action to protect all of the furniture and consumable medical supplies. Specifically: The government contracted for 142 sets of furniture for the PHCs under contract W27P4B-05-C-0016. Six sets of furniture were delivered directly to PHC construction sites, 90 sets were delivered to the U.S. government-controlled warehouse in Abu Ghraib, and 46 sets were delivered to the Iraqi Ministry of Health warehouse in Erbil. The furniture delivered to Abu Ghraib was formally accepted, inventoried, and inspected. Damaged items were corrected by the contractor. However, the furniture at Erbil was formally accepted for payment purposes but was not inventoried and inspected. The furniture at Erbil has also been reported as damaged. The contractor was not notified in a timely manner and is refusing to take responsibility for furniture reported damaged after delivery. There were also 118 sets of consumable medical supplies ordered to provide 90-day "start-up" supply (approximate) for each PHC. 112 sets of consumable medical supplies were delivered to both the Abu Ghraib warehouse and the Iraqi Ministry of Health warehouse in Erbil. Six sets were delivered directly to PHCs under construction. GRD stated that it inventoried crates at Abu Ghraib but did not open the crates. At Erbil, we found no evidence that the U.S. government formally accepted, inventoried, or inspected these items.



06-045	Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq	1,797 KB	January 30, 2007
	Iraq's governing capacity has suffered from years of centralized control that led to the decay of core functions in many key institutions and ministries. Government systems and processes were weakened in strategic and policy planning, finance, information technology, and civil service. Capacity development is defined as an activity or multiple activities that lead to the transfer of knowledge, skills, and abilities across a range of functions over a period of time. It is also an essential prerequisite for sustainment, thus enabling individuals, units, organizations, and systems to perform functions efficiently to establish sustainable operations. A national capacity-development program in Iraq is a critical component of the U.S. government's goal of building the capacity of the Government of Iraq to provide sustainable security and services to the Iraqi public. U.S. government organizations have signaled their commitment to developing Iraqi governing capacity by budgeting approximately $125 million for current programming and requesting an additional $380 million for FY 2007/2008. Undermining the U.S.-led effort to build Iraqi capacity is an operating structure where capacity-development activities are spread among multiple organizations and offices that are working without clear overall objectives, without a synchronized plan for conducting assignments, and without a system to measure if progress is or is not being made. Some organizations appear to address a crisis rather than projects that have been defined and prioritized as a part of an overall detailed strategy. Further complicating the U.S. effort is the lack of a single entity with the mandate to implement a unified comprehensive U.S. ministerial capacity-development program in Iraq, having full authority not only to direct proactive solutions, but also to measure desired end-state results. Establishing viable Iraqi governing capacity will almost certainly require an investment of additional years and resources. This effort will not go unchallenged at the outset, given the difficult security situation and the increasing sectarianism within Iraqi society and its governing institutions. Both international and regional support are critical factors in the formula for success. The Iraqi government and the United Nations have much hope in the success of the International Compact for Iraq. However, this vehicle to unify the country is dependent upon each Iraqi minister demonstrating supportive leadership and strong commitment to the Compact and governing capacity to provide and sustain security and services to the Iraqi public.



06-029	Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Contract Number S LMAQM-04-C-0030, Task Order 0338, for the Iraqi Police Training Program Support	1,292 KB	January 30, 2007
	This report discusses the results of a joint Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and Department of State (DoS) Inspector General review. In Iraq, the DoS Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is responsible for assisting in the development of police capabilities. To assist in achieving its mission, the DoS awarded contract number S LMAQM-04-C-0030 to DynCorp International, LLC (DynCorp), and as part of this contract, Task Order 0338 was issued, with a not-to-exceed value of $188.7 million in June 2004. Under Task Order 0338, DynCorp was to provide: training services for international police liaison officers; training support equipment; construction of a residential camp on the Adnan Palace grounds in Baghdad to house training personnel; and construction of five regional camps at selected locations in Iraq. The actions relating to the establishment of the residential camp and the performance of unauthorized work by DynCorp are the principal focus of this report. SIGIR found that poor contract administration by INL and the DoS Office of Acquisition Management resulted in millions of dollars put at unnecessary risk and property that can not be accounted for that was acquired under Task Order 0338. Specifically, between July 2004 and June 2006, DoS paid about $43.8 million for manufacturing and temporary storage of a residential camp that has yet to be used, including $4.2 million for unauthorized work associated with the residential camp. In addition, DoS may have spent another $36.4 million for weapons and equipment, including armored vehicles, body armor, and communications equipment that cannot be accounted for. The report also discusses management control weaknesses regarding contracting and contract management. The report makes recommendations to address the conservation of funds; the reimbursement improperly authorized payment of funds for unauthorized work; the enforcement of contract administration duties and responsibilities; and the establishment and enforcement of tenure limitations for all contracting personnel. INL appears to be making some recent progress after about two years of attempting to find a resolution for the use of the residential camp trailers, in that discussions are underway for an alternative use of the trailers at the Baghdad Embassy. Also, according to INL officials, a number of steps have been initiated and completed to strengthen contract and management controls. SIGIR will continue its review of Task Order 0338 and will conduct a full review of the DynCorp contract and other expenditures by INL in Iraq.



06-036	Follow-up on SIGIR Recommendations Concerning the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI)	937 KB	January 29, 2007
	This report follows up on actions taken by U.S. government agencies to address recommendations made in previous SIGIR audit reports on the control and accountability for contracts, grants, and cash transactions using the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). These recommendations were made to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, the Joint Area Support Group-Central (JASG-C), and the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A). In April 2006, SIGIR reported that appropriate actions had been taken to close 23 of 40 SIGIR recommendations. Since then, SIGIR redirected recommendations that were made to the U.S. Ambassador to the DFI Administrator, who is also the Commanding General, JCC-I/A. This report follows up on the remaining 17 open recommendations to determine whether appropriate corrective actions were taken to address the deficiencies. Of the 17 recommendations that were open, 9 remain open. SIGIR considers the actions underway to be responsive for 6 of the 9. Effective action is not underway on the remaining 3 recommendations. SIGIR also observed that the U.S. government spent about $1.4 million on audit services and computer equipment to satisfy SIGIR recommendations, but failed to effectively write the contract and monitor the contractor's work. As a result, DFI accountability has only slightly improved. SIGIR makes no additional recommendations, but discusses a lesson learned regarding the need to write clear requirements in a statement of work for contracted services.



06-039	Review of USAID/Bechtel National, Inc., Property Management Controls for Contract SPU-C-00-04-00001-00	871 KB	January 29, 2007
	To support its mission and related infrastructure reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) awarded its contractor, Bechtel National, Inc., (Bechtel), two successive contracts, referred to as Phase I and II. Under the contracts, Bechtel was required to maintain the official property records. On July 18, 2005, USAID authorized the transfer of all IRRF-funded property—either supplied to or acquired by Bechtel or its subcontractors—from Bechtel's Phase I to Phase II property records. Thus all government property was consolidated in the Phase II contract property records. This report discusses SIGIR's review of government property management controls by USAID and Bechtel for the Phase II contract, SPU-C-00-04-00001-00. In performing the review, SIGIR learned that in 2005, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) reviewed Bechtel's management controls for the purchase and inventorying of government property and reported no significant deficiencies. Therefore, SIGIR concentrated its audit efforts on USAID's and Bechtel's property management controls over the disposition of government property under the contract. SIGIR's tests of those controls found that USAID and Bechtel provided adequate accountability over the disposition of government property. SIGIR made no recommendations.



06-034	Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq	2,007 KB	October 29, 2006
	The U.S. government continues to advance capacity-development programs in Iraq's ministries and provinces. For the past four decades, Iraq was a statist economy with a highly centralized administration. Baghdad drove budgeting and service delivery through ministries that funded the provinces. The decentralization of authority that the Coalition Provisional Authority initiated following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime had the effect of empowering inexperienced local officials to manage the delivery of provincial government services. The consequences of this devolution in decision-making required the United States and other donors to establish programs aimed at developing local capacities. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Program is key among these. PRTs provide the best opportunity for U.S. government experts to provide grassroots support in the development of nationwide governance capacity in Iraq. In October 2005, the PRTs were established by Cable 4045, issued jointly by the U.S. Embassy-Iraq and the U.S.-led Multi-National Force-Iraq. The PRT's mission is to assist Iraq's provincial governments in developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, to promote increased security and rule of law, to promote political and economic development, and to provide the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population. The objectives of this audit were to determine whether PRTs are fully empowered, staffed, and resourced to meet their mission, and to identify any other barriers impeding achievement of the PRT mission. The PRT program has been ongoing for more than a year and some PRTs are still being established. Many obstacles have been overcome, but many remain, such as the ever-changing security situation, the difficulty of integrating civilian and military personnel, the lack of a finalized agreement on PRT operational requirements and responsibilities, a lag in funding resources, and the difficulty in recruiting and retaining qualified civilian personnel. Now that the PRT has completed its first year, it is time to start gathering lessons learned about what works and what needs improvement in the implementation of the Iraq PRT model.



06-033	Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	1,234 KB	October 28, 2006
	This review was requested by the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. In his request, the Chairman stated that a critical element of the reconstruction effort in Iraq is the development of logistics support capabilities for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) within the Ministries of Defense and Interior, including providing and maintaining weapons. The United States plans to provide equipment for approximately 325,500 ISF personnel by December 2006. Of these, 277,600 have been issued weapons as of August 2006. Responsibility for determining weapons requirements and the initial equipping and training of ISF personnel primarily rests with the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). About $133 million of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) was used to purchase more than 370,000 weapons through 19 contracts with 142 separate delivery orders. The weapons were small arms, comprising 12 types that ranged from semiautomatic pistols and assault rifles to heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. We identified the several factors as limiting ISF's capability to independently maintain and sustain these specific weapons, including the lack of spare parts and technical repair manuals; the apparent decision by ISF units not to fill vacant arms maintenance positions; and the questionable accuracy of MNSTC-I inventories for 3 of the 12 types of weapons purchased with IRRF funds. Also, MNSTC-I had not fully complied with the requirement to register the serial numbers of all weapons in the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program.



06-032	Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities	1,385 KB	October 28, 2006
	This review was requested by the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. In his request, the Chairman stated that a critical element of the reconstruction effort in Iraq is the development of logistics support capabilities for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) within the Ministries of Defense and Interior. The Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) is using funds from both the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and the Iraq Security Forces Fund to build the logistics capabilities of the Iraqi Army under the Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi local and national police forces under the Ministry of Interior. Our report is limited to the use of IRRF to achieve these goals. As of August 1, 2006, the United States had spent $666 million from the IRRF on the development and fielding of these capabilities. MNF-I has made some progress in its efforts to build effective logistics capabilities within the Iraqi Army and to transition these capabilities to the control of the Ministry of Defense. However, significant challenges remain that put at risk MNF-I's goal to transition a sustainable and maintainable logistics operation to the Ministry of Defense by January 1, 2008. Further, we found that the planning for the logistics capabilities for the Ministry of Interior is incomplete. Consequently, we also believe that MNF-I will face significant challenges in implementing and transitioning logistics capabilities to the Ministry of Interior and its local and national police forces.



06-031	Management of the Iraqi Interim Government Fund	1,125 KB	October 27, 2006
	In 2004, the Iraqi Interim Government established the Iraqi Interim Government Fund (IIGF), providing $136 million from the Development Fund for Iraq for U.S. military commanders to respond to the urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements in their areas of responsibility. The Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) is responsible for overseeing and reporting monthly to the Iraqi government on the status of IIGF projects and financial information; MNF-I's subordinate command, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), is responsible for management of the IIGF projects. The objectives of this audit were to determine if MNF-I can properly account for the funds provided by the Iraqi Interim Government and has used the funds for their intended purposes. We found that MNF-I can account for the $136 million of IIGF monies in its overall financial records. For the 26 projects we randomly reviewed, MNF-I used the funds for the intended purposes and in accordance with appropriate rules and regulations. However, we also found that project files were incomplete and that data could not be reconciled to the financial records or to the project files. Further, although monthly reports to the Iraqi government on the status and uses of the IIGF are required, we found that MNF-I had not reported to the Iraqi government since December 2005. MNF-I and MNC-I have actions underway to improve data quality. In response to our report, MNF-I stated that it has resumed monthly reporting to the Iraqi government.



06-035	Interim Audit Report on Inappropriate Use of Proprietary Data Markings by the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Contractor	925 KB	October 26, 2006
	The purpose of this interim review was to provide an assessment of whether the LOGCAP Task Order 130 contractor, Kellogg Brown and Root Services, Inc. (KBR), is following applicable Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) direction on classifying proprietary data and is complying with contract provisions regarding information. We concluded that KBR's practice of routinely marking almost all of the information it provides to the government as KBR proprietary data, even when the data marked does not relate to internal contractor information such as indirect costs, labor rates, or internal processes—and so does not appear to be proprietary—is not consistent with the direction in the FAR as to what constitutes proprietary data and is a misuse of the FAR. This inhibits transparency of government activities and the use of taxpayer funds and places unnecessary requirements on the government to both protect from public disclosure information received from KBR and to challenge inappropriate proprietary markings.



06-028	Review of Administrative Task Orders for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts	1,503 KB	October 23, 2006
	This audit was initiated to evaluate the effectiveness of project management and the monitoring and controls exercised by administrative contracting officers. Administrative task orders (ATOs) were intended to capture all administrative and overhead costs for each design-build contract, separate from direct costs, for each individual construction task order under the contract. We found that the design-build contractors' administrative costs were not uniformly tracked because ATOs were not issued for all 11 design-build contracts and there were inconsistencies in the ATOs that were issued. Furthermore, the ATOs were issued at different times after contract award. In addition, a series of audits conducted by DCAA found that all but one of the accounting and billing systems associated with the five contracts for which ATOs were issued were not adequate to capture administrative costs.



06-038	Unclassified Summary of SIGIR's Review of Efforts to Increase Iraq's Capability to Protect Its Energy Infrastructure	818 KB	September 27, 2006
	This report provides the unclassified summary of a classified audit report we issued on July 27, 2006, that addresses U.S. efforts to increase the capacity of the Iraqi government to protect its critical oil and electricity infrastructure. Specifically, this report addresses: Factors affecting Iraq's infrastructure, including attacks, physical condition, and criminal activity. This is an expansion of our original objective of focusing on attacks in recognition of the importance of factors other than attacks. This objective's purpose is to identify the scope of requirements/needs. The extent to which the Iraqi government can perform independently to protect its oil and electricity infrastructure. This is to identify a baseline metric. The support the United States is providing the Iraqi government to increase its capability to protect its oil and electricity infrastructure. This is to identify the current and future investment of resources needed to attain the desired capability.



06-037	Interim Audit Report on Improper Obligations Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF-2)	809 KB	September 22, 2006
	Our review of the Project and Contracting Office obligations recorded in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE's) financial records determined that the $362 million recorded under the vendor name as "Dummy Vendor" does not constitute proper obligations. The establishment of these obligations is not consistent with a 1995 decision by the Comptroller General of the United States on appropriations availability, the U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO) Appropriations Law Manual, and the DoD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) requirements for the recording and reviewing of commitments and obligations. If action to obligate these funds consistent with GAO and DoD guidance on what constitutes proper obligations is not taken by September 30, 2006, they will expire. As a result, USACE actually over–reported its obligations by $362 million so it really had as of August 24, 2006, $826 million remaining to obligate by the end of the fiscal year.



06-026	Review of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Management of the Basrah Children's Hospital Project	1,505 KB	July 28, 2006
	As part of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Program, USAID was tasked with the construction of a modern pediatric facility in Basrah to improve the quality of care and life expectancy for both the women and children of Iraq. In November 2003, Congress authorized $50 million for this project from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). USAID, in turn, established a Memorandum of Understanding with Project HOPE, under which Project HOPE would take the lead in providing a significant portion of the hospital equipment and have responsibility for training medical and administrative staff. The scope of work was modified in July 2005 at the request of the Iraqi Ministry of Health to increase the number of beds and to upgrade the facility to be an oncology center. USAID issued a job order for construction of the hospital in August 2004 to Bechtel National, Inc. (Bechtel). Bechtel began initial activities to include site preparation and, in mid-October 2004, awarded a design-build subcontract for $37 million. The job order with Bechtel required that the hospital be completed by December 31, 2005. Completion of the project slipped several times over the next year. The purpose of this review was to determine the effectiveness of the U.S. government project management team and the contracting team in the performance of this project.



06-025	Review of the Medical Equipment Purchased for the Primary Healthcare Centers Associated with Parsons Global Services, Inc., Contract Number W914NS–04–D–0006	2,196 KB	July 28, 2006
	On March 25, 2004, contract W914NS-04-D-0006, a cost-plus award fee type contract, was awarded to Parsons Delaware, Inc. Under this contract Parsons was required to construct 150 Primary Healthcare Centers (PHCs) as well as provide and install 151 medical and dental equipment sets for each of the 150 PHCs as well as a medical training academy. The total definitized cost of the equipment was approximately $70 million. In April 2006, SIGIR reported on the construction phase of this contract and issued an interim report. The concerns raised included: (1) the lack of written plans for the acceptance, storage, and use of the 131 medical equipment sets to be delivered by Parsons in April 2006 that were in excess to the current PHC needs as a result of descoping the number of PHCs to be constructed from 150 to 20, and the non-construction of the medical training academy (whose construction was not part of the Parsons contract); (2) the need to ensure U.S. government accountability of the equipment upon delivery to the Iraqi Ministry of Health warehouse in Erbil, Iraq by Parsons; and (3) U.S. government's inability to ensure proper protection and accountability of equipment to be stored in an Iraqi warehouse. This report provides our results on whether medical equipment was properly accounted for, and identifies the impact the descoping of the PHCs construction project had on this medical equipment purchase.



06-023	Changes in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program Activities – January through March 2006	835 KB	July 28, 2006
	In January 2006 and again in April 2006 we reported on the challenges faced by the Coalition Provisional Authority, and its successor, the Chief of Mission in Iraq, in directing and supervising Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) program activities. Our first report focused on changes that occurred in the United State's original reconstruction plans between November 2003 and September 30, 2005. In April 2006, we issued a second report that updated our earlier report to include project changes that occurred between October 1, 2005 and December 31, 2005. This report provides a further update of changes that occurred between January 1, 2006 and March 31, 2006.



06-021	Joint Survey of the U.S. Embassy – Iraq's Anticorruption Program	1,035 KB	July 28, 2006
	Corruption in Iraq siphons resources from needed government services and reduces the willingness of international investors to invest in Iraq. It has been identified as a major barrier to establishing citizens' trust and confidence in their government and to improving economic growth and prosperity. Unless reforms are put in place, corruption may jeopardize the political stability of the new government. The U.S. Embassy-Iraq has identified assisting the Iraqi government in its efforts to reduce corruption as one of its highest priorities. SIGIR and the DoS, Office of the Inspector General, jointly initiated this survey of the U.S. Embassy-Iraq's Anticorruption Program at the request of the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq. This product reports SIGIR's position on the results of the joint work that address the survey objectives. The objectives of this survey were to determine (1) which U.S. government agencies participate in the anticorruption program in Iraq, and whether they have a coordinated strategic plan with identified goals; (2) whether program outcomes and metrics have been established to measure progress and success; and (3) whether organizational roles and responsibilities have been clearly identified and resources provided to meet the program goals. In addition, the survey identified international leading practices from other organizations that have had successful experience in reducing corruption.



06-020	Review of the Advanced First Responder Network	1,313 KB	July 28, 2006
	Recognizing the problematic security environment that existed in Iraq in April of 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) initiated a project to deploy a communications network to enable interoperable communications for Iraqi Ministry of Interior security and safety forces throughout Iraq to improve public safety. This project, commonly referred to as the Advanced First Responder Network, or simply "AFRN", intended to address the limited communication capabilities of Iraq's emergency first responders: the police, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel. In total, the AFRN design-build project, first responder radio procurement, and subsequent sustainment efforts will cost $218.5 million by the end of Fiscal Year 2006. The AFRN system was transferred to full Iraqi government ownership and control on June 26, 2006. This report addresses whether responsible personnel efficiently and effectively managed the Advanced First Responder Network project that was created to provide Iraqi police, fire, and emergency medical units with a core national public safety communication, command, and control system.



06-019	Review of the Use of Definitization Requirements for Contracts Supporting Reconstruction in Iraq	1,226 KB	July 28, 2006
	A variety of contract actions were used in awarding IRRF reconstruction contracts to meet this mandate, including what is referred to in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) as an undefinitized contract action. The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether the definitization process for contracts (including letter contracts and task orders) funded by the IRRF complied with applicable regulations, policies, and procedures and whether such contracts were being definitized in a timely basis. While the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development award contracts using IRRF, neither identified contracts subject to definitization. Therefore, our review focused on contracts awarded by the DoD.



06-017	Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government	979 KB	July 28, 2006
	This SIGIR review looked narrowly at IRRF-funded assets including their transfer and short-term sustainment. It also looked at the support provided to the Iraqi government to enhance its capacity to manage and operate the assets. Agencies that will remain in Iraq after the completion of IRRF-funded work will have a longer-term role in capacity-development and infrastructure sustainability as U.S. support of reconstruction efforts in Iraq shifts from grants to foreign assistance programs managed by the Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). This report discusses U.S. plans to accomplish this transition.



06-024	Joint Cash Count : Iraq National Weapons Card Program	403 KB	July 26, 2006




06-018	Survey of the Status of Funding for Iraq Programs Allocated to the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs as of December 31, 2005	1,619 KB	July 2006
	This report presents the results of the joint survey by the Department of State (Department), Office of Inspector General (OIG), and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) of funding for Iraqi-related activities by the Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL).



06-016	Interim Audit Report on the Review of the Equipment Purchased for Primary Healthcare Centers Associated with Parsons Global Services, Contract Number W914NS-04-D-0006	60 KB	April 29, 2006
	SIGIR conducted an audit to determine whether the medical equipment acquired by Parsons Global is properly accounted for and to identify the impact of descoping the PHCs contract on the medical equipment. This interim report is provided to alert management to concerns SIGIR noted on the accountability for, and utilization of, the $70 million of medical equipment procured by Parsons Global for the PHC construction project, providing them the opportunity to take corrective actions before the final report is completed.



06-015	Iraqi Armed Forces Seized Assets Fund: Review of Contracts and Financial Documents	927 KB	April 28, 2006
	In response to a USAAA recommendation, MNSTC-I requested that SIGIR conduct a further review of MNSTC-I's reconciliation of the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) Seized Assets Fund and associated financial disbursing documents to determine whether any issues warranted further investigation. Discrepancies included missing contracts, contract numbers, and supporting invoices. SIGIR analysis of the combined records found payments exceeding documentation limits, potential overpayments, and potential de-obligations.



06-013	Briefing to the International Advisory and Monitoring Board for Iraq: Management Controls Over the Development Fund for Iraq	1,906 KB	April 28, 2006
	This briefing, presented on April 5, 2006, provided the status of corrective actions taken in response to a series of audits conducted by SIGIR addressing the use of the DFI for Iraq relief and reconstruction activities. These recommendations were made to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, the JASG-C, and the JCC-I/A. Overall, these audit reports found a lack of control and accountability for contracts, grants, and cash transactions using the DFI and made recommendations for improvement.



06-012	Development Fund for Iraq Cash Accountability Review: Joint Area Support Group-Central/Falluja	811 KB	April 28, 2006
	This particular audit addresses DFI cash held by the Division Level Agent (DLA) in Falluja, Iraq. DLA is responsible for issuing cash payments to designated entities (individuals and/or businesses) and for clearing their accounts with the JASG-C Disbursing Officer. The overall audit objective was to provide assurance that DFI funds turned in by the Falluja DLA agreed with government records. It specifically looked at whether DoD polices and procedures for cash accountability and disposition were being complied with.



06-011	Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects	4,910 KB	April 29, 2006
	This report discusses management of the Primary Health Care Centers (PHC) construction project in response to a request by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division (GRD) and the U.S. Ambassador. As of March 6, 2006, approximately $186 million (about 77% of the definitized cost) was spent on the PHC project, over a two-year period, with little progress made. 8 of the 150 planned centers were descoped; 1 was placed under another contract vehicle; 135 were only partially constructed (with 121 subsequently "terminated for convenience"); and only 6 were accepted as completed by USACE GRD. However, there is also a strong commitment among the Iraqi and U.S government managers to complete the 121 partially completed centers. Both governments are developing a plan and attempting to identify the required funds to finalize these centers for the benefit of the Iraqi citizens.



06-010	Review of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Reconciliation of the Iraqi Armed Forces Seized Assets Fund	967 KB	April 28, 2006
	In response to a U.S. Army Audit Agency (USAAA) recommendation, MNSTC-I requested that SIGIR conduct an extended review of the MNSTC-I internal review and reconciliation of the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) Seized Assets Fund and associated financial disbursing documents to determine whether there were any issues warranting further investigation. During this review, SIGIR noted indications of potential fraud and referred those matters to the SIGIR Assistant Inspector General for Investigations for action. Related investigations are continuing.



06-009	Review of Task Force Shield Programs	2,014 KB	April 28, 2006
	This report addressed the U.S.- led effort, implemented by Task Force Shield, from September 2003 through April 2005, to build the capacity of the Iraqi government to protect its oil and electrical infrastructure.



06-008	Development Fund for Iraq-Cash Accountability Review: Joint Area Support Group-Central	997 KB	April 28, 2006
	This audit discusses the accountability for DFI cash controlled by the JASG-C Comptroller, who also serves as the DFI Account Manager. The overall audit objective was to provide assurance that funds on hand agreed with government records. SIGIR specifically looked at whether DoD polices and procedures for controlling cash and cash expenditures were being followed and whether the procedures were adequate given existing conditions.



06-007	U.S. Agency for International Development: Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government	1,823 KB	April 29, 2006
	This audit focused specifically on asset recognition and transfer policies and procedures used by USAID. SIGIR recommended that USAID, in coordination with IRMO, complete the development of a common policy and process facilitating the transfer of completed project assets to the Iraqi government. USAID did not concur with SIGIR's recommendation.



06-006	Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq: Management of the Transfer of IRRF-funded Assets to the Iraqi Government	929 KB	April 29, 2006
	The overall objective of this audit was to determine whether the U.S. government organizations responsible for managing IRRF projects have developed and approved policies and procedures for transferring the billions of dollars of assets—purchased, renovated, and constructed with IRRF funds—to the Iraqi government and its citizens. This audit focused specifically on asset recognition and transfer policies and procedures used by MNSTC-I.



06-005	Follow-up on Recommendations Made in SIGIR Audit Reports Related to Management and Control of the Development Fund for Iraq	879 KB	April 28, 2006
	In a series of SIGIR reports addressing the use of the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) for relief and reconstruction activities, SIGIR determined that improvements could be made in overall control and accountability for contracts, grants, and cash transactions using the DFI, and made recommendations for such improvements. This report follows up on those recommendations to determine if appropriate corrective actions were taken to address the deficiencies. SIGIR concluded the actions taken or underway on the prior recommendations to be responsive and, as a result, makes no further recommendations.



06-004	Changes in Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program Activities-October through December 2005	852 KB	April 28, 2006
	In January 2006, SIGIR reported on the challenges faced by the Department of State (DoS) in directing and supervising IRRF program activities. That report focused on changes that occurred in the original U.S. reconstruction plans from November 2003 to September 30, 2005. This report updates the earlier SIGIR report to include project changes that occurred between October 1, 2005 and December 31, 2005.



06-003	Review of Data Entry and General Controls in the Collecting and Reporting of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	1,493 KB	April 28, 2006
	The objective of this audit was to determine whether policies, procedures, and internal controls established by U.S. government organizations ensure valid and reliable data for effective management of Iraq reconstruction projects. Specifically, this report addresses internal control procedures used to assure integrity of data entering the IRMS and the general controls relating to the IRMS system itself. The review did not address controls over individual applications within IRMS.



06-002	Prompt Payment Act: Analysis of Expenditures Made From the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	921 KB	February 3, 2006
	This audit report discusses the management and payment of interest penalties incurred from provisions of the Prompt Payment Act by U.S. government organizations responsible for managing the IRRF. The objective of this audit was to determine whether expenditures by U.S. government organizations responsible for the management of the IRRF were made in compliance with the Prompt Payment Act and other applicable policies and regulations.



06-001	Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program: The Evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System	1,730 KB	April 24, 2006
	The objective of this audit was to determine whether information systems used by U.S. government organizations support the effective management of IRRF programs. Specifically, this audit focused on the development and evolution of the information management system intended to support all organizations for the reporting of IRRF project and funding information.



05-029	Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Activities	896 KB	January 26, 2006
	This audit discusses the challenges faced by Department of State in carrying out IRRF program activities. The objectives of this audit were to determine the effectiveness of U.S. agencies in carrying out plans for Iraq reconstruction activities, and identify the reasons, if any, for changes in the plans. SIGIR found that although significant progress has been made in developing Iraq's infrastructure, the United States will not complete all of the projects it originally planned to construct through its Iraq relief and reconstruction program.



05-028	GRD-PCO Management of the Transfer of IRRF-funded Assets to the Government of Iraq 05-028	1,109 KB	January 23, 2006
	This report is one in a series that discusses the management by U.S. government organizations in the transfer of completed reconstruction projects to the Iraqi government. The objective of this audit was to determine whether the U.S. government organizations responsible for managing IRRF projects have developed and approved policies and procedures for transferring the billions of dollars of assets purchased, renovated, and constructed with IRRF funds to the Iraq's government and its citizens. SIGIR found that GRD-PCO has recognized the need for formal asset recognition and transfer policies and procedures, and is working to resolve the issue.



05-027	Methodologies for Reporting Cost-to-complete Estimates	2,910 KB	January 27, 2006
	This report is one in a series of reports that addresses the reporting of cost-to-complete information, and discusses the need for improvements to the processes and procedures used to estimate and report the cost-to-complete projects funded by the IRRF. SIGIR found that the Department of Defense, Gulf Region Division-Project and Contracting Office (GRD-PCO), Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), and USAID failed to estimate and report reliable and transparent cost-to-complete information for IRRF projects in the Facilities and Transportation sector.



05-026	Issues Related to the Use of $50 Million Appropriation to Support the Management and Reporting of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	41.5 KB	January 27, 2006
	This fact sheet discusses the use of the $50 million appropriation earmarked to support the management and reporting of the IRRF. SIGIR determined that the $50 million was initially apportioned by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to the Department of Defense (DoD) as "Operating Expenses of the Coalition Provisional Authority." Given that earmarked funding of $23.8 million may have been spent on other than intended purposes, Congress may wish to direct Department of State to provide a full accounting of the funding to show how this money was spent on the preparation, maintenance, monitoring, and reporting requirements of P.L. 108-106, as amended.



05-025	Management of the Commander's Emergency Response Program for Fiscal Year 2005	1,157 KB	January 23, 2006
	This audit discussed the management of $718 million allocated to the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) for use in FY 2005 for the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) to support Operation Iraqi Freedom. SIGIR found that MNF-I had made considerable progress to improve the management of the CERP. However, SIGIR found that the project data MNF-I used to track the progress of projects and reconcile funds with higher headquarter units contained several errors, and MNF-I units still did not fully comply with requirements for project records.



05-024	Management of the Mansuria Electrical Reconstruction Project	1,288 KB	January 23, 2006
	This audit evaluated the effectiveness of project management, and the monitoring and controls over this project by USAID and IRMO. Specifically, SIGIR reviewed the approval, planning, monitoring, and cancellation of the Mansuria Project.



05-023	Management of Rapid Regional Response Program Contracts in South-Central Iraq	1,238 KB	January 23, 2006
	This audit report is one in a series of reports addressing controls over cash, contract management, and grants management for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) South-Central Region. The overall audit objective was to determine whether disbursing officers in selected locations in southern Iraq complied with applicable guidance and properly controlled and accounted for DFI cash assets and expenditures. During the audit, SIGIR observed deficiencies in contract award documentation and expanded the scope to determine whether CPA South-Central Region personnel properly managed contracts.



05-022	Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs	834 KB	October 24, 2005
	The audit found that the Iraq government is not yet prepared to take over the near or long-term management and funding of the infrastructure developed through IRRF projects.



05-021	Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs - Cost-to-Complete Estimate Reporting	799 KB	October 24, 2005
	The audit found that PCO, USAID and MNSTC-I did not provide reasonably comprehensive cost-to-complete data to IRMO until recently. The IG recommends that future reports include information on changes to project baselines.



05-020	Management of the Contracts, Grant, and Micro-Purchases Used To Rehabilitate the Karbala Library	1,489 KB	October 26, 2005
	This audit report is one of a series of reports addressing controls over cash, contract management, and grant management for the Coalition Provisional Authority South-Central Region. This audit report discusses the deficiencies in the Coalition Provisional Authority South-Central Region's process for managing 5 contracts, 1 grant, and 33 micro-purchase contracts awarded for more than $2.1 million for the rehabilitation of the Karbala Library (the Library).



05-019	Attestation Engagement Concerning the Award of Non-Competitive Contract DACA63-03-D-0005 to Kellogg, Brown, and Root Services, Inc.	865 KB	September 30, 2005
	The audit was performed to assess whether disbursements of DFI funds for non-competitive contracts awarded to Brown and Root Services were consistent with the transparency provision and that sufficient documentation existed to justify a non-competitive award.



05-018	Acquisition of Armored Vehicles Purchased Through Contract W914NS-05-M-1189	884 KB	October 21, 2005
	The audit was performed to determine whether adequate procurement practices were used to acquire the vehicles and whether the government received appropriate value for the money spent on the vehicles. The audit found that the vehicles did not have the level of armored protection required.



05-017	Award Fee Process for Contractors Involved in Iraq Reconstruction	1,644 KB	October 25, 2005
	The audit was performed to determine whether award fees provided to contractors performing IRRF -funded projects are adequately reviewed, properly approved, sufficiently substantiated, and awarded according to established standards.



05-016	Management of the Contracts and Grants Used To Construct and Operate the Babylon Police Academy	1,489 KB	October 26, 2005
	This audit report is one of a series of reports addressing controls over cash, contract management, and grant management for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) South-Central Region. This audit report discusses the deficiencies in the CPA South-Central Region's process for managing 11 contracts, 4 grants, and 1 grant modification awarded for the establishment and operation of the Babylon Police Academy (the Academy).



05-015	Management of Rapid Regional Response Program Grants in South-Central Iraq	1,329 KB	October 26, 2005
	The audit was performed to determine whether disbursing officers in southern Iraq complied with applicable guidance and properly controlled and accounted for Development Fund for Iraq cash assets and expenditures.



05-014	Management of Commanders' Emergency Response Program for Fiscal Year 2004	52 KB	October 13, 2005
	The audit was performed to evaluate the adequacy of controls over CERP funds with regard to allocation procedures, whether used for intended purposes and accuracy of financial records.



05-013	Controls Over Equipment Acquired by Security Contractors	51 KB	September 9, 2005
	The audit was performed to determine whether controls over equipment acquired by security contractors were established, implemented and are effective.



05-012	Policies and Procedures Used for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Project Management Construction Quality Assurance	325 KB	July 22, 2005




05-011	Cost-to-Complete Estimates and Financial Reporting for the Management of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	550 KB	July 26, 2005




05-010	Interim Briefing to the Project and Contracting Office - Iraq and the Joint Contracting Command - Iraq on the Audit of the Award Fee Process	620 KB	July 26, 2005




05-009	Reconciliation of Reporting Differences of the Source of Funds Used on Contracts After June 28, 2004	195 KB	July 8, 2005




05-008	Administration of Contracts Funded by the Development Fund of Iraq	2,233 KB	April 30, 2005




05-007	Administration of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Contract Files	1,921 KB	April 30, 2005




05-006	Control of Cash Provided to South-Central Iraq	867 KB	April 30, 2005




05-005	Compliance with Contract No. W911S0-04-C-003 Awarded to Aegis Defense Services Limited	618 KB	April 20, 2005




05-004	CORRECTED - Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the National Budget Process	1,993 KB	January 30, 2005




05-003	Memorandum Report regarding audit of Task Order 0044 of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program III Contract	311 KB	November 23, 2004




05-002	Accountability and Control of Materiel Assets of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Kuwait	755 KB	October 25, 2004




05-001	Coalition Provisional Authority Control of Appropriated Funds	97.5 KB	October 22, 2004




04-013	Coalition Provisional Authority's Contracting Processes Leading Up to and Including Contract Award	300 KB	July 27, 2004




04-011	Audit of the Accountability and Control of Materiel Assets of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad	672 KB	July 26, 2004




04-009	Coalition Provisional Authority Comptroller Cash Management Controls Over the Development Fund for Iraq	404 KB	July 28, 2004




04-008	Coalition Provisional Authority Control Over Seized and Vested Assets	102 KB	July 30, 2004




04-007	Oil for Food Cash Controls for the Office of Project Coordination in Erbil, Iraq	272 KB	July 26, 2004




04-006	Corporate Governance for Contractors Performing Iraq Reconstruction Efforts	206 KB	July 21, 2004




04-005	Award of Sector Design-Build Construction Contracts	579 KB	July 23, 2004




04-004	Task Orders Awarded by the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence in Support of the Coalition Provisional Authority	430 KB	July 28, 2004




04-003	Federal Deployment Center Forward Operations at the Kuwait Hilton	133 KB	June 25, 2004




04-002	Management of Personnel Assigned to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad	88 KB	June 25, 2004




04-001	Coalition Provisional Authority Coordination of Donated Funds	270 KB	June 25, 2004




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